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This thesis analyses decision making through the lens of behavioural economics.  
The three essays within consider variants of adverse selection problems and 
psychological biases which can manifest from imperfections in an information 
structure. The predominant psychological theory is informed by the idea of bounded 
awareness; one’s tendency to make suboptimal decisions through overlooking 
important information. 
The first essay concerns the winner’s curse in bargaining. The second essay assesses 
bidding behaviour in an auction environment. The third essay considers disclosure 
decisions. The general findings are as follows: 
(i) Research on the winner’s curse grew significantly since 1980 and peaked in 
2009. The seminal work of William Samuelson and Max Bazerman in 1985 
extended the concept to a new domain of bilateral bargaining and inspired 
fifteen further experimental studies. I demonstrate that costless nonbinding 
signals complicate decision-making but that alternative forms of cheap talk 
do not statistically influence bidding strategies. Secondly, I show that 
individuals find it challenging to strategically avoid information, exhibiting 
difficulties in performing contingent reasoning in bargaining. 
 
(ii) Analysing bidding efficiencies in high stakes and competitive auctions, I find 
that 80% of thoroughbred foals sold realise negative returns. The scale of 
losses is amplified as winning bids increase. On average, once a winning bid 
increases above €20,000, the assets enter the domain of losses. Incompatible 
incentives between stakeholders and diversification strategies fail to explain 
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the inefficiencies. Although multiple interpretations of the findings exist, the 
results are consistent with the winner’s curse hypothesis and incompatible 
with the idea of profit maximisation. 
 
(iii) Investigating the unravelling principle in the hospitality industry, I find that 
the strict equilibrium prediction does not occur. A partial unravelling result is 
reported. The major finding is that a downward linear relationship exists 
between TripAdvisor signals and voluntary disclosures by hotels. Low 
ranked hotels tend to hide ratings information. Higher rank hotels are more 
likely to make a voluntary disclosure when compared to the lowest ranked. 















This thesis consists of three essays in behavioural economics. The aim of the essays 
is to provide an original contribution to knowledge in this sub-field. Generally, I 
consider strategic decision making and appeal to models of, and concepts relating to, 
adverse selection. Specifically, I consider projection biases in bargaining, auction 
and consumption settings which exhibit alternative informational properties. In many 
respects, the bargaining, bidding and consumption settings considered within this 
thesis represent examples of the basic activities of economic life (Camerer, 2003)1. 
As the interactions explored throughout the three essays are characterised by 
interdependent parties, joint decision making strategies and alternative preferences, 
the general theme of this work is classified as negotiator cognition (Bazerman & 
Moore, 2009).  
Each essay represents an interdisciplinary project, drawing on both the disciplines of 
economics and psychology. Thus, the thesis straddles classifications. It falls under 
the remit of Behavioral Microeconomics (JEL: D03) but can extend to both a 
classification of Asymmetric and Private Information (JEL: D82) and Game Theory 
and Bargaining Theory (JEL: C7).  The markets studied are diverse. The thesis 
therefore has specific applications to, and implications for, niche industries and 
research areas. Examples include the tourism and sports industries.  
This introduction serves four purposes. Section 1.1 outlines the scope of the three 
essays by suggesting unifying features of the content. This places boundaries on the 
subject matter. I focus on defining the most important psychological and economic 
                                                          
1 While the terms ‘bargaining’ and ‘negotiation’ are used interchangeably throughout this thesis, the 
former term was historically reserved for purely economic research while the latter emerged from 
research in applied psychology. A common distinction is that the latter often involves an unstructured 
approach to bargaining.    
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concepts that tie the essays together. Section 1.2 describes the overarching 
philosophical standpoint of the thesis, demarcating an explicit scientific approach. 
This provides a brief opportunity to address epistemological issues. Section 1.3 
outlines the broad goals of the thesis and offers a general rationale, detailing the 
motivating factors for the research in light of historical and recent developments in 
behavioural economics and information economics. In particular, this section offers 
an opportunity to discuss why the topics within this thesis are worthy of study, 
certifying the purpose and relevance of the research area. The final objective of the 
introduction is to provide a practical guide for what is to follow. This is included as 
the thesis contains diverse methods, data sources and domains of study. Section 1.4 
offers a brief overview of the methods and data used while Section 1.5 provides a 
synopsis of three essays2. Section 1.6 explains the form and structure of the essays. 
This involves providing practical information on the timeline of the thesis and 
background information relating to how the essay topics were generated. 
1.1 Scope 
It is important to identify unifying features within the essays and to set boundaries to 
the content of this thesis. While the settings studied throughout are diverse, ranging 
from simulated experimental markets to natural auction and market environments, 
the content is unified by distinct psychological and economic theory.  Each essay 
assesses a scenario where adverse selection problems arise and considers resulting 
psychological biases which can manifest from imperfections in an information 
structure. The target environments in essay two and three, which may appear diverse 
on first inspection, are carefully selected and studied to ensure they provide an 
                                                          
2 The precise implications of the individual essays and the exact contributions to knowledge do not 
occur here and are reserved for each essay. 
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appropriate setting. The two unifying features are discussed now, beginning with the 
psychological theory.  
Bounded Awareness 
The psychological insights imported to study the scenarios addressed in the 
forthcoming essays are drawn from research on bounded awareness, applied to 
economic settings (Chugh & Bazerman, 2007). Bounded awareness occurs when an 
individual fails to perceive and use information that is important to making a choice 
or excludes information by placing “arbitrary and dysfunctional bounds” around the 
definition of a problem (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011 p.7).  As a behavioural bias, 
bounded awareness can be placed alongside a wider family of other failures of visual 
awareness such as change blindness (Simons & Levin, 1997; Simons & Rensink, 
2005) and inattentional blindness (Simons & Chabris, 1999).  
The basic concept has overlapping features with other behavioural biases, most 
notably, the availability bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). As suggested by 
Bazerman and Moore (2009 p.61) “both concepts confront the fact that important 
information often remains unavailable to the decision maker”. The distinguishing 
feature of bounded awareness is that it “examines the specific groups of variables 
that are likely to be in or out of focus in specified domains”. For this thesis, the 
information content held by another agent is the variable “out of focus”.   
Table 1.1 demonstrates how the overarching psychological concept of bounded 
awareness is applicable to each essay. Each of the three applications involve the 
general failure of perspective taking.  
17 
 
Table 1.1 Bounded Awareness by Essay 
 
As Thaler (1992 p.62) surmises “the key ingredient is the existence of a cognitive 
illusion, a mental task that induces a substantial majority of subjects to make a 
systematic error…whenever such an illusion can be demonstrated, the possibility 
that market outcomes will diverge from the predictions of economic theory is 
present”. This thesis argues that such errors are common in the economic contexts 
identified in Table 1.1. 
 Thus, the theme of negotiator cognition, with an emphasis on how decision makers 
interact with an information environment, often naively, will surface across the 
markets examined. Although it is important to note that ideas relating to individuals 
facing limitations in the amount of information they can process is old, a 
contemporary review of the findings relating solely to judgemental failures in a 
negotiation context is provided by Bazerman and Chugh (2005)3.  
Adverse Selection – The Basics & Variants 
An investigation of bounded awareness, insofar as it concerns adverse section 
problems, is the primary focus of this thesis. The potential for adverse selection 
effects is an important feature of the three domains researched. While the thesis 
predominantly concerns variants of the basic adverse selection problem initially 
                                                          
3 Simon (1955) represents a notable early identification of the general problem at hand.     
Essay Economic Context Bounded Awareness 
Essay 1 Bilateral Bargain 
Individuals may fail to make rational strategic inferences 
based on the information structure of a game. 
Essay 2 Auction 





Individuals may fail to observe or underestimate the 
implication of non-disclosure of quality information. 
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conceived by Akerlof (1970), it is important to define the class of situations adverse 
selection seeks to address. This is required as the variants I explore hold key 
properties of the original and simple problem (Ball, Bazerman & Carroll, 1991). 
In lay terms, adverse selection involves lying during a negotiation in an attempt to 
further one’s own interests. Private information, that is asymmetric, is a precondition 
of such behaviour4. This intuition is premised on a standard economic account of 
exchange which implies that if sellers and buyers have opposing incentives, a seller 
will pursue profit by selling products that are inexpensive to produce at the highest 
price possible. Oppositely, consumers desire the highest quality goods in light of 
their preferences and budget constraints. When this incentive structure is 
accompanied by unequal knowledge of product quality between a buyer and a seller, 
opportunistic behaviours can emerge. Despite the presence of incompatible 
incentives an agreement could be reached that leaves both parties better off. 
In contrast to the intuitive description of the problem, a technical definition of 
adverse selection conceives it as pre-contractual opportunism characterised by an 
informed agent benefiting from a trade or contract with a less informed agent, who is 
not privy to unobserved characteristics. This general problem of adverse selection 
has a distinct market implication; Pareto inefficiencies can come about as a 
consequence of an information environment characterised by latent private 
information and thus unobservable quality. A Walrasian equilibrium is not reached 
as asymmetric information exists (Molho, 1997)5.  
                                                          
4 Asymmetric information can also lead to problems in markets outside of adverse selection, most 
notably, moral hazard (post-contractual opportunism). 
5 Molho (1997) provides a formal statement of the model described. 
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This abstract logic has a general application, a characteristic which determined the 
influence of Akerlof’s (1970) contribution (Sandmo, 2011). The appeal of the model 
lies in its ability to invite one to infer that similar processes, where exchange is 
positively related to the symmetry of information, can occur across markets. While 
the assumptions underpinning the model are restrictive, they represent human 
motivations and behaviour as it occurs in ‘real world’ markets (Sugden, 2000). 
To overcome this type of information problem both parties in a trade typically enter 
a negotiation, adopting strategic mechanisms to avoid impasse and achieve gains 
from trade. In its most basic form this negotiation is a process of “managing 
information in order to resolve conflicts of interest” (Lewicki & Polin, 2013 p.176). 
This practise occurs as individuals deem negotiation a more efficient means to 
resolve a dilemma than acting independently.  
The three variations of adverse selection investigated throughout this thesis are 
derived from this core problem and are sketched below.  
The Winner’s Curse in Bilateral Bargaining  
The first version of adverse selection in Essay One relates to an experimental model 
of the problem identified by Akerlof (1970). The form of adverse selection evaluated 
is considered extreme as it is premised on a strict prediction derived from an 
experimental model. In this model, a normative analysis predicts that the decision-
maker should refrain from entering a negotiation in light of the structure of the trade 
faced. Past research suggests that individuals commonly suffer from the winner’s 
curse in these bilateral bargains and naively bid when presented with an extreme 
‘lemons’ problem. The form of information asymmetry is pure as there is no way for 
a decision maker to learn valuable information without engaging a more informed 
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party. In Essay One, this model is reviewed and manipulated to produce insights 
from both the buyer and seller side of a negotiation.  
Auction Environments & Adverse Selection 
The second essay explores high-stakes and competitive auctions which have strict 
and unique information conditions. Namely, no leakages of information regarding 
the true value of the asset are possible at the time of sale. This is a context in which 
the winner’s curse was first conceived and provides a relatively appropriate target 
environment to consider bidding strategies involving experienced bidders. Thaler 
(1988) provides an accessible introduction to the topic of naïve bidding in the 
context of auctions and Harrington (2009) details a formal model of the problem. 
The setting is carefully chosen and represents a relatively rare opportunity to analyse 
bidding in an auction environment where the true value can be assigned to an asset 
ex-post.  
The Unravelling Principle & Adverse Selection  
The third essay considers the potential for adverse selection in spite of competitive 
market pressures initiating a signalling mechanism. I suggest that partial unravelling 
can form a fertile environment for adverse selection in light of cognitive limitations 
faced by consumers. These bounds on consumer reasoning are informed by 
psychological theory. In theory, consumers should make smart inferences when non-
disclosure occurs. I challenge these inferences imposed on consumers. In turn, this 
has ethical implications relating to disclosure decisions for firms. An intuitive 
explanation of the unravelling results is offered by Frank (1988) and most recently in 
a consumer context by Sah and Read (2017a). The most recent formal treatment of 
information revelation and the unravelling result is provided by (Riley, 2012). 
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Table 1.2 details the nature of the information environment for the three essays, 
providing an explanation of how each problem explored deviates from the basic 
adverse selection model.  
Table 1.2 Adverse Selection – Variations & Description by Essay 
Essay  
No. of 
Agents Economic Context 
Information 
Environment Explanation 
Essay 1 2 Bilateral Bargain 
Pure Information 
Asymmetry 
Sellers have a distinct 
information advantage 
over buyers - a 
extreme version as 
selective acceptance 
will occur, resulting in 
losses on average 
Essay 2 ≥2 Auction 
Impure Information 
Asymmetry 
Partial but strictly 
limited knowledge of 
the true value is 
known by both sellers 
and buyers  





Sellers have full 
knowledge of their 
quality. While this is 
accessible to buyers, 
they may or may not 




1.2 A Brief Epistemological Note 
As a sub-discipline, behavioural economics proposes limits on human rationality in 
general domains. Two specific findings stand out which are important to this thesis. 
The first concerns general constraints on the level of strategic thinking humans can 
reach. A second relates to individuals’ imperfect understanding and interpretation of 
game-theoretic situations. In the main, the findings suggest that (i) individuals fail to 
practise optimal strategic reasoning and, (ii) individuals fail to interpret game-
theoretic scenarios appropriately. These results are based on empirically grounded 




This thesis follows a similar scientific approach by considering these confines; 
rational choice and logical outcomes are often the starting point of analysis 
(Kahneman, 2003; Sent, 2004). By anchoring decision making on rational choice, 
one has an expository device to investigate deviations from optimal decision-
making. This is the tradition in which this thesis proceeds. In the context of the 
essays that follow, rational choice is commonly defined by an agent’s ability to make 
appropriate strategic inferences.  
Although many parts of the thesis consider behavioural biases, rational choice is a 
powerful analytical tool. It can classify criteria for normative decision-making and 
offers a valuable methodological instrument to study psychological variables 
important to adverse selection. By appreciating rational choice, one has a clearer 
prediction of excepted behaviour. Rational theories act as a yardstick from which to 
measure systematic deviations. As a scientific approach, this method can be labelled 
as an error-based style to researching decision making.  
As is the intention with the vast majority of research in behavioural economics (that 
follows a similar methodological approach), this thesis does not aim to displace any 
incumbent microeconomic theory or invalidate game theoretic constructs. 
Commonly, the falsification of normative theory through experimental means, or 
otherwise, in the social sciences has an alternative end to that of the natural sciences 
as it allows for the modification of a theory in light of new evidence. Consequently, 
researchers can improve the descriptive and/or predictive capacity of models. As 
Smith, (1994, P.129) suggests “when a theory works well, they [experimental 
economists] push imaginatively to find deliberately destructive experiments that will 
uncover its edges of validity, setting the stage for better theory and a better 
understanding”. This is a common sentiment advocated by thinkers in the field.  A 
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similar claim is expressed by Camerer (2003), who implies that the goal of 
experimenting with and testing game-theoretic models is not to refute 
microeconomic theory but rather to improve its explanatory power and predictive 
capacity to inspire new theory. When novel findings that deviate from strict 
predictions are observed, the idealised rational choice model becomes more 
descriptively complex and less driven by theoretical impositions. ‘Failures’ or 
‘errors’, can reveal a representative agent of greater dimensionality.  
In sum, the purpose of identifying idiosyncrasies in decision making is not intended 
to be a substitute but rather a complement to the traditional tools of the social 
scientist. The representative agent, embedded in textbooks, can become “a more 
rounded and interesting ‘fatter’ character – a man who can learn, bargain, act 
strategically, has memory, and may even be happy” (Morgan, 2012 p.166). 
1.3 A General Rationale  
The roots of the intellectual connection between psychology and economic theory 
concerning information are deep. The confluence of the themes are arguably the 
basis of one of the most important works in economics (Akerlof & Yellen, 1987)6. 
Since the 1960’s, following the initial relaxation of the perfect information 
assumption (Stigler, 1961), economists have paid increasing attention to the role of 
information in markets. They have focussed on information’s form, absence, and 
mechanism of communication. A specific focus has been placed on how one’s access 
to information should be an important determinant in decision-making. The 
application of theories emerging from this paradigm of research have varied over 
                                                          
6 George Akerlof and Yanet Yellen (1987) draw an explicit connection between the contributions of 
John Maynard Keynes in his General Theory of Employment Interest and Money to findings on 
informational biases.  
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time, with the most prominent extensions arising in the domains of labour and 
finance (Lofgren, Persson, & Weibull, 2002). A fusion with psychological concepts 
is a natural extension.  
Pursuing research at this intersection is not reserved to the contribution of landmark 
historical works. It is important to stress that this intersection has been identified as 
worthy of fresh insights by contemporary thinkers (Stiglitz, 2002; Akerlof, 2002)7. 
The need to use psychology to highlight and develop upon the failures of 
information economics, which commonly applies rational models, is a ripe research 
area (Stiglitz, 2017). With such ideals in mind, this thesis seeks to increase the 
precision of association between microeconomic models, insofar as they concern 
information, and psychology. Strengthening these connections and providing an 
increasingly precise and psychologically plausible description of individual 
behaviour in specific markets is the primary motivation for this thesis.  
Pursuing this goal involves following a distinctly empirical approach. For the field 
studies (Essay Two and Essay Three) there is a specific emphasis placed on building 
sizeable datasets to allow increasingly precise measurement. Sections of literature, as 
seen in Essay One, are also data driven. This is a core goal of the thesis - developing 
and strengthening the connection between psychological approaches in economics 
by providing unique datasets that are unrivalled in terms of their size by previous 
research in the specific markets under analysis. 
Another broad motivation for this thesis is to conduct research in a nascent area in 
behavioural economics. As a branch of the research agenda, spaces such as the 
                                                          
7 This is particularly pertinent given that the intellectual backdrop in economics that is favouring 
‘softer’ regulatory measures, involving information provision and disclosure policies, as solutions to 
economic problems characterised by misaligned incentives (Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, 
O'Donoghue & Rabin, 2003; Sah, Cain & Loewenstein, 2013). 
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(behavioural) economics of disclosure, which are intrinsically linked to the impact of 
information, have recently been identified as underdeveloped and worthy of further 
psychological insights (Loewenstein, Sunstein & Golman, 2014).  In particular, the 
systematic occurrence of bounded awareness has been argued as an underexplored 
aspect of judgmental failure in this context (Bazerman & Chugh, 2005). The 
unfledged nature of this branch of the research agenda is an attractive feature and 
served as another general motivating factor. 
A final motivating factor is to offer practical insights to specific industries. As past 
research has shown, conducting analysis at the intersection of psychology, 
information and economics holds everyday implications in many settings. In 
particular, the insights can usually be applied to a managerial setting (Bazerman & 
Moore, 2009; Goldfarb, Ho, Amaldoss, Brown, Chen, Cui, & Xiao, 2012). The 
findings in Essay Two and Essay Three have practical applications to the sports and 
tourism industry. Essay Two has specific implications for the thoroughbred 
horseracing industry. As Essay Three concerns consumer decision-making, the 
findings offer a basis to inform policy, a common end goal of behavioural decision 
research (Milkman, Chugh & Bazerman, 2009).   
1.4 Methods & Data 
Two methods of investigation are adopted, both of which are empirically based. The 
first method is grounded on experimental tests. These seek to simulate a controlled 
negotiation environment. Later parts of Essay One incrementally change an 
experimental adverse selection model. This is operationalised in an experimental 
setting with the aim of testing new hypotheses. Secondly, as the later essays consist 
of field studies, traditional regression analysis is used as a method of investigation. 
These approaches involve estimating differences and causal relationships using a 
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variety of statistical and econometric techniques. The methods are applied to datasets 
which are assembled manually over the course of the thesis. Specifically, the 
econometric analysis involves using Quantile and Huber regression models (Essay 
Two) and Binary Response Models in light of a disclosure decision being a 
dependent variable (Essay Three). 
Data for this thesis are derived from multiple sources. In Essay One, data are 
acquired through individual choice tasks in an experimental setting. Bibliographic 
data are also accessed when surveying the topic of the winner’s curse in bilateral 
bargaining. For Essay Two and Essay Three data are sourced from online resources. 
These data are extracted via a manual page ‘web scraping’ method. This involved 
extracting publically available information and transferring it into a local dataset to 
make it amenable to analysis. The second essay and third essay involve the 
construction of expansive datasets to consider naturally occurring markets. This 
encompasses the assembly of detailed information on 1,681 (Essay Two) and 4,357 
(Essay Three) observations, respectively. Both datasets are constructed in an effort to 
align laboratory conditions with relatively appropriate target environments. In and of 
themselves, these datasets offer a contribution due to their uniqueness.  
1.5 An Overview of the Forthcoming Essays 
This section provides a synopsis of the forthcoming essays. This is intended to 
outline the highlights of each essay and provide an abstract to the forthcoming work. 
Essay 1 - Thirty Years of Acquiring Companies: A Review of the Winner’s Curse in 
Bilateral Bargaining 




 Optimal bidding strategies are typically adopted by under 10% of 
participants.  
 Opportunities to learn have a minimal effect on bidding strategies.  
 Training and group decision making can soften the bias.  
 I conduct two small-scale experiments to investigate the influence of (i) 
cheap talk and (ii) seller’s ability to strategically avoid information. 
This essay contributes to the behavioural science literature by synthesising and 
reviewing experimental tests of the winner’s curse in the setting of bilateral 
bargaining. Since the original findings of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), fifteen 
further studies have experimentally tested the phenomenon in the extended domain 
of bilateral bargaining.  Following thirty years of research on the problem, this study 
considers the origins of the bias and assesses the robustness of naive bidding 
behaviour. Extensions to the basic experimental model which address the impact of 
learning and communication are reviewed before alternative explanations for 
suboptimal bidding are considered. I discuss several applications of the adverse 
selection problem and conduct two small-scale experiments to provide insights to 
both buyer and seller psychology in the game.  
Essay 2 - Winner Alright? High-Stakes Bidding and Returns to Ownership in the UK 
and Irish Thoroughbred Horseracing Industry 
 80% of the assets sold at auction realise negative returns.  
 Once a winning auction bid increases above €20,000, on average, the assets 
enter the domain of losses.  
 This scale of loss is amplified as winning bids increase. 
 Incompatible incentives and diversification strategies fail to explain the 
inefficiencies. 
 Although multiple interpretations of the findings exist, the results are 
consistent with the Winner’s Curse hypothesis. 
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This essay conducts an ex-post productivity evaluation of 1,681 thoroughbred foals 
sold between 2007 and 2008 in high-stakes UK and Irish public auctions. Such 
auctions offer a unique natural context to study competitive bidding behaviour as 
each assets yield can be measured. The results provide empirical weight to a 
commonly held belief - a high percentage of thoroughbreds incur net negative 
returns. The scale of losses is amplified as winning auction bids increase. Huber 
(robust) and quantile regression models are estimated to determine the factors 
associated with each assets net returns. Alternative behavioural arguments, to explain 
the inefficiencies, are given consideration. These do little to explicate the losses. In 
light of the findings, I offer conjectural explanations for the pattern that can form the 
basis of further research. 
Essay 3 - Unravelling & Strategic Disclosure: Evidence from the Hospitality 
Industry 
 I study the frequency of voluntary TripAdvisor disclosures by hoteliers 
regionally and internationally. 
 Contrary to a strict unravelling result, an incomplete level of disclosure is 
observed. 
 A linear relationship is detected with lower ranked hotels displaying a 
tendency to veil their TripAdvisor rating. 
 Two additional datasets allow one to probe emerging questions relating to the 
sales medium and consumer expectations. 
I consider strategic disclosure and test the unravelling principle in a new market by 
analysing TripAdvisor rating admissions made by hoteliers internationally and 
regionally (in the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland). I construct two unique 
datasets and verify disclosure decisions for 4,357 hotels across 22 locations globally. 
These measures are established from 4,060,830 TripAdvisor reviews. The major 
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finding is that a downward linear relationship exists between TripAdvisor scores and 
voluntary disclosures, both regionally and internationally. The strict equilibrium 
prediction, that all information will be revealed, does not occur. Whilst an 
unravelling process is initiated through the disclosure of high-quality signals, a 
substantial degree of low level disclosure fails to transpire. Evaluating interactions 
between TripAdvisor ratings and internal certification (star ratings) indicates that the 
latter may serve as a reference point for a disclosure decision. I compile two 
supplementary datasets to answer ancillary questions that arise from the primary 
findings. The first is from holiday catalogues and shows that TripAdvisor disclosures 
increase considerably in a simpler decision-making context where choices are easily 
comparable and non-disclosure is salient. The second is from Trustpilot - a nascent 
third-party signalling mechanism based on electronic word-of-mouth (eWOM). This 
data reveals a similar disclosure pattern in a domain where the expectation of a 
disclosure is questionable. The essay concludes by arguing that the findings have 
implications for guest experiences and ethics in the industry, given the challenges 
consumers face observing information gaps.   
1.6 Essay Background & Further Information 
The placement of the essays within this thesis reflect the chronological order in 
which the ideas were generated. The ideas explored in the first essay can be traced to 
conversations on the 14th of February 2014. The first essay characterises the first two 
academic years of doctoral research where experimental inquiry was the primary 
focus. In many respects, this first essay attempts to show evidence of a deep 
literature review and is based on research in earlier years of research. Included in this 
essay are two small-scale experiments that are a product of interesting questions 
arising during discussions of the adverse selection puzzle.  
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The second essay derived from theory important to Essay One. Learning about past 
experimental and field studies on the winner’s curse stimulated the idea for the 
second essay. In 2015, I focussed on finding appropriate target environments to 
consider naïve bidding strategies. Naturally, I also required a context where data was 
accessible. Essay Two commenced in 2015 and involved a significant period of data 
collection, cleaning and coding.  
The kernels of the third essay can be traced to the 18th of April 2016. This is when I 
was introduced to the unravelling principle during an MBA session in Warwick 
University. I commenced data collection for this essay in the summer of 2016 and 
extended data collection procedures in February and June 2017. Akin to Essay Two, 
Essay Three involved a significant time period for data collection, intensive coding 
and analysis.  
The thesis is concluded in section five. This conclusion reviews the major ideas and 
findings of the thesis and highlights general limitations and avenues for future 
research. While specific limitations and future lines of enquiry are included in each 
essay, the conclusion offers an opportunity to speak in generalities. 
One final point is of note. As the forthcoming essays represent individual research 







2. ESSAY ONE - THIRTY YEARS OF ACQUIRING COMPANIES: A 
REVIEW OF THE WINNER’S CURSE IN BILATERAL BARGAINING 
2.1 Introduction  
In 1985 William Samuelson and Max Bazerman demonstrated that individuals 
routinely earn sub-standard or negative returns by failing to anticipate the decision 
rule of better-informed negotiators using the Acquiring a Company game (AAC)8. 
Their experiment tasked decision-makers with an intellective puzzle, designed to 
illustrate the tension between the opportunity for mutual gain and the impact of 
asymmetric information. Theoretically, an information barrier brings a structural 
inefficiency to a bargain. Their application represented an explicit test of buyer 
rationality as assumed by Akerlof (1970) and signified an extension of the winner’s 
curse to a new setting - bilateral bargaining. As previously identified in the context 
of common value auctions, this expression - the winner’s curse - captures a 
behavioural outcome where individuals fail to account for an adverse selection 
problem embedded in success.   
Since the original findings of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) fifteen further studies 
have experimentally tested the winner’s curse using the AAC game9. These studies 
are important as they examine whether individuals can formulate a bidding strategy 
that is consistent with the standard economic theory of negotiation. A typical 
treatment of naïve bidding strategies classifies suboptimal bidding behaviour as a 
disequilibrium phenomenon (Kagel & Levin, 2008).  
Over a thirty-year period, a richer understanding of the curse in the domain of 
bilateral bargaining has emerged. The central finding is stark. Despite the presence 
                                                          
8 Occasionally this task is called the ‘Takeover Task/Game’ or the ‘Acquisition Problem’. 
9 While several unpublished manuscripts testing the phenomenon do exist, this essay only considers 
the results from published studies.  
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of asymmetric information, individuals regularly fail to foresee the perils of selective 
acceptance. Although a theoretical barrier exists to prevent mutually beneficial 
trades, decision makers often act as if information is symmetric. The repercussions 
of mistaking the decision rule of the seller results in consistently low and typically 
negative returns for negotiators, a propensity which naturally has a wholesale and 
practical application for organisations whom assumedly aim to negotiate rationally 
(Bazerman & Neale, 1992 chp.7).  
The purpose of this essay is to review the experimental tests of the winner’s curse in 
the setting of bilateral bargaining and synthesise prominent findings. A key 
contribution is to provide a current and precise assessment of the curse in this 
context, describing its robustness and explaining the direction of the research 
agenda. By tracing the development of this general projection bias, this essay can 
parallel other reviews of judgemental heuristics or rules of thumb which are 
important to the behavioural economics research agenda, all of which have been 
appraised after a significant period of research. These include the confirmation bias 
(Nickerson, 1998), framing on risky decisions (Kühberger, 1998), the hot-hand 
fallacy (after twenty years of research by Bar-Eli, Avugos, and Raab (2006)), the 
anchoring effect (after forty years of research by Furnham and Boo (2011)) and 
willingness to pay/accept gaps (after thirty years of research by Horowitz and 
McConnell (2002)). In particular, this essay can supplement literature on naïve 
bargaining by adding to the experimental survey of Kagel and Levin (2002) which 
focuses on the winner’s curse in the context of common value auction experiments.  
As Figure 2.1 would suggest, the general topic of the winner’s curse (in a variety of 
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domains) has become of increasing interest to researchers since the 1980’s10. An 
increasing trend (and increasing moving average) is observed until 2009. 
In addition, this study makes a contribution to the literature by conducting two 
small-scale experiments on the AAC problem from either side of the bargain. The 
first experiment provides insights to buyer psychology in the AAC task and 
questions whether ‘cheap talk’ or costly non-binding messages influence buyers. The 
second experiment probes seller rationality; the question of whether a seller can 
strategically avoid information is investigated.  
 
                                                          
10 A database of the academic publications on the winner’s curse is constructed via two online 
databases, Google Scholar and Ebsco. The data are collected between the 2nd and the 9th of November 
2015. A total of 418 journal articles referred to the winner’s curse. Unpublished manuscripts, working 
papers, newspaper articles and textbooks are not included. To warrant inclusion in the dataset, there 
must a specific reference to the concept and use of the term. The articles ranged from specific tests of 
the curse where complete studies consider its existence, to articles where the authors appeal to the 
winner’s curse to explain their results or refer to the concept, even though their original research 
question is not essentially addressing the bias. 11.8 articles have appeared on average per annum over 








Figure 2.1 Journal Articles Concerning the Winner's Curse: 1965-2014 
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The next section of this work briefly recounts the history of the winner’s curse and 
explains its evolution to the setting of bilateral bargaining. Section 2.3 illustrates the 
primary model developed to study the winner’s curse in the domain of bilateral 
bargaining. Section 2.4 considers the results from studies that have adopted the core 
model while section 2.5 analyses the findings from extended experimental research 
on the AAC game in three specific domains: learning, communication and causal 
mechanisms. Section 2.6 specifies applications of the problem. Section 2.7 details 
experiment I concerning buyer behaviour and section 2.8 details experiment II 
concerning seller behaviour.  
2.2 A Brief History of the Winner’s Curse  
The winner’s curse is the systematic tendency for individuals to overbid or follow 
naïve bidding strategies when the true value of an asset is unknown. The naming, 
and first explicit formal claim of the problem, was provided by three petroleum 
engineers in their influential study of bidding behaviour for oil and gas drilling rights 
in the Mexican gulf (Capen, Clapp & Campbell, 1971)11. The critical observation of 
Capen et al (1971) was that oil companies were cursed by overbidding for Outer 
Continental Shelf (OCS) leases during the 1960’s. These companies suffered 
unexpectedly poor returns over the decade. This was a frequent event, often 
happening on a yearly basis. A causal factor, critical to the problem’s occurrence, 
was that oil companies were ignoring the adverse selection problem inherent in 
winning an auction for oil rights, offering estimates for oil tracts based on 
                                                          
11 Antecedents of the problem do exist. The earliest insights, to my knowledge, can be traced to the 
PhD thesis of Donald H. Woods, under the supervision of Robert B. Wilson. Woods was the first to 
identify the central problem at hand for organisations (Woods, 1965).  
35 
 
unconditional expected values that did not adjust for tendering a successful bid. This 
finding was to have important implications for the research agenda.  
Analysing overbidding in the aftermath of oil lease auctions continued to attract the 
lion’s share of attention from researchers after the early contributions of Capen et al 
(e.g. Smith, 1982). However, the presence of alternative explanations and mixed 
evidence associated with field studies complicated the debate. Historically, the curse 
was a hotly disputed issue as observations of overbidding in naturally occurring 
markets encountered both data reliability problems and plausible alternative 
interpretations (Kagel & Levin, 2002). The motivation to conduct experimental 
studies on the winner’s curse was a consequence of the ambiguity associated with 
naturally occurring markets contexts (e.g. Kagel & Levin, 1986). This led to the rise 
of a substantial experimental literature testing whether participants make systematic 
judgment errors when bidding in competitive environments under uncertainty. The 
obvious advantage of an experimental method was the reduced number of confounds 
associated with the approach and the greater degree of control over environmental 
characteristics that cannot be accessed while studying naïve bidding strategies in the 
field. Laboratory experiments offered a mechanism to control and vary the value of 
the item for sale, the information structure and the number of bidders. In sum, the 
experimental method provided a strictly controlled environment to test whether the 
curse was a robust phenomenon (Roth, 1995).  
While the first mentions of the bias using experimental methods can be traced to 
Cox, Smith and Walker (1983), the first specific experimental test can be found in 
Bazerman and Samuleson (1983). The aptly named I Won the Auction but Don't 
Want the Prize was significant as it was the first published experiment to generally 
support the empirical findings of Capen et al (1971), albeit that the authors report 
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significant variation in the presence and magnitude of the effect. Since this 1983 
article a wealth of experimental studies on the winner’s curse in the original domain 
of common value auctions have emerged. A thorough review of this setting is 
documented by Kagel and Levin (2002). 
The mid 1980’s witnessed a different application of the problem. Samuelson and 
Bazerman (1985) extended the winner’s curse to the new domain of bilateral 
bargaining. This study represented a migration of the concept from an experimental 
analysis of common value auctions to bargaining tasks. Although overbidding in the 
setting of bilateral bargaining has been referred to as “curse-like phenomena”, given 
that the curse is recorded in a non-auction environment (Crawford & Iriberri, 2007 
P.1722), the term is generally associated with both contexts. It is this branch of 
research, controlled bilateral negotiation experiments, which this essay concerns. 
2.3 The Acquiring a Company Game & The Winner’s Curse 
Seminal experimental work on bilateral bargaining under uncertainty was conducted 
in 1985 by William Samuelson and Max Bazerman12. The model they developed 
falls into a general class of situations characterised by adverse selection. This was a 
problem identified by Akerlof (1970). Importantly, Akerlof recognised that 
asymmetric information has the potential to destroy the attractive properties of 
welfare enhancing trades. Consequently, information differences can be a source of 
market failure. 
The initial study developed and experimentally tested three versions of the AAC 
game where a buyer and seller negotiate over the sale of a company of unknown 
value to the buyer. The three versions of the game have alternative parametric 
                                                          
12 Prior theoretical work important to this experimental exploration is detailed in Samuelson (1984).  
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structures which determine the asset’s value. For each bargaining model a normative 
negotiation solution exists for a buyer who has access to less information. Equally, 
given the information structure, normative decision rules exist for sellers. The first 
version considers a bargain where the outcome is dependent on a discrete probability 
distribution. The second considers a bargain where the outcome is dependent on a 
uniform probability distribution when a fixed absolute advantage exists for the buyer 
upon the completion of a trade. A benefit to the buyer from achieving a trade is 
constant for all values of the asset in this second structure. 
The third parametric structure considers a bargain where the outcome is also 
dependent on a uniform probability distribution where gains from trade are 
proportional to the value of the asset. This third model has a beta distribution which 
assumes a prior value of 1 for both α and β.  This standard (generalised) beta 
distribution reveals a smooth probability distribution and offers a versatile means to 
define prior knowledge. This is attractive for methodological purposes.  Given that 
the distribution is defined between 0 and 1 it provides a useful tool to deal with 
probabilistic decision making. It is the third version of the AAC game that is of 
greatest interest and has inspired significant further study. A stylised example of this 
model is provided here. The prediction of this model is that asymmetric information 
is a barrier to mutually efficient transactions13. The parametric structure provides an 
illustration of extreme adverse selection as a rational analysis reveals that a 
negotiator’s best strategy is to refrain from entering a bargain given the information 
                                                          
13 It should be noted that imperfections in the information structure is not the only reason why 
negotiators do not reach a positive contract zone; a psychological explanation for the existence of 
impasses in bargaining is the self-serving bias (Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997).  
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structure. While reaching this conclusion is intuitively demanding, it is relatively 
straightforward analytically.   
2.3.1 The Standard Bargaining Model - An Illustrative Example  
From the outset, it is assumed that the true value of an asset is unknown to a buyer 
who only holds probabilistic information regarding the true value. The model had a 
uniform probability distribution of possible values for an asset within a jointly 
known distribution. While the value of the asset to both parties will vary depending 
on the random distribution, regardless of the value, the asset is worth at least as 
much to the buyer as it is to the seller. Typically, the multiplier is 50%. The seller is 
aware of the true value. As an accepted bid would occur on a selective basis by a 
rational seller (full information player), valuable information is embedded in a 
bargain being struck. A rational examination of the problem reveals that the 
existence of an information asymmetry is a barrier to a mutually beneficial trade.  
Assume that: 
𝑋𝑣 = the true value of an asset which is known to the seller but unknown to the 
buyer. The value of this asset is uniformly distributed between the values £0 and 
£10,000, allowing any one of eleven potential integers (v ε [£0, £10,000]) equally 
likely to take on the true value 
𝑋𝑏 = the true value of the asset to the buyer. Assume that 𝑋𝑏 is greater to the buyer 
than to the seller. To begin, and for illustrative simplicity, assume that the asset is 
worth 50% more to the buyer ex-post. Thus, 𝑋𝑣 = 1.5*𝑋𝑏  
𝐵1 = A buyer’s uncertain estimate  
𝑆𝑎  = A seller’s acceptance of a buyer’s uncertain estimate  




To understand the average value of 𝑋𝑏, one imposes a decision rule so that 𝑆𝑎 only 
occurs when 𝐵1 ≥ 𝑋𝑣 . If 𝐵1 < 𝑋𝑣  impasse follows.  When 𝐵1 ≥ 𝑋𝑣  then 𝑅 = 𝑋𝑏 - 𝐵1 . 
This derives from the principle of selective acceptance. Specifically, any rational 
seller will not sell an asset for less than its true (known) value.  On acceptance, the 
expected value of the asset can occur over a range of uniformly distributed values 
from £0 ≤ 𝑋𝑣  but not for any value >𝑋𝑣 . For any accepted bid the expected value of 
the asset is (0.5*𝐵1 )*1.5. Thus, on 𝑆𝑎,  𝑅 = (0.5*𝐵1 )1.5 - 𝐵1 .  
The combination of the seller’s decision rule and the uniform probability distribution 
ensures that irrespective of the presence of a positive bargaining zone, on average, 
buyers secure assets which are worth 25% less than the true value. Incorporating this 
pay-off structure and probability distribution, the likely losses emerging from 
positive bids will range on average from -£250 to -£2,500. The optimal bidding 
strategy for any rational buyer is to offer £0. This strategy is identical to abstaining 
from the trade.  
When tested experimentally this model exhibits sequential moves. A definitive offer 
by the buyer (move one) is followed by a seller’s acceptance or rejection (move 
two). Following the seller’s acceptance or rejection decision the game concludes. For 
example, if an uncertain estimate of £5,000 is accepted by the seller, the expected 
value of the asset is less than the original bid ((0.5*£5,000)*1.5 < £5,000), so that 𝑹 
= -£1,250. For this accepted bid of £5,000 there is a two thirds likelihood that the 
buyer will experience net negative returns (true value £0 to £3,000) and a one third 





In light of the decision rules introduced, where 𝑆𝑎 only occurs when 𝐵1 ≥ 𝑋𝑣 , a 
normative strategy is that a buyer should refrain from making a bid.  Thus, the model 
provides a point prediction. Given the parametric structure of the problem, rational 
decision makers should reason to the equilibrium bid of £0. Falling prey to the curse 
involves a bidder adopting a naïve bargaining strategy, failing to appreciate the 
asymmetry in information.  
One hundred and twenty-one possible permutations of the model exist that are 
contingent on the random true value and subsequent buyer estimate. To visualise the 
bargaining model, Figure 2.3 provides an illustration of the three potential 
bargaining outcomes for alternative bidding strategies a buyer may take. This figure 
depicts the structural inefficiency that is built into the AAC game as a positive 
bargaining zone exists (Bazerman & Moore, 2009 P.55).  Of the one hundred and 
twenty-one possible permutations of the negotiation that exist, fifty-five states (45%) 











































































Uniform Distribution of Values (£0-£10,000)
Figure 2.2 Average Values (£) Conditional on Seller Acceptance
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the true value of the asset and is rejected given the seller’s decision rule. Twenty-six 
possible states (21%) exist where a bargain can be struck. In this zone the buyer does 
not incur negative returns and a sale is completed for the seller. These states are 
indicated by the points and zone marked in white in Figure 3.3. Twenty-two states 
(18%) in this bargaining zone result in positive (non-neutral) profits to the buyer. For 
the first three bidding strategies (£0 – optimal bid, £1,000 and £2,000) only one 
possible value allows the buyer to strike a bargain that produces non-negative 
returns. The remaining forty possible states (34%) result in losses to the buyer. 
 
Figure 2.3 Bargaining Zones Contingent on AAC Outcome 
 
Naïve positive bidding under this parametric structure persists until the multiplier 
doubles. Once the value of the asset is twice the worth to the buyer than it is to the 
seller, the average value of all accepted bids becomes neutral. Consequently, the 
optimal bidding strategy switches from refraining to enter the trade to bidding the 
highest possible offer when the gains from trade are greater than double the true 
value. As is later highlighted, the tightening of the lower bounds of the parameters 
also modifies the optimal bidding strategy.    
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2.4 Bidding Results from the Uniform Distribution Bargaining Model 
The initial laboratory analysis of the model outlined in the previous section tested for 
naïve bidding behaviour amongst 595 MBA students at Boston University. 
Participants were provided with a narrative about acquiring a company and were 
tasked with submitting a bid14. This served to contextualise the adverse selection 
problem.  
The central finding of this seminal study is that buyers consistently fail to follow a 
normative bargaining strategy. In this extreme adverse selection setting, where 
participants should refrain from entering negotiations, Samuelson and Bazerman 
(1985) show that buyers fail to anticipate the behaviour of the better-informed seller, 
who would not sell their company for less than it is worth. In all three variations of 
the bargaining game, participants overwhelmingly choose to bid round numbers and 
93% of participants rejected the normative bidding strategy ($0)15. Figure 2.4 
reproduces count data showing the number of bidders that fall within a bidding range 
from the original Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) experiment16. Only 7.5% and 
7.7% of the samples could reason to the normative strategy in the non-incentivised 
and incentivised version of the experiment.  
                                                          
14 The original instructions are replicated in the appendix.  
15 In version 1 (two possible values) of the model 41% of participants bid optimally. Only 16% and 
7.5% bid optimally in in the more complex version two (lower limit) and version three (unknown 
value with a uniform distribution) of the experiment. 




As Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) initially identified, reasoning to the normative 
outcome rarely occurs.  Table 2.1 reports the mean offers and the percentage of the 
sample that bid optimally from experiments that adopt version three of the original 
Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) negotiation model described above. This table 
synthesises the evidence from different studies that adopt the original model and 
report reasonably specific estimates. This provides a comparable metric to consider 
the existence of the curse in this setting and a means to consider the ability of further 























Figure 2.4 Samuelson & Bazerman (1985) - Version 3: No Bidders by 
Bidding Range 
Monetary Payoffs (n=65) Non-Monetary Payoffs (n=120)
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Table 2.1 Bidding Results – Uniform Distribution Bargaining Model 
 
Either exact or partial information for the variables of interest in Table 2.1 are 
reported for ten of the fifteen studies that test the standard AAC model. The original 
studies of the problem reveal that participants commonly bid close to the 
unconditional expected value of the asset, with few participants bidding optimally. 
For studies that report the distribution of bids, the modal bid range is typically from 
.50 to .75 of the asset’s value. All of the experiments that adopt a uniform 
distribution bargaining model, where an equilibrium bid is zero and report mean 
bidding data, on average, observe non-optimal buyer behaviour. Each of the ten 
studies in Table 2.1 reveal that optimal decision-making is infrequent. For two 
studies, no participants in the sample tender an optimal bid. Unpublished 
experiments have also reported bidding data similar to the published studies above17.  
 
Three years after the formation of the AAC game, Carroll, Bazerman and Maury 
(1988) exposed the resilience of the curse, producing similar experimental evidence 
                                                          
17 Daniel Kahneman and Richard Thaler found that twenty out of twenty-four participants from 
faculty and doctoral student made naïve bids. The two that failed to bid admitted that they had done 
so due to cowardice (Thaler, 1994 P.161).  
Authors N Mean Offer (% of Sample) Optimal Bids 
Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) 120 50-75 (75%) 7.5% 
Carroll et al (1988) 75 50-75 (52%) 10.6% 
Ball et al (1991) 69 52.61 7.2% 
Foreman & Murnighan (1996) 8 ~49-52† 0.0% 
Tor & Bazerman (2003) 82 65.84 8.5% 
Idson et al (2004) 51 - 13.7%* 
Selten et al (2005) - ~40† - 
Grosskopf et al (2007) 20 38.84* - 
Garbarino & Slonim (2007) 62 50-75 (69%) 6.5% 
Bereby-Meyer & Grosskopf (2008) 21 ~45-55*† 0.0% 
* A control treatment 
† Inferred from graphical representation     
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to the initial study. This was followed by the first experiment of Ball, Bazerman and 
Carroll (1991) who observed consistency in terms of bidding strategies with the first 
two studies. For Ball et al (1991), the mean bid across twenty trials had a minimum 
value 45.37 and a maximum value of 58.61 (on the first round trial).  Six further 
studies have reported relatively consistent average bidding strategies with the first 
three studies of the puzzle. An average bid of 38.84 is the lowest recorded average 
bid to date (Grosskopf, Bereby-Meyer & Bazerman, 2007). 
 
2.5 Experimental Extensions & Exploring the Winner’s Curse  
The uniform probability distribution bargaining model is essential as it provided a 
theoretical and methodological basis for fourteen further articles. These advances 
have incorporated incremental extensions or adjustments to the task to increase the 
complexity of the model. Table 2.2 provides an overview of the tests which 
implement the AAC model in chronological order18. The extension is identified 
which explains the methodological development and/or the new hypothesis tested.  
The purpose of this section is to classify the motivations for these further works 
under alternative streams and to summarise the major findings in each domain. 
Research on the AAC game has branched in three directions. For conciseness, three 
questions have been chiefly posed in light of the naïve bidding strategies originally 
observed. 
1. Is the winner’s curse robust to learning?   
2. What are the effects of communication in the AAC game?  
3. What are the psychological mechanisms causing decision making errors? 
                                                          
18 Significant alternations to the basic game, such as Keysar, Ginzel & Bazerman, (1995) which are 
used to test related hypothesises (such as the curse of knowledge) are not included in the table below.  
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Table 2.2 The Acquiring a Company Game: 1985-2015 
 
Author(s) Year Experimental Extension(s)  
Samuelson and Bazerman 1985 The original AAC experiment. Three alternative parametric structures are 
adopted. 
Carroll et al 1988 Participants are recorded thinking aloud while participating in the AAC 
game to conduct verbal protocol analysis. 
Ball et al 1991 Roles of buyers and sellers are iterated to facilitate learning and perspective 
taking. 
Holt & Sherman 1994 Alteration to the parametric structure to test for naïve underbidding or a 
‘loser’s curse’.  
Foreman & Murnighan 1996 Observational opportunities (seeing others losses) and experiential learning 
opportunities are provided (4 week time gaps to allow reflection between 
trials). 
Valley et al 1998 Alternative mediums of costless non-binding pre-play communication 
(cheap talk) are added to face-to-face, over the phone and in writing to AAC 
bargains. 
Bazerman 2002 The AAC game is tested with skilled individuals from the financial services 
industry (reported in Tor & Bazerman, 2003). 
Tor & Bazerman  2003 Participants are recorded thinking aloud to conduct verbal protocol analysis 
across multiple decision problems.  
Idson et al 2004 Participants are provided with training. This involves undertaking the Monty 
Hall problem and a multi-party ultimatum game task before taking the AAC 
puzzle.  
Selten et al 2005 The AAC game is tested over longer experimental periods to Ball et al’s 
(1991) 20 round experiment and the lower bounds of models parameters are 
increased. 
Grosskopf et al   2007 A tweaked design that changes the added value of the company to the buyer 
and allows participants compare and contrast valuations. In a second 
experiment information is added to show participants forgone payoffs.  
Garbarino & Slonim 2007 A ceiling effect is estimated over twenty bidding rounds where participants 
firstly partake in the AAC game and then have to accept or reject lotteries 
that reflect identical probabilities to positive bids in the game.   
Bereby-Meyer & 
Grosskopf 
2008 The payoff variance is decreased. To control for any potential experimenter 
demand effects, participants are offered an opt-out choice before bargaining 
commences. To control for participants experiencing a thrill from gambling 
the structure of the game is simplified. 
Charness & Levin 2009 A transformation of the AAC into an individual choice problem showing 
participants one hundred cards. 
Casari et al 2015 The AAC game is tested on groups as opposed to individuals. Traditional 
equilibrium bids ($0, $50, $100) are not adopted. Only a discrete and small 
range of true values are used.  
Di Cagno et al 2015 
 
Cheap talk is introduced to the AAC game to test whether there are gender 




The persistence of the curse has been investigated by testing whether learning or 
experience diminishes the frequency of the bias. Central to this branch of 
experimental work is a commitment to address the issues of feedback and practise. A 
standard perspective regards disequilibrium bidding strategies, and subsequently 
loss-making outcomes, as transient. In the case of the AAC model, this constitutes 
the adoption of naive bidding strategies in the form of positive offers on behalf of the 
buyer. Traditional economic theory would maintain that participant behaviour 
adjusts toward equilibrium responses through learning. In turn non-equilibrium 
strategies will be replaced by more efficient ones (Samuelson, 2005). While the 
curse was present in one shot tasks, is disequilibrium bidding behaviour corrected 
over time? Do participants learn the opponent’s decision rules or become more 
experienced after multiple iterations of the task?  
In contrast to the common value auction setting where learning can occur to a greater 
degree, several studies have shown that a significant adjustment to the normative 
bidding strategy does not occur for the AAC game. The initial evaluation of learning 
was conducted by Ball et al (1991). In their first experiment that took place over 20 
trials, only 5% of the sample displayed traits of learning, signifying that their bidding 
strategy advanced to an equilibrium bid. The second experiment of Ball et al (1991) 
adopted a role reversal treatment to question if participants learned when they are 
exposed to the perspective of the alternative party in the trade. The researchers elicit 
data that did not differ significantly from their first experiment; only 4 out of 44 
participants learned the optimal bidding strategy from playing the task of the 
counterpart in the trade.  
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The similarity in results between the initial one-shot experiments and repeated trials 
found by Ball et al (1991) was confirmed by Foreman and Murnighan (1996). In 
their study Foreman and Murnighan (1996) tested the AAC problem twice a week 
over a four-week period. The participants were encouraged to reflect on their 
strategies between bidding sessions and had the opportunity to observe other 
individual’s decision making strategies. Suggestively, individuals observed fellow 
participant’s cursed bids. Using the standard model outlined in the previous section, 
Foreman and Murnighan (1996) show that reflection periods and considerably more 
information minimally reduces the frequency of naïve bidding strategies. Comparing 
offers, the highest bids were consistently observed in the AAC puzzle vis-à-vis 
common value auctions experiments. The authors conclude that avoiding the curse is 
difficult and rare, concluding that “people appear to be tremendously susceptible to 
the winner’s curse. Neither information, experience, time, a variation in 
endowments, nor a problem that allowed the possibility of profitable bids helped 
them learn to avoid the curse. It was extremely persistent” (Foreman & Murnighan, 
1996 P.178).  
More recent evidence contends that the winner’s curse is robust to stronger learning 
techniques. The inability of subjects to learn to avoid the curse has been attributed to 
the inherent variability in the feedback. In the standard model, alternative 
probabilities of making a profit exist if a bid is accepted. Adopting the bidding 
strategy of offering the unconditional expected value (£5,000) of the asset gives the 
buyer a one-third chance of ensuring a positive return and a two thirds likelihood of 
incurring a loss if a bid is accepted. This variability in the likelihood of the gamble is 
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not constant however and differs for every accepted bid under the uniform 
distribution model19.  
Researchers have attempted to alter this feedback mechanism as a primary concern 
with Ball et al (1991) is the distinctiveness of the normative solution, as viewed in 
the stylised bargaining model. In response to this concern, harder learning techniques 
have been sought out. A potential solution has been to alter the variability of 
feedback participants are provided so that the probability of winning is substantially 
reduced. Logically this increases the likelihood of losses (Grosskopf, Bereby-Meyer 
& Bazerman, 2007). Despite this alteration, participants fail to climb the learning 
curve. Overbidding remains even when the optimal response is positive (which is 
achieved through altering the lower bounds of the value of a seller’s asset) and one 
hundred trials are adopted in contrast to the 20 trials run by Ball et al (1991) (Selten, 
Abbink & Cox, 2005). 
Idson, Chugh, Bereby-Meyer, Moran, Grosskopf and Bazerman (2004) argue that 
training, as opposed to procedures to facilitate learning, can improve decision 
making in this task. Idson et al (2004) show that training can soften the bias. 
Training for participants constituted partaking in other common puzzles such as the 
Monty Hall problem prior to bidding in the AAC task. While 13.7% of the 
participants in the control treatment followed the normative strategy, 32.6% and 
38.8% of participants in training treatments reach the solution of abstaining from 
trade.  More systematic training, as opposed to placing confidence in the 
                                                          
19 Ignoring the probability of acceptance, this positive return likelihood has a lower bound of odds of 
one-quarter. This occurs when a bid of £3,000 is accepted. The variability can increase to a maximum 
of a one-half likelihood of success when a £1,000 bid is accepted.    
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participant’s ability to learn after the iteration of roles or receiving detailed feedback 
acts as a more successful mechanism to debias the problem.  
The most recent effort to challenge the persistence of the curse has questioned if 
groups can learn optimal bidding strategies or behave in a more strategically 
sophisticated manner than individuals (Casari, Zhang & Jackson, 2015). The Casari 
et al (2015) study contrasts the performance of individual and group bidding 
behaviour in the AAC game. Three member groups outperformed individuals in the 
fraction of cursed winning bids. The percentage of bids with negative expected 
profits for individuals was 18.3%, however it was 10.5% for groups. Groups were 
also recorded as showing a significant improvement over the course of the 
experiment. This learning was in contrast to the individual treatment where no 
significant improvement was observed.  
2.5.2 Communication 
The dynamics of naïve bidding have been explored by adding pre-play 
communication to the AAC task. Specifically, researchers have asked whether the 
efficiency of a negotiation is altered by cheap talk and by alternative communication 
media.  
In the first experiment to scrutinise communication effects using this model, Valley 
et al (1998) compared negotiated outcomes when participants communicated face-to-
face, by phone, and in writing. MBA students were recruited and grouped into 83 
negotiation pairs for alternative communication treatments (46 for a written 
treatment and 37 in a face-to-face treatment). Valley et al (1998) find that these 
costless nonbinding signals (messages) aid the formation of mutually beneficial 
trades. Logically, the content of these messages should have no influence on the 
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underlying incentive structure faced by participants and should not alter the 
normative bidding strategy. The incidence of the winner’s curse remained constant 
across communication mediums but, critically, the medium in which cheap talk 
occurred affected the outcome of the negotiation process.  Efficient outcomes are 
commonly reached in face-to-face negotiations with the use of cheap talk. Impasse 
only occurred twice in the face-to-face cheap talk treatment. Although all modes of 
communication increased the efficiency of trades over the standard prediction of 
impasse, surpluses were more evenly distributed in face-to-face trades. As the 
authors suggest, “honestly may be endogenous to the negotiation process” (Valley et 
al, 1998 P.233).  
Although the model’s prediction would not differ according to the level of sociality 
involved in a trade, the asocial contact involved in the ACC game appears to be a 
primary impediment to achieving welfare enhancing trades. Valley et al (1998) find 
that the medium in which cheap talk occurred, face-to-face, by phone, and in writing, 
affected the outcome of bargaining and impasse only occurred twice in the face-to-
face cheap talk condition. The results suggest that social interactions provide 
negotiators a vehicle to overcome the inefficient outcomes of the theoretical 
prediction of impasse.  
Most recently, Di Cagno, Galliera, Güth, Pace and Panaccione (2015) analysed the 
effects of gender when pre-play communication is allowed in the AAC game. Their 
modification of the AAC game restricted knowledge of the other negotiator’s gender 
for various treatments. A primary finding from the investigation of gender effects 
with cheap talk is that female sellers, aware that they are participating with a female 
buyer, show a tendency to overstate the value of their asset. 
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2.5.3 Causal Mechanisms 
Thirdly, underlying psychological processes have attracted the attention of 
researchers. Competing explanations to explain the source of the winner’s curse in 
private negotiations exist. These fit into two broad categories; (i) information 
disadvantages/deficits and focussing failures and (ii) risk preferences. Explanations 
within these general categories appeal to alternative psychological processes. 
2.5.3.1 Bounded Awareness  
The primary and standard mechanism to explain the curse suggests that individuals 
can systematically fail to appreciate their information disadvantage or fail to adjust 
their estimations in light of other’s information. The standard account stresses the 
importance of an information asymmetry in creating the cognitive illusion, leading to 
a general propensity labelled as bounded awareness (Bazerman & Chugh, 2006). 
This occurs when individuals fail to perceive and use information that is important to 
making an optimal decision (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). Bidders can make the 
mistake of assuming symmetric information or fail to understand the information 
expressed in accepted or winning bids. Under this reasoning, decision makers are 
blind to the importance of the actions of others when focusing on a competitive task. 
Negotiators limit their focus of attention on personal goals and ignore contingencies 
that are as consequence of the private information possessed by others (Samuelson & 
Bazerman, 1985; Carroll et al, 1988; Tor & Bazerman, 2003).  This specific single-
mindedness can ultimately lead to negotiator overconfidence (Neale & Bazerman, 
1983).  This set of explanations views the intrinsic naivety or bounded rationality of 
an individual, who has failed to either realise either the impact of asymmetric 
information or has failed to foresee the fact that future decisions are relevant for 
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current ones, as the most important causal factor underlying the curse (Charness & 
Levin, 2009).   
Verbal protocol analysis has provided a useful qualitative instrument to analyse this 
hypothesis in an experimental setting. By asking participants to think out loud during 
the game, researchers have identified why information deficits are formed (Carroll, 
et al, 1988; Tor & Bazerman, 2003). A primary explanation emerging from verbal 
protocol analysis of participant behaviour suggests that negotiators simplify the task 
or the cognition of the other negotiator. This simplification process can cause an 
illusion of equal information. As Carroll et al (1988 P.21/22) surmise “when 
individuals are faced with contingencies, they make simplifying assumptions to 
make decision making under uncertainty more manageable”. The combination of 
negotiating with another and the requirement to understand future contingencies 
fosters an extremely challenging bargaining framework for normative bidding 
behaviour to take place.   
2.5.3.2 Risk Preferences  
The second economic and psychological factor scholars have probed to explain the 
origins of the winner’s curse is risk preferences. Research relating to risk aversion 
propensities has asked whether bidders experience gratification from “the thrill of 
winning”? (Holt & Sherman, 1994 P.642). Under this explanation, gratification from 
success is deemed a significant factor in causing the curse. Holt and Sherman (1994) 
establish parameters in the AAC model where the naïve strategy for a buyer is to 
underbid – a type of bidding behaviour labelled the Loser’s Curse. If the winner’s 
curse can be explained through a thrill associated with winning (rather than failing to 
appreciate the seller’s acceptance rule), then it follows that underbidding should not 
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occur or that its frequency should arise to a lesser degree to that of a winner’s curse 
treatment. To test this hypothesis Holt and Sherman (1994) tightened the parameters 
of the standard model so that the lower bound of the seller’s asset ranged from 0.5 to 
1 for one (loser’s curse) treatment. Consequently, positive offers were in the buyer’s 
interest. The primary finding of Holt and Sherman (1994) is that the bidding 
strategies of participants, regardless of the parameters (loser’s/winner’s curse), are 
similar. The study finds no strong evidence exists for the utility/thrill of winning 
hypothesis as an explanation for the winner’s curse.  
Garbarino and Slonim (2007) consider risk preferences further and present 
experimental data that supports their hypothesis that a proportion of individuals 
prefer at least one or more of the underlying lotteries attributed to positive bids in the 
AAC game. According to the authors an underlying psychological explanation for 
the presence of decision errors, in this context positive offers in the AAC game, is 
the preference for positive bids on behalf of buyers. The researchers observe 
consistency regarding participants’ bids and their subsequent acceptance/rejection 
decision when offered lotteries that reflect identical probabilities to those underlying 
positive bids in the AAC game. As opposed to a decision error as a plausible 
psychological reason to explain naïve bidding strategies in the game, non-monetary 
utilities that are embedded in participant preferences (such as participation, or 







The implication of failing to account for the decision rule of a seller, and 
subsequently overbidding, has a variety of practical implications. In particular, these 
insights are applied to organisations undertaking mergers and takeovers bids 
(Bazerman & Moore, 2009). The curse is categorised as a ‘common mistake in 
negotiation’ as managers fail to account for the valuable information held by an 
interacting party (Bazerman & Neale, 1992). Cognisance of a seller’s decision rule 
can allow organisations to pre-empt the dangers of selective acceptance rather than 
suffering from after-the-fact regret. Roll (1986) originally discussed the curse in the 
context of corporate takeovers where buying firms return little or no gains. By 
collecting data on stock prices upon the announcement of takeover bids, Roll (1986) 
inferred that acquiring firms make low levels of profits (less than expectations) upon 
acquisition.  
Along with other psychological biases such as intentional blindness, the 
psychological factors underpinning the curse have more recently been applied to the 
field of behavioural ethics. The concept of ‘bounded ethicality’ highlights how 
failing to notice information imperfections can cause individuals to behave in a 
manner that is inconsistent with one preferred ethics (Bazerman & Sezer, 2016).  
Equally, one’s failure to observe important information to decision making can lead 
to a failure to observe or prevent other’s unethical acts (Chugh & Bazerman, 2007; 
Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). 
A variety of interesting empirical studies have applied the idea to sports labour 
markets, given the wealth of data available in this domain. Very often sports labour 
markets represent high stakes environments where repeated behaviours occur.  For 
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instance, Cassing and Douglas (1980) considered competitive bidding upon the 
removal of the reserve clause in major league baseball, showing that majority of free 
agents signed in the late 1970’s bore negative productivity returns and were paid 
20% more than their projected marginal revenue product. More recently, the strength 
of this finding has been revaluated in light of improved measures of productivity. 
The evidence still points to a weak-form of the curse existing in the field as potential 
buyers fail to take all past information into account (Burger & Walters, 2008). 
Assessing American Football, Massey and Thaler (2013) found evidence that 
outcomes from the National Football League draft are consistent with research on the 
winner’s curse. 
2.7 Experiment I: Insights to Buyer Psychology in Bilateral Bargaining 
2.7.1 Background & Key Findings 
Valley et al (1998) find that cheap talk or costless nonbinding signals (messages) 
help bargainers. Rather than using cheap talk to deceive another negotiator, they 
show that bargainers use communication as a mechanism to establish gains from 
trade, despite the fact that economic theory would predict impasse (Akerlof, 1970). 
Although cheap talk is not a panacea to securing Pareto-efficient outcomes, 
messages sent by sellers who have private information can modify a buyer’s 
assessment of a seller’s trustworthiness (Farrell & Rabin, 1996). Cheap talk can 
support efficient trades and diminish the frequency of the winner’s curse. It is 
particularly relevant if it aids two parties in avoiding communication problems 
(Charness, 2000). This is interesting as buyers should not be influenced by cheap 
talk in a bilateral bargain. Treating it as meaningless is consistent with rationality. 
Despite its costless nature, cheap talk is still recognised as “an integral part of 
bargaining” (Croson, Boles & Murnighan, 2003 P.144). 
57 
 
Here, I question whether cheap talk can have subtle psychological effects using the 
AAC bargaining model.  More accurately, I hypothesise that appearing perfect or 
‘too good to be true’ when bargaining can cause one to be trusted less. While Valley 
et al (1998) were primarily concerned with the medium through which cheap talk 
was conveyed, I explore whether a message affects interpersonal attractiveness and 
trust. Assuming that a bid reflects the buyer’s suspicion/trust, this experiment 
explores whether heterogeneous cheap talk measures influence a buyer’s strategic 
behaviour. In doing so, the aim is to provide an improved description of the role of 
cheap talk in bargaining scenarios, a setting where communication is commonplace. 
The experimental design adopted follows Valley et al (1998) and Di Cagno et al 
(2015) - a cheap talk game with asymmetric information. Essentially, the experiment 
mimics a signalling game with one sided, costless, pre-play communication. The 
design is based on an adaption of Samuelson and Bazerman’s (1985) original AAC 
game. Identical parametric structures to the experimental work of Samuelson and 
Bazerman (1985) and later Ball et al (1991) are applied. This design is used to 
enquire whether heterogeneous cheap talk modifies the trust levels of uniformed 
buyers.  
This study is motivated by the need to consider the effects of specific 
communication strategies in negotiating scenarios characterised by asymmetric 
information and misaligned incentives. As suggested, the aim is to provide an 
improved description of the dynamics of cheap talk using the AAC negotiation 
model. To date, the literature concerning the effects of communication in the AAC 
model is relatively underdeveloped. Specifically, there is an absence of research 
concerning the nature of specific communication strategies and its influence on 
bidding behaviour and trade.  Such research can have practical significance given the 
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prevalence of tacit bargaining that involves communication in the context of trade 
agreements or labour relations (Crawford, 1990; Lewis, 2011).  
Given that cheap talk can convey meaning where there is a moderate (but not 
overwhelming) incentive to lie, I hypothesise that appearing imperfect to a point 
increases the trust of an uninformed buyer. Conversely, this suggests that when 
buyers only have partial information, appearing perfect as a seller will diminish a 
buyer’s trust/increase a buyer’s suspicion. This hypothesis is derived from social 
psychology. The advantages of making purposeful errors has shown that to err can 
increase one’s interpersonal attractiveness or ‘believability’ (Aronson & Linder, 
1965; Aronson, Willerman & Floyd, 1966). This psychological insight has been 
applied in a commercial context (Ein-Gar, Shiv & Tormala, 2012), to intrapersonal 
relationships (Miron, Knepfel & Parkinson, 2009) and to education (Uranowitz & 
Doyle, 1978). Occasionally, appearing imperfect occurs naturally.20  
I extend this insight to bargaining. By addressing subtle psychological tendencies, 
one can gain a richer description of bargaining behaviour and add to the ‘rebirth’ of 
social psychological insight to the study of negotiation (Bazerman, Curhan, & 
Moore, 2001 P.199). 
Unsurprisingly, the study finds that only a small percentage of the sample (4.27%) 
play equilibrium bids. This is consistent with the extent of optimal bids previously 
recorded (seen in Table 2.1).  As measured by the difference between the claimed 
value (cheap talk) and mean bid, the highest level of distrust is observed when sellers 
allege that their asset is the highest possible quality (flawless). A high level of 
                                                          
20 For example, when Mount Everest was first measured by Radhanath Sikdar, a mathematician and 
surveyor, the recorded height was exactly 29,000ft (8,839m). Publically, an additional 2ft were added 
to the height to increase the trustworthiness of the measurement process.  
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receiver scepticism exists across all cheap talk treatments.  The level of scepticism 
decreases as sellers claim to have lower value assets. Despite the fact that the 
numerical results reflect the underlying hypothesis, inferential statistical tests suggest 
that no significant differences are present in bidding behaviour across cheap talk 
treatments. 
The next section briefly introduces related experimental literature that spans 
economics and behavioural decision research that are specific to this research 
question but outside central literature previously considered for the AAC game. 
Section 2.7.3 briefly recaps on the bargaining model, explaining any minor 
alternations required to facilitate testing the hypothesis. Section 2.7.4 considers 
matters relating to the task, design and procedures. Section 2.7.5 provides details on 
the participants. Section 2.7.6 outlines the results. Section 2.7.7 concludes the 
experiment with a brief discussion. 
2.7.2 Related Literature 
It is important to note that the effects of pre-play communication have been studied 
through alternative bargaining games outside the AAC model. For instance, Croson 
et al (2003) show that both proposers and responders in the ultimatum game lied 
equally often and that these lies were more likely to come earlier in a bargaining 
game. Cheap talk influenced bargaining more than theoretically expected as lies 
about private information and non-credible threats altered both short and long-term 
bargaining outcomes.  
Other previous investigations into the role of pre-play interaction outside of 
bargaining games has shown that communication can solve coordination problems in 
the battle of the sexes game (Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe & Ross, 1989) but has little 
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effect in trust games (Bracht, & Feltovich, 2009). Charness and Grosskopf (2004) 
add cheap talk treatments to a version of the stag hunt game and show how pre-play 
communication facilitates coordination. Finally, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) show 
that participants are significantly affected by a cheap talk message in public good 
games. Crawford (1998) provides an overview of a variety of experiments which 
adopt cheap talk.  
2.7.3 The Bargaining Model 
To explore the dynamics of cheap talk I utilise the AAC bilateral negotiation game 
with asymmetric information previously detailed. This is a common form of 
bargaining, where only one individual has complete information regarding the value 
of an asset. While the economic prediction of this model is impasse, behavioural 
decision research has found that bidders follow naïve strategies and suffer from the 
winner's curse. For this study, I use version three of the original model21.  
Only the seller has complete information regarding the value of his asset, they value 
it at v. In light of the true value of the asset, the seller can provide a pre-bid message 
to the buyer. Incorporating this component creates a signalling game. Traditionally, 
signals convey honest information for sellers when they are costly. Those receiving a 
signal can infer a sender’s quality based upon the cost attributed to a given signal.   
As the message sent in this study is costless and nonbinding, is takes the form of 
cheap talk (Gibbons, 1992). A standard theory of signalling implies that this 
information is uninformative (Farrell, 1995).  
                                                          
21 The parameters of the model can be modified to test alternative pay-off structures and to produce 
alternative predictions of optimal buyer behaviour. Constant returns can be introduced regardless of 
the product’s value and cumulative rather than uniform probability distributions can be applied. 
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For efficiency purposes, the value the seller claims to hold is restricted to five possible 
values when the model is operationalised experimentally (this is unknown to the 
buyer). Regardless of the true value of the seller’s asset, it is in the best interest of any 
seller to tell a buyer they have a high quality asset given that a message is costless.  
The schematic in Figure 2.5 outlines the structure of the model and these claimed 
values. 
The buyer does not know the value of the asset and considers v a random variable 
from a range of possible values that take the form of positive integers. Buyers are 
aware of the uniform probability distribution of possible values within the jointly 
known distribution f(v), [£0, £10,000]. The value for the buyer will be w(v) in light 
of this distribution. While the value of the asset to both parties will vary depending 
on the random distribution, regardless of v, the asset is worth at least as much to the 
buyer as it is to the seller. Thus, w(v) ≥ v for all possible asset values. This represents 
gains that result from trade and ensures that reaching an agreement is welfare 
enhancing. As suggested, both the buyer and the seller are aware of the distribution 
f(v), and are aware that w(v) ≥ v. The seller however knows v and w precisely, with 
the buyer only holding probabilistic information of f(v). 
In spite of asymmetric information, both parties must settle on a price to trade; if no 
agreement on price is reached, an impasse results. For this model the asset is worth 
50% more to the buyer than it is to the seller for all values and can be summarised as: 
w(v) = v1.5 where f(v) = v/10, for v ε [£0, £10,000] 
The only way a buyer can learn about the actual value of the asset depends on 
whether or not a bid is accepted. As a consequence of a costless message, buyers 
should not use a sellers’ signal as an indication of quality. As suggested, this 
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message is an unverifiable disclosure and should not be treated as a credible claim. 
Working under the assumption of selective acceptance, if a bid is accepted on 
average the expected return will be negative. As this logic applies to any positive 






Figure 2.5 Schematic for Buyer Negotiation Model 
 
This schematic depicts the bargaining model and isolates the individual components that are operationalised experimentally. While the true value of the 
seller’s asset is drawn from a uniform distribution and known to the seller, one of five cheap talk messages is randomly received by the buyer. Regardless 
of this message, a normative bidding strategy for the participant is to refrain from trade (bidding £0).
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2.7.4 Task, Experimental Design & Procedures 
The task follows an adaption of Valley et al (1998) and Di Cagno et al (2015) by 
introducing costless pre-play communication to the bargaining model. By bringing 
communication between the buyer and the seller before a bid is tendered, signalling 
is introduced to the model. The participants who receive this signal should take into 
account the cost of the signal when forming a bidding strategy.  
As cheap talk is introduced, theoretically, buyers should discount the message. This 
is a costless signal. For any buyer, the message provided by the seller should 
increase the complexity of the problem through the addition of superfluous 
information but should not detract from the probabilistic structure underlying the 
payoffs. 
To test if cheap talk influences the trust of buyers, this model is operationalized in a 
one-shot game using a between subject design. The experiment included five 
individual cheap talk treatments (visible in Figure 2.5). The narrative participants 
encounter is provided in the appendix. Participants are asked to play a game show 
where they are a buyer who must negotiate over the sale of ten locked boxes. The 
seller learns the value of the contents of these boxes and the participant must make 
an offer to the seller. The information asymmetry is public knowledge and 
participants are made aware that no future interaction will occur. They are also 
informed of the value of the boxes and that they are required to make only one 
decision. Participants randomly received one pre-play communication message and 
are then asked if they wished to make a bid.   
To control the type of message a buyer received, participants negotiated with a 
computerised seller. The seller in each bargain is programmed to randomly provide 
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one of five valuations for their boxes. These values ranged from the seller claiming 
Vs = £10,000 to Vs = £4,000. These claims are randomised for individual 
participants so that any one of five possible claims could be made to the buyer. 
Subsequent buyer bids are restricted to positive integers. No bid greater than £15,000 
is allowed. An opt-out route is included before offering participants the possibility to 
bid. This is included to allow participants follow the normative strategy of refusing 
to enter the trade and preventing a potential response elicitation or demand effect.  
In addition to carrying out the experiment, the participants are asked a series of 
qualitative questions relating to the extent they would agree with certain statements 
and are asked to provide a quantitative ability score (SRQA). These questions are 
available in the appendix and related to the buyer’s perception of the influence of 
cheap talk.   
The experiment is programed in Qualtrics survey software.  The general advantages 
of this software is that it allows cheap talk messages to be randomised and the game 
show to proceed in a logical fashion based upon a participant’s choice. Furthermore, 
Qualtrics software allows visualisations to be incorporated into the task, thus aiding 
participants in understanding the task and what is required of them.   
2.7.5 Participants 
Prolific Academic (PA) is the chosen platform to recruit participants for this 
experiment. This facilitated the recruitment of geographically and ethnically diverse 
participants. Specific pre-screening criteria is adopted to ensure high quality data 
collection. Only participants over 18 years of age with English as their official first 
language are recruited. Furthermore, only those with an Eligibility Requirements 
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Approval Rate (ERAR) of 90% that held a high post primary education are 
recruited22.  
The text of the narrative has a Flesch reading ease of 76.2 and a Flesch-Kincaid 
grade level 6.1 These readability test scores indicate that the narrative should be 
easily read by participants. Given the pre-screening procedures, a participant pool of 
10,888 participants remained (from an initial 41,050).  Participants are randomly 
sampled from this stratified pool. 
To ensure high quality data, two controls are introduced. Firstly, participants that fail 
the attention check question (ACQ/manipulation check) at the conclusion of the 
experiment are removed from the sample.  This ACQ is available appendix and the 
final sample subject to analysis must answer the ACQ correctly to be included in the 
dataset. Secondly, participants that progress past the payoffs and probability 
information in under half a standard deviation of the mean time are rejected; this 
constituted reading the main part of the experiment in under twenty-five seconds. 
This minimum timing threshold is devised in light of timed pilot experiments. 15% 
of the participants failed to either answer the ACQ correctly or meet the timing 
criteria (or failed to meet both). These participants are rejected, as they are deemed 
to have not understood the experiment. 
Over the course of the experiment three sampling periods were required so that the 
sample correctly answered the ACQ and fulfilled the timing requirements.  In the 
first sampling session 184 participants fulfilled the criteria successfully (30 
rejections). 23 (6 rejections) and 4 participants (0 rejections) are recruited in the 
                                                          
22 ERAR is a measure of how diligently participant’s performed in past studies.   
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second and third sampling round respectively. Participants are paid £0.50 for 
completing the task. This sampling strategy maximised the budget available.  
To summarise, two hundred and eleven participants are recruited to conduct the 
experiment. This comprised of one hundred and eleven males and one hundred 
females. No personal information is collected on participants. Each participant could 
however be individually identified through personalised identification number; this 
ensured that no participants completed the task more than once. The average reading 
time of the payoffs and probabilities stage of the experiment is 38.96 seconds (SD = 
25.82). The mean bidding time is 36.10 (SD = 27.11). 
2.7.6 Results 
Firstly, a high percentage of participants tender positive offers. Only nine 
participants (4.27% of the sample) follow a normative strategy of bidding £023. This 
is relatively similar to the original findings of Samuelsson and Bazerman (1985) who 
observed that 93% of participants rejected the normative bidding strategy. The 
average bid, regardless of a cheap talk treatment is £3,631 (SD = £2,447). The 
median bid is £4,000.  Figure 2.6 displays the distribution of bids for the entire 
sample. Similar to past studies on the AAC problem, the most frequent estimate is 
£5,000, the unconditional expected value of the asset. 
 
 
                                                          
23 This was relatively consistent with past research without cheap talk and pilots of this study where 
baseline effects (without cheap talk) are recorded. 6% of the samples played the solution concept in 




Turning to the outcome of the bargains, 46% result in impasse. Cursed winning 
bidders account for 35% of the sample. From seventy-four cursed trades, the average 
loss is £2,835 (SD = £1,804).  Four neutral trades are reported. These constitute 
successful but non-welfare enlacing exchanges. Thirty-six welfare-enhancing trades 
took place. This constitutes 17% of the sample. The average surplus from a trade to 
the buyer is £1,789 (SD = £751).  
To explicitly address the hypothesis, I now analyse the influence of heterogeneous 
cheap talk messages. Table 2.3 displays the descriptive statistics relating to bidding 
information for participants receiving different cheap talk messages across the 




















Figure 2.6 Distribution of Bids (% of Total Sample, N=211)
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Table 2.3 Descriptive Statistics for Five Bidding Treatments   
 
Normative bidding strategies are observed in all cheap talk conditions. The 
confidence intervals for the five treatments at the 95% level are [£2,799.81, 
£4,572.90], [£3,573.65, £5,184.88], [£2,578.14, £4,346.97], [£2,747.66, £3,954.89], 
and [£2,833.43, £ 3949.89] respectively24. Figure 2.7 displays a box plot revealing 
the median and the range of bids across cheap talk treatments outlined in Table 2.3 
(where group 1 corresponds to seller’s claiming Vs = £10,000).   
 
Table 2.4 and Figure 2.8 display the number of bidders per treatment and bidding 
category and the mean bid for the five alternative treatments, in light of the claimed 
                                                          







1 2 3 4 5
Figure 2.7 Bidding for Alternative Cheap Talk Treatments
Treatment (claim) N Mean Bid SD Min Max 
1 (Vs =£10,000) 45 £3,686 £2,916 £0 £10,500 
2 (Vs =£9,000) 41 £4,379 £2,552 £0 £10,000 
3 (Vs =£8,000) 41 £3,463 £2,802 £0 £9,000 
4 (Vs =£6,000) 39 £3,351 £1,862 £0 £6,500 
5 (Vs =£4,000) 45 £3,392 £1,858 £0 £8,000 
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value. As measured by the difference between the claimed value and mean bid, the 
highest level of distrust is observed when sellers claim that their asset is perfect (Vs 
= £10,000), with an average difference of £6,314 between the claimed value and 
mean bid (£3,686). The mean bid increases in treatment two and declines in the third 
treatment. In this sense, the level of distrust decreases as sellers claim to have lower 
value assets. Treatment one (Vs = £10,000) observes the highest level of suspicion 
with the greatest number of participants bidding over £0 but under £1,000 for the 
boxes. The highest mean bid is elicited when buyers reputed to have an asset valued 

























1 2 3 4 5
Figure 2.8 Mean Bid for Five Cheap Talk Conditions
Mean Bid
Claimed Value


















£9,999 >£10,000 n 
1 (Vs =£10,000) 2 12 3 0 3 5 10 4 3 0 2 1 45 
2 (Vs =£9,000) 1 5 2 3 2 5 12 5 3 0 2 1 41 
3 (Vs =£8,000) 3 7 5 3 3 2 6 7 1 3 1 0 41 
4 (Vs =£6,000) 2 4 1 4 10 5 10 3 0 0 0 0 39 
5 (Vs =£4,000) 1 3 2 8 13 8 4 3 2 1 0 0 45 
Total 9 31 13 18 31 25 42 22 9 4 5 2 211 
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While the results observed in the descriptive statistics are numerically consistent 
with the hypothesis, that appearing perfect increases suspicion, inferential statistical 
tests reveal no significant statistical differences between the treatments. A one-way 
ANOVA to compare the differences in alternative bidding categories does not report 
a statistically significant difference between the treatments (p<.01, F=1.25, p = 0.29). 
Additionally, non-parametric tests are conducted given the relatively small samples. 
This allows one to make no assumptions concerning the underlying distribution of 
the data. A Kruskal-Wallis test to compare mean ranks for the five alternative 
bidding treatments also reports no statistically significant difference between the 
cheap talk conditions (χ2 =4.98, p = 0.284).  No one sub-sample stochastically 
dominates another.  
Focussing solely on treatment 1 (n = 45) with M = £3,686 (SD =£2,916) and 
treatment 2 (n = 41) with M = £4,379 (SD =£2,552), an independent-sample t-test is 
performed to test if significant differences exists between the means bids of these 
individual treatments. This is analysed as it represents a change from appear 
perfecting to exhibiting a flaw. The distribution of bids is sufficiently normal in each 
treatment to warrant conducting a t-test (skewness; 0.387, 0.836, kurtosis; 0.202, 
0.817). Furthermore, the assumption of homogenous variances across treatments is 
satisfied (a Levene’s F test, reports F(83) = 0.19, p = 0.163). Although numerically 
different averages are recorded, an independent-sample t-test reports no statistically 
significant differences between both groups; t(83) = -1.1622, p = 0.2485. 
Consequently, the mean bids for those receiving a message that Vs = £10,000 did not 
differ statistically from those receiving a message that Vs = £9,00025. 
                                                          
25 This statistical result is supported by a non-parametric test between the mean bids of these 
individual treatments; a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test reports a p value of 0.340. 
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Although logically any cheap talk message should not influence a buyer’s offer, 71% 
of the sample agreed with the statement that the seller’s message influenced their 
bid, with 21% of participants consenting to cheap talk strongly affecting their bid. 
Despite the influence of cheap talk, buyers still displayed a high level of distrust 
following the message they are provided. Over 90% of participants in each of the 
first four subsamples tendered an offer lower than the value of the seller’s claim. 
This distrust is highest when sellers appeared to have a perfect asset, claiming it to 
be worth £10,000. In this case, 98% of the sample made an offer lower than £10,000. 
The highest level of trust is observed in the final treatment, where a seller has 
claimed their asset is worth £4,000. In this treatment, 40% of the sample made an 
offer equal to or above the claimed value.  
No substantial variation is observed between the bids of males (£3,941, SD = 
£2,487) and females (£3,375, SD = 2,410). Male and female buyers do not differ in 
their levels of suspicion with both displaying a high level of distrust in light of a 
cheap talk message. This finding is consistent with the recent experimental results of 
Di Cagno et al (2015).  
To consider the effects of trade and the influence of specific messages Figure 2.9 
provides a visualisation of the trade outcomes from the buyer’s perspective across 
the five treatments.  The red data points indicate ‘cursed trades’ while the yellow 
data points signify welfare-enhancing trades (those which occur within the positive 
bargaining zone). The green data-points signify neutral trades. 
 
 











Seller Claim Vs = £10,000 Seller Claim Vs = 9,000 
Seller Claim Vs = £8,000 Seller Claim Vs = £6,000 
Seller Claim Vs = £4,000 
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The lowest number of welfare enhancing trades occurred in treatment 1, when sellers 
claim Vs = £10,000. This treatment also observed the lowest number of trades in 
total (27% of the sample). When compared to treatment 1 (Vs =£10,000), a greater 
number of welfare enhancing trades are observed as seller’s claim to have lower 
valued assets (Vs =£9,000, 8; Vs =£8,000, 7; Vs =£6,000, 8; Vs =£4,000, 9). 
Finally, no evidence exists to suggest that self-reported quantitative abilities relate to 
a participants’ optimal performance in the task. The average SRQA score is 6/10. 
While no participant’s that followed the normative strategy submitted a SRQA 
below 5, a participants’ optimal performance in the task did not relate to their SRQA. 
Oppositely, the average bid for participants with a SRQA of 10/10 is the highest for 
the entire sample while the lowest SRQA recorded the lowest bid on average (albeit 
small sample sizes existed for both). Figure 2.10 displays the mean bids for the 
alternative SRQA levels. The left hand axis measures the percentage of the sample 
that reported a specific SRQA and the right hand axis measures the average bid. 





2.7.7 Discussion & Conclusion – Experiment I 
This experiment began by questioning whether cheap talk can have subtle 
psychological effects using the AAC bargaining model. In particular, the study 
hypothesises that appearing perfect when bargaining under uncertainty can cause one 
to be trusted less. As Figure 2.8 displays - sellers are trusted more, as measured by 
difference between the claimed value and mean bid, when they claim to hold an asset 
of lower value. Even though this claim is non-credible and costless, buyers show a 
tendency to distrust sellers who appear perfect. Whilst no statistical differences are 
observed between cheap talk treatments, sellers are distrusted most when they claim 
that their asset is perfect (treatment 1, Vs = £10,000). The prevailing levels of 
suspicion expressed in buyer’s bids, coupled with a consensus from buyers that a 
seller’s claim matters, suggests that buyers find it challenging to ignore the noise that 


















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 2.10 Mean Bids for SRQA Levels
% of Sample Average Bid
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Despite a common incidence of cursed winning bids across all cheap talk treatments, 
the frequency of trade increases as seller’s claim to have lower value assets. A 
seller’s claim that Vs = £10,000 is associated with the lowest levels of trade. The 
higher rates of impasse observed in this treatment supports the hypothesis that high 
valued claims are treated with greater levels of suspicion. Despite the lack of 
statistically significant results, the rate of welfare enhancing trades increases when 
sellers claimed a degree of imperfection at Vs = £9,000.  
The results reported in this experiment add to the literature that consider the role of 
communication effects in bargaining. In a general sense, it supplements the literature 
which questions if decision-making is affected by uninformative interactions. In 
particular, this experiment builds on the work of Valley et al (1998) and Di Cagno et 
al (2015) who explore the role of communication in the AAC game. The results 
generate further interesting questions relating to communication. Firstly, buyers 
generally agree that cheap talk influences their bidding behaviour.  Do buyers anchor 
on this information or does the insertion of cheap talk increase the strategic 
complexity of the adverse selection problem further? Only 4.27% of the sample 
disregarded the cheap talk message and offered a bid that reflected an equilibrium 
strategy.  
Inclusive of this study, research on the effects of cheap talk communication in the 
AAC problem has explored the effects of the medium of communication, the role of 
gender and, now, the impact of alternative messages. Several directions exist to 
explore the influence of communication further. One specific avenue open to future 
research is the need to demonstrate the specific value of alternative credible signals 
for sellers. This study has provided a benchmark measure of the bidding behaviour 
of informed buyers, when messages are costless. The question remains whether a 
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credible and costly signals would be ‘worth it’ for the seller given the bidding 
behaviour of participants in cheap talk treatments. Estimating the difference between 
costly and cheap signal is a viable avenue for future research for literature 
concerning communication and the AAC game.  
The aim of this experiment was to explore subtle communication effects in the AAC 
bargaining model, thereby providing a richer descriptive account of bargaining 
scenarios. In particular, this experiment focused on importing insights from social 
psychology to the domain of bargaining. Whereas initial research on the AAC 
problem could be classified as asocial, several previous articles have investigated 
strategic nuances of bargaining by incorporating communication to this game-
theoretic model.  Theoretically, sociality in the form of cheap talk communication 
should not influence another party, or provide a resolution to the underlying adverse 
selection problem. This has been argued theoretically for a long time but relatively 
few research articles have explored this claim experimentally (Farrell & Gibbons, 
1989). I investigated this further by asking whether a specific cheap talk message 
alters intrapersonal attractiveness and trust of those receiving a message. 
To recap, the key finding is that a negligible number of participants (4.27%) follow a 
normative bidding strategy and discount the cheap talk message. Cursed winning 
bidders accounted for 35% of the sample and 46% of the trades resulted in impasse. 
Although no statistically significant differences exist across cheap talk treatments, 
the highest level of distrust is observed when sellers claim that their asset is perfect 
(treatment 1, Vs = £10,000). This treatment also holds the fewest successful and 
welfare enhancing trades. While buyers do admit to being swayed by cheap talk, a 
considerable degree of distrust remains; this is evident from the low number of 
participants (<10%) who bid equal to or above the seller’s claim. The reported 
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SRQA does relate to a participant’s performance in the task but not in the direction 
one would expect. 
2.8 Experiment II: Insights to Seller Psychology in Bilateral Bargaining 
2.8.1 Background & Key Findings 
Since its development by William Samuelson and Max Bazerman (1985), 
experimental tests of the AAC bargaining game have largely focused on buyer 
(acquirer) behaviour, both in terms of the efficiency of trades and the buyer’s ability 
to learn to minimise losses. Extensive empirical evidence has documented the naïve 
bidding strategies on the part of buyers (Samuelson and Bazerman, 1985; Ball et al, 
1991; Foreman & Murnighan, 1996). Even experienced participants frequently 
formulate a bid that is equal to its unconditional expected value and thereby suffer 
from the winner’s curse, failing to appreciate the information embedded in a seller’s 
acceptance decision (Bazerman, 2002). In general, this curse is robust to strong 
learning techniques but can be diminished by training individuals (Idson et al, 2004).  
The aim of this experiment is to develop the AAC problem by concentrating on the 
rationality of sellers. To date, little attention has been placed on seller behaviour in 
this game. It appears an implicit assumption (and depending on the methods adopted 
can also be a required auxiliary hypothesis) that buyers participate against a seller 
who adopts rational strategies and exploits lesser informed individuals through a 
precise decision rule. This decision rule derives from the idea of selective acceptance 
– a rational seller will not trade an asset for less than its worth. Thus, buyers can only 
learn about the true value of an asset by having a bid accepted or rejected. This 
second experiment explores whether sellers behave optimally, anticipating the 
contingencies associated with more information and thus having the foresight to 
strategically avoid information.  
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I hypothesise that sellers will choose more information over less and will opt into a 
setting characterised by asymmetric information, thereby failing to foresee the future 
contingencies of their choices. Such a decision is naïve as it fails to acknowledge the 
interdependences of the negotiation and the gains from trade that can transpire from 
choosing to avoid additional information. While a rational analysis in this game 
would suggest that ignorance allows a potential solution, I propose that the 
temptation of more information may be too much for a seller who may succumb to 
‘cursing’ themselves by accessing new knowledge. A rational analysis shows that 
this causes trade to break down.    
The experiment is designed so to introduce a preliminary step to the AAC game and 
establish an individual choice task to ask whether sellers naively opt into an 
asymmetric (as opposed to a default symmetric) information setting established in 
the AAC bargaining model. The design, is based on an adaption of Samuelson and 
Bazerman’s (1985) original AAC game. Identical parametric structures to the 
experimental work of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) and later Ball et al (1991) are 
applied. 
The rationale for this study began with a theoretical insight for the AAC model 
(version 3 - Samuelson & Bazerman, 1985). This is that two-sided symmetric but 
imperfect information in bilateral bargains, (while obviously less effective than a 
two-sided symmetric complete information setting - full disclosure), should, on 
average, produce a greater number of welfare enhancing agreements than bargains 
characterised by one sided asymmetric information (impasse). This experiment seeks 
to consider this logic experimentally. Specifically, this experiment asks whether (i) 
participants adopting the role of sellers can understand the benefits of both parties in 
a trade remaining equally unenlightened rather than obtaining more information and 
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(ii) whether a greater number of two-sided symmetric but imperfect information 
settings produce a greater number of welfare enhancing exchanges.  
Both (i) and (ii) are important questions to test. Non-normative strategies adopted by 
sellers logically harm the allocation of resources. In scenarios of one-sided 
asymmetric information bargaining should conclude with impasse, once specific 
parameters are posited (Akerlof, 1970). Experimental and behavioural economists 
however have yet to empirically test whether sellers in bargaining understand the 
perils of additional information and whether those that do, produce a greater number 
of welfare enhancing trades than bargainers ‘cursed’ by knowing more. Extra 
knowledge or expertise has been recognised as a ‘cognitive handicap’ that leads one 
to underestimate the challenges unaware parties face (Hinds, 1999). 
Additionally, this work is concerned with the strategic behaviour of sellers whom opt 
into one-sided asymmetric information bargaining. Whereas ‘cheap talk’, in 
experiment I is computerised, it remains to be seen whether sellers engaged in 
alternative forms of deception. These alternative forms would be contingent on the 
true value of their asset. Supplementary questions important to this experiment 
include asking what messages sellers send to buyers if given the opportunity. Do 
sellers act deceptively in alternative means when provided with a flawless or 
worthless asset?  While deception is a complex phenomenon, occurring in multiple 
forms, the standard game-theoretic and formal interpretation of deception involves 
one agent in a negotiation sending information to another that does not match their 
actual ‘type’. With this definition, deception is measured by the frequency of 
imprecise states of nature revealed by individuals. For a detailed classification of 
deception, that includes many behavioural examples, see DePaulo, Kashy, 
Kirkendol, Wyer, and Epstein (1996 P.983). The authors distinguish between the 
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content of a lie, its reason, its extent and its target. A similar classification of lying is 
provided by Lewicki (1983). 
The major finding of experiment II is that decision makers frequently choose to take 
additional information in a setting where accessing it is not advantageous to trade. 
Only 22% of the sample followed normative decision rules, a strategy which 
qualitative evidence suggests is not informed by purely rational inferences.  
The next section of this experiment briefly reviews related literature that is specific 
to this research question but outside central literature previously considered for the 
AAC game. Interdisciplinary perspectives that consider the disadvantages of extra 
information and the ‘curse of knowledge’ are reviewed.  Section 2.8.3 briefly recaps 
the bargaining model and describes the additions to the basic model. Section 2.8.4 
introduces the experiment. This section considers matters relating to the design and 
procedures. Section 2.8.5 introduces the participants and 2.8.6 outlines the results. 
Section 2.8.7 discusses the findings and concludes the experiment. 
2.8.2 Related Literature 
The idea that less information in bargaining can be advantageous is not a new 
suggestion. Schelling (1957) reasoned that lesser informed bargainers can gain an 
advantage over better informed antagonists. Three years after this insight Schelling 
outlined how ignorance can also be a useful commitment mechanism (Schelling, 
1960). Both of Schelling’s works conceived less information as compatible with 
standard economic theory.   
Past experimental research has tested for the perverse effects of additional 
information relative to a counterpart. When it is wise to ignore additional 
information that only one party is privy to, individuals find it challenging to exploit 
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their information advantage in markets (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Weber, 1989). 
This ‘curse of knowledge’ implies that better informed parties may suffer losses 
when they hold additional information that they should selectively disregard or at 
times completely ignore. For instance, Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber (1989) 
conducted a two-stage study on fifty-one Wharton University students. The 
participants were firstly asked to predict the value of eight companies. Next, a 
second group of students were informed of the actual earnings of the companies and 
were required to trade assets in a double oral auction where the dividend is identical 
to the predictions of fifty-one students. Thus, this group had access to the actual 
company earnings. The trading results showed that prices generally started in the 
range of a ‘pure-bias’ and ‘no-bias’ prediction and move away from the pure bias 
condition. The known information is only partially discounted. In a separate 
experiment the authors showed that incentives and feedback did not reduce the bias 
but that market forces could.  
Smith (1991) also reported results from a continuous double auction where 
knowledge worked to the disadvantage of better informed participants in a market 
context.  In Smith’s (1991) experiment complete and private information conditions 
were compared. The evidence revealed that convergence to the equilibrium 
prediction occurred more rapidly under the private information condition then it did 
under the common, complete information condition.  
Finally, Keysar, Ginzel and Bazerman (1995) conducted an experiment where 
participants predicted buyer behaviour in a negotiation game. When participants 
knew the true value of the firm for sale they believed that buyers would be more 
willing to complete a sale when the negotiation is closer to the true value of the 
asset, even though the buyer still had to bid under uncertainty (the buyer is unaware 
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of the true value of the firm). Keysar et al (1995) conclude that their evidence 
constitutes as further validation for the curse of knowledge hypothesis.  
The general idea of the curse of knowledge has been applied to various domains 
since its initial application in economics. The most prominent borrowing has 
occurred from the fields of social and developmental psychology, where the curse of 
knowledge has been used as a tool to understand both adults’ and children’s 
difficulty in appreciating low levels of perspective taking (Birch, 2005; Birch & 
Bloom 2003). Table 2.5 provides an insight to the alternative domains in which the 
general idea of the ‘curse of knowledge’ has been applied since Camerer, 













Table 2.5 The Curse of Knowledge – An Interdisciplinary Perspective 
 
2.8.3 The Bargaining Model 
This section presents a condensed and adapted version of the basic negotiation model 
outlined in greater detail in section 2.3.1. This abridged version recaps on the 
essential features of the model and explains any additional features to the 
information structure of the game.  
The seller and the buyer do not know the value, v of an asset and consider v a 
random variable from a range of possible values that take the form of positive 
integers. Both parties are aware of a uniform probability distribution of possible 
values within the jointly known distribution f(v), [£0, £10,000]. The value for the 
buyer will be w(v) in light of this distribution. While the value of the asset to both 
parties will vary depending on the random distribution, regardless of v, the asset is 




The designers of technological equipment can 
underestimate the challenge posed to the users 
in terms of learning how to work specialised 
goods.   
Kennedy 1995 Accountancy; Auditing 
Auditors who are aware of unaudited book 
values may direct excessive attention to these 




2003 Organisational Theory 
The curse can act as a cognitive limitation that 





‘Expert blind spots’ can affect those with 
expertise in a subject matter, leading to higher 
standards being required from student learners.  
Bibas 2004 Law 
The amount awarded by judges can be lower 
when a motion is not previously heard. 
Birch 2005 Developmental Psychology 
The curse biases adults but importantly 
children’s social cognition, contributing to 
limitations in mental reasoning. 
Tobin 2009 Media; Entertainment 
Writers often take advantage of the curse of 
knowledge suffered by the viewer. This allows 
narrators to satisfy the audience with increased 
suspense.  
Pinker 2014 Linguistics 
The curse imposes a communication limitation 
on writers who appeal to specific rhetoric and 
thus fail to comprehend the mental model of 
the reader.  
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worth at least as much to the buyer as it is to the seller. Thus, w(v) ≥ v for all possible 
asset values. This represents gains that result from trade and ensures that reaching an 
agreement is welfare enhancing. Both the buyer and the seller are aware of the 
distribution f(v), and are aware that w(v) ≥ v.  
Both parties must settle on a price to trade; if no agreement on price is reached an 
impasse occurs. The asset is worth 50% more to the buyer than it is to the seller for 
all values and can be summarised as: 
w(v) = v1.5 where f(v) = v/10 for v ε [£0, £10,000] 
Neither the buyer nor the seller however knows v and w precisely, and hold 
probabilistic information of f(v). With equal information the expected value to the 
seller is half of the total value. As suggested in the background (2.8.1), I hypothesise 
that sellers will fail to foresee the implications of additional information, an action 
that will destroy the attractive properties of exchange. The normative strategy for a 
seller would be to refuse additional information and not learn the true value of the 
asset they have been endowed with26. By not having additional knowledge the true 
value of the asset would remain unknown to both the buyer and the seller. By 
introducing a preliminary step, a third move is added to the model; the initial choice 
to learn the value (move 1) is followed by the (computerised) buyer’s rational 
estimate (move two). Subsequently, the seller faces an acceptance or rejection 
decision (move three) The introduction of this first move is in contrast to the 
traditional two-stage sequential move game.  
                                                          
26 It is assumed that sellers would not seek to gain additional information to take advantage of, what 
they believed to be, naïve buyers. Qualitative analysis of the responses in this experiment never 
revealed this as a reason to take extra information.   
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In light of the structure of the game, a rational buyer under a setting of symmetric 
information (dual asymmetric information) should tender an offer between the 
expected value of the boxes to the seller up to the 50% greater than this expected 
value. This would naturally vary depending on a buyer’s appetite for risk. The 
rational strategy for buyers is to make a bid that is between half of the total value up 
to the expected value (£5,000-£7,500). A risk neutral seller should accept any bid 
equal to or above the expected value of the asset (£5,000). On the contrary, if a seller 
chooses to learn the true value of their asset, they enter a negotiation characterised 
by one-sided asymmetric information (the AAC game). Regardless of any 
communication they have with a buyer the true value of the contents is known to the 
seller and there is no positive bid at which a buyer can expect to make a profit on 
average based on the rules, payoffs and probabilities. The schematic below provides 
an insight to the model from the seller’s perspective and the normative strategy one 




Figure 2.11 Schematic for Seller Negotiation Model  
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
The schematic in Figure 2.11 displays the bargaining model and isolates the individual components that are operationalised experimentally. The seller’s initial 
choice to choose more or less information will direct the trade down one of two possible pathways. The rational buyer will refrain from trade (offering £0) if a 
participant chooses additional information. The buyer will make an offer in the symmetric information trade. 
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2.8.4 Task, Experimental Design & Procedures 
The task involves a novel version of the AAC game focusing on the sellers’ side of 
the bargain. The probability and payoff structure of the game adopt the same 
parametric structure of Samuelson and Bazerman – Version 3 (1985), Carroll et al 
(1988), Ball et al (1991) and Valley et al (1998). Participants are faced with a 
uniform probability distribution as outlined in the previous section. At the outset of 
the experiment the true value of the asset is unknown to both the buyer and the 
seller. Thus, a third stage is added to the game where the seller has a choice whether 
or not to access additional information. 
This model is operationalized in a one-shot game, similar to that of the previous 
experiment. The narrative participants encounter is provided in the appendix. 
Paralleling experiment I, participants play a game show where they are a seller who 
must negotiate over the sale of ten locked boxes. Each participant is given the role of 
the seller and are informed that their objective is to make as much money as 
possible. All participants are asked whether or not they wish to view the true value of 
their asset (a decision which is known to the buyer). If participants choose to look 
inside their boxes they are freely accessing more information.   
Once this occurs, the economic prediction is that the bargain ends in impasse. The 
rational decision of a buyer is not to enter negotiations. If a seller chooses to remain 
equally uninformed, rational buyers should offer an amount between the average 
values of the boxes to the seller up to the expected value of the asset to them, a value 
which risk neutral sellers would accept. The buyer is programmed to be a risk 
neutral, rational buyer. This entailed two strategic responses outlined in the previous 
schematic; either (i) offering a bid of £0 if sellers chose to learn the true value of 
their asset or (ii) offering a bid of £5,000 if sellers rejected additional information.  
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As a corollary, if a participant chooses more information they are also asked to send 
a (cheap talk) message to the seller. This message concerns how many boxes are 
empty. For the entirety of the experiment participants negotiated with a computerised 
buyer that always followed a normative bidding strategy that is not contingent on the 
message they received. For instance, if a participant chooses to learn the value of 
their boxes, regardless of their true value, the computerised buyer did not deviate 
from the equilibrium strategy of a £0 bid.  
In addition to carrying out the task, the participants are asked a series of qualitative 
questions which gave them an opportunity to explain their motivations for 
seeking/not seeking additional information, the strategy behind the message they 
sent (if they choose to look inside the boxes) and other questions relating to how 
much they believed a message would alter a buyer’s strategy. These are introduced 
to build an accurate assessment of whether participants foresee the contingencies 
associated with their choice. 
The experiment is programed in Qualtrics survey software. There are multiple 
advantages of using Qualtrics for this specific experiment. Specifically, for this 
experiment the software allowed all sellers to negotiate with a rational buyer who 
followed consistent decision rules based on a participant’s choice. 
Prolific Academic (PA) is the chosen platform to recruit participants for this 
experiment. As is the case with experiment I, a clear pre-screening strategy is 
formed. This is adopted to ensure high quality data collection. Only participants over 
18 with English as their official first language are recruited. Furthermore, only those 
with an ERAR of 90% that held a high post primary education are recruited. As an 
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additional filter, participants that had previously taken part in related tasks are 
prevented in accessing the experiment.  
The text has a Flesch reading ease of 74.8 and a Flesch-Kincaid grade level 6.1 
These readability test scores indicate that the narrative should be easily read by 
participants. Given the pre-screening procedures, a participant pool of 11,608 
participants remained (from an initial 44,406). Participants are randomly sampled 
from this stratified pool. 
2.8.5 Participants 
198 individuals participated in the experiment. Participants are recruited from two 
general populations; online participants (through the PA platform) and university 
students.  
An ACQ control (manipulation check) is included to ensure that participants 
understood the probabilities and payoffs of the game. This ACQ is available 
appendix. Participants that could not answer this question correctly are likely to have 
not understood the task.  Four participants failed to complete the survey and seven 
participants incorrectly answered the ACQ. These seven participants also only spent 
between six and twenty-two seconds reading information on the games payoffs and 
probabilities, this is far below the average time of 57.1 seconds and hence these 
observations are removed from the sample, leaving a remaining forty-seven 
responses.  
The online version of the experiment is conducted via PA. To ensure high quality 
data using PA, two controls are introduced. Firstly, participants that failed the ACQ 
survey are removed from the sample. Secondly, (and as is the case in experiment I) 
participants that progressed past the payoffs and probability information in the 
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experiments in under half a standard deviation of the mean time are rejected. 15% of 
the participants failed to either answer the ACQ correctly or met the timing criteria 
(or failed to meet both). This constituted 32 submissions. These participants are 
rejected, as they are deemed to have not understood the experiment. A resampling 
process commenced for replacement participants. In total two sampling period were 
required so that the sample correctly answered the ACQ and fulfilled the timing 
requirements. Participants are paid £0.35c for completing the task that took 
approximately four minutes. This sampling strategy maximised the budget available.  
A total of fifty-eight university participants are also recruited to conduct the 
experiment via the Qualtrics software. These participants constituted undergraduate 
finance studies in University College Cork. Twenty-eight are female and thirty are 
male. The participants are aged between nineteen and twenty-two and had no 
previous training in game theory. All participants would have completed an 
introductory course to statistics and quantitative methods.   
2.8.6 Results 
The primary variable of interest in this study is seller cognition in relation to their 
decision whether to access more information. On average participants took 22.66 
seconds to reach their decision to learn the true value or not. This indicates that the 
chosen strategy is not done so in haste. As hypothesised 155 participants (78%) 
followed a naïve strategy and choose to learn the value of their asset, thereby 
entering an asymmetric information negotiation setting (AAC game) with the buyer.  




This result suggests that the majority of sellers, in a similar vein to the majority of 
buyers who partake in the standard AAC game, fail to foresee the implications or 
contingencies associated with their decision. Sellers are generally not cognisant of 
any impending normative logic which is implied in the information structure and 
rules of the game when making their decision. Of the 155 participants that failed to 
follow the normative strategy, 148, refused the (rational) buyer’s equilibrium bid of 
£0. This resulted in 148 impasses. 7 participants accepted the normative bid of £0, as 
they are randomly drawn a worthless asset.  Although this trade occurred it is not 
welfare enhancing.  
The average SRQA of the sample is 6.51 (SD = 2.14) where 0 is ‘extremely weak’ 
and 10 is ‘extremely strong’. No difference is observed between the SRQA of those 
that choose to look inside the boxes (6.49, SD = 2.19) and those that did not (6.58, 
SD = 1.96). An unpaired t-test confirms that no statistically significant difference in 
self-reported quantitative skills exists across those who access and do not access 
additional information (T=-0.2282, p = 0.8197). No differences relating to gender or 
the alternative samples (university students versus PA) is observed. Of the 43 
participants that followed the normative strategy, 22 sellers traded (11% of the total 
sample) while 21 rejected the bid of £5,000. This increased the rate of impasse to 
85% of trades.  
An important question to consider is whether a rational buyer returns higher gains 
from trade when participants choose not to look in their boxes. At a minimum, 
accepted bids from those who traded produced a neutral net welfare gain. The 
average distribution of the welfare gain across the 22 trades is as follows. 13 of the 
22 trades resulted in positive gains for the buyer. Accepted bids under symmetric 
information (dual asymmetric information) resulted in, on average, positive net 
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returns of £2,295 for the buyer. Positive seller returns took place in 11 of the 22 
trades.  On average, accepted bids resulted in positive net returns of £136 for the 
seller. This result suggests that risk sharing through information avoidance can 
increase the efficiency of exchanges. 
Figure 2.12 displays the returns to buyers and sellers for these 22 exchanges. In 
addition to the distribution, the net welfare effect is displayed. 3 of the 22 successful 














































Figure 2.12 Returns Distributions with Normative Bidding Strategies 
Seller Returns Buyer Returns Net Welfare
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The 155 participants who choose to learn the value of their boxes also are given an 
opportunity to send the buyer a (cheap talk) message regarding the true value of their 
asset. As suggested in the rationale, exploring strategic behaviour on the part of the 
seller, especially deceptive behaviour, is of interest and a natural follow on from 
experiment I.  Figure 2.13 displays the average value sellers claimed their boxes to 
be worth in light true value. For efficiency purposes, sellers are allocated to one of 
five treatments (10, 8, 6, 4 or 0 gold coins – these correspond to groups 1 through to 
5). As any participant that choose to look into the boxes are randomly drawn one of 
the five treatments, the sample sizes for the groups ranged from 29 to 31. 
 
On average sellers claimed that their boxes are worth between £4,379 and £6,700 
regardless of the true value.  Sellers that had a ‘perfect’ asset (treatment 1) 
underrepresented its true value, on average claiming that their boxes are worth 
£6,700. Participants underrepresented the true value of assets worth £8,000 but did 
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undervalued in treatment 1). On average, participants overestimated the value of 
boxes worth £6,000 to £0. The boxes worth £4,000 and £0 are on average claimed to 
be worth £5,451 and £4,379 respectively. A Kruskal-Wallis test to compare means 
ranks across the treatments reports a statically significant differences (χ2 =13.135, p 
= 0.01). No statistical difference between genders are observed. Of the 155 
participants that choose additional information, the 86 males and 69 females both 
overvalued their asset on average (M = £500, F = £642). 
A Likert scale is used to measure whether sellers believed that their message 
influenced the decision of the buyer (0 = strongly believing that a message would 
influence the buyer’s bid; 100 = strongly disagreeing that a message would influence 
the buyers bid). The mean reported score for this scale is 36.93 (SD = 30.05).  Nine 
participants that opted for additional information strongly disagreed (100) that their 
message would influence the buyers bid. This data could be interpreted as further 
evidence that individuals failed to foresee the contingencies associated with learning 
the true value of their boxes. Participants with additional information believed that 
their message would influence the buyer.   
Figure 2.14 displays the rate of deception for each of the five conditions. Deception 
is considered a binary variable and is shown a percentage of the sample on the right 
hand axis. Both overestimating and underestimation of the true value of the asset is 
considered deception. Formally, deceptive actions are frequent (this occurred when 
the seller in a negotiation sent information to the buyer that did not explicitly equal 
the actual value of their asset). Of the 155 participants who choose to learn the true 




The rates of deception are highest in treatment one (perfect asset) and condition five 
(worthless asset). Whilst the deception in treatment one is explained by participants 
underestimating the true value of the asset, treatment five solely concerns deception 
through overestimating.     
Clues to explaining this pattern of deception are available through qualitative data 
gathered from participants. These explanations relate to plausibility and profit 
making arguments. For instance, one participant with high value boxes suggested 
that “4 empty boxes are believable (emphasis added) but will still lead to a large 
offer, larger than the value of the coins I have, allowing me to make a profit.” 
Equally, participants who held worthless assets lied for the obvious reasons that “it 
(the lie) would force him to pay a higher price for each box”. Participants with low 
valued assets also engaged in deception due to plausibility reasons. One participant 
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Figure 2.14 True Seller Value & Rate of Deception
True Value Rate of Deception
99 
 
boxes, and when I had 10 empty boxes I was bluffing with a believable (emphasis 
added) amount because there's nothing to lose.” 
2.8.7 Discussion & Conclusion – Experiment II 
In this experiment only 22% of the sample followed the predictions of normative 
theory by adopting information avoiding strategies. As the majority of the literature 
on the AAC game considers the sub-optimal decision of buyers, the evidence in this 
experiment shows that sellers can make similar suboptimal decisions too when their 
task is cognitively complex (and they must consider contingencies). 22 trades are 
successfully completed when sellers choose not to learn the true value of their assets, 
13 of which produced positive gains for the buyer. While the distribution of gains 
favoured the buyer, adopting strategies to avoid additional information produced 
welfare enhancing trades.  
Most AAC game research features rational sellers who have an easy decision to 
accept or reject an offer. The experiment here is based on a rational buyer when the 
computationally challenging task is switched to the seller’s side. The imposition 
causes sellers to also make naïve decisions (discounting the fact that they learn the 
value as they hope buyers will not realise the implications). While a significant body 
of evidence points towards irrational buyers in bilateral bargains, the evidence 
presented here supports that idea that sellers exhibit similar tendencies when 
contingencies exist.  
Interestingly, sellers opt to engage in more deceptive behaviour when their assets are 
either worthless (overvaluing) or perfect (undervaluing). The fact that the sellers 
adopt sophisticated cheap talk strategies and believe that these message would 
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influence a buyer add further credence to the argument that sellers fail to appreciate 
the hazards associated with learning the true value of their asset.  
A natural question that arises is to ask if those that remained uninformed did so by 
chance or foresight? Qualitative evidence supports the former idea. Those that 
choose less information did not suggest that the contingency as a motivation for this 
choice. The rationale for not choosing addition information did not relate to foresight 
and fell into three broad categories; fairness concerns, emotional worries (unnerve 
the opponent, increased thrill), and indifference, as the ultimate value would remain 
the same. Three participants provided ‘the right reasons’ for rejecting additional 
information. These individuals understood that the buyer’s bid is intrinsically linked 
to this decision.    
Much ink has been spilled arguing that buyers pursue naïve bidding strategies when 
deciding under uncertainty in bilateral bargains. The other side of the coin remains 
surprisingly underdeveloped. This small-scale experiment encourages more work 
specifically on the sellers’ side of bargains under (a)symmetric information. There 
are several directions for future research in this area; firstly, there is a question of 
learning, do sellers learn to reject additional information in multiple rounds of this 
game. If so, how does this compare to buyer learning speeds in the traditional 
version of the AAC game?  Secondly, as impasse in such games happens to a lesser 
extent in face-to-face negotiations sellers may be more likely to adjust their 
behaviour in these contexts. The idea of addressing face-to-face bargaining (from the 
perspective of the seller) is an avenue for future research, particularly as this medium 
of interaction is an important predictor of cooperation rates (Sally, 1995). Finally, in 
the experiment there are strict assumptions governing buyer behaviour and no costs 
associated with acquiring additional information for the seller. Altering these 
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parameters would likely lead to different results. For instance, if costs are imposed 
on sellers to build an asymmetry over a buyer, participants may revaluate the 
benefits of additional information.   
Whereas buyers generally fail to focus on the decision rules of informed sellers in 
the AAC game, sellers also generally fail to foresee the perils of additional 
information, exhibiting a difficulty to perform contingent reasoning on future events. 
Only 22% of the sample could follow a normative strategy and trade occurred in 
only twenty-two bargains. 78% of the sample followed a naïve strategy and choose 
to learn the value of their asset, thereby entering an asymmetric information 
negotiation setting (AAC game) with the buyer. This temptation to learn the true 
value on the part of sellers is tantamount to opening ‘Pandora’s box’. The seller’s 
action to gain additional information leads an unforeseen challenge, ultimately 
leaving them cursed.   
Given the structure of the AAC game, sellers are cursed by opting for more 
information and thereby electing not to share any risk with a buyer. Logically, 
welfare enhancing agreements are restricted with additional information. It is likely 
that sellers are not even aware of this curse; there is no evidence of a significantly 
lower level SRQA for those that do gain extra knowledge and those that learn the 
true value of their asset frequently adopt sophisticated strategies to deceive their 
uninformed counterpart in the trade. They commonly believed that their message 
would influence a buyer’s bidding strategy. These results can serve to connect 




3. ESSAY TWO - WINNER ALRIGHT? HIGH-STAKES BIDDING AND 
RETURNS TO OWNERSHIP IN THE UK AND IRISH THOROUGHBRED 
HORSERACING INDUSTRY 
3.1 Introduction  
This essay conducts an ex-post productivity evaluation of 1,681 thoroughbred foals 
sold between 2007 and 2008 in UK and Irish public auctions. Doing so is 
advantageous as this domain offers a novel opportunity to study competitive bidding 
at high-stakes. Not only is a substantial volume of data available on thoroughbred 
auctions but, in particular, the dominant statistic of a thoroughbred’s lifetime 
winnings provides a precise measure to monetise each asset’s output. This allows 
one to determine the productivity of these assets ex-post (Smith, Staniar & Splan, 
2006; Langlois & Blouin, 2007).   
The advantages of studying thoroughbred auctions go beyond the non-trivial sums 
committed or measurement considerations. As thoroughbred sales are recurring 
competitive events, one would expect this auction environment to be populated with 
bidding agents who have ample opportunity to learn. Furthermore, the informational 
features on offer are rarely, if ever, represented in other naturally occurring auctions 
- foal auctions provide restricted informational conditions that can approximate 
laboratory environments. Given each asset’s infantile status, there are minimal 
disparities in information across potential buyers. No knowledge of their training or 
earnings potential is available at the time of sale to a bidder at auction as foals are 
usually only ‘broken in’ as yearlings (a process known as halter-breaking). Thus, the 
potential for information differences between buyers is significantly reduced when 
compared to yearling markets where information leakages can occur. If sellers have 
additional and valuable information later in a thoroughbred’s lifecycle (for instance, 
knowledge relating to medical history, physical attributes or psychological profile), 
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adverse selection problems can emerge (Chezum & Wimmer, 1997). In the case of 
this study, at the time of auction all potential buyers only have access to a foal’s 
pedigree and past veterinary reports. Thus, foal auctions offer a clean but naturally 
occurring information structure. For these reasons, this market offers a fitting 
naturalistic environment to study bidding behaviour from the perspective of 
behavioural economics.  
Although few studies have considered this auction context, fewer still have evaluated 
the returns to the assets sold or considered alternative economic and psychological 
explanations for the patterns observed. Besides analysing thoroughbreds from their 
earliest sales point, this essay offers two further steps forward. The first is 
methodological; the sample evaluated is not restricted by thoroughbred bloodline or 
gender and data are accessed on environmental characteristics such as trainer 
specific characteristics. Additionally, I access data on thoroughbreds that are sold but 
do not appear on the racetrack. This sampling strategy offers a clearer picture of the 
industry’s operations. Secondly, the dataset facilities a basic exploration of two 
behavioural arguments proposed to explain the net returns. Neither principle-agent 
problems arising between owners and trainers or diversification strategies adopted by 
owners have been empirically explored as route to explain returns in horseracing.  
A unique feature of this study is that it concentrates on the horseracing industry in 
the British Isles. While the basic sporting operations of thoroughbred horseracing are 
alike on either side of the Atlantic, the traditions and institutional features of the 
industry have evolved differently. To date, this topic has been studied in the context 
of American thoroughbred horseracing only and, as is understood, a detailed 
assessment of bidding efficiencies has yet to be conducted for thoroughbred 
horseracing in the UK and Ireland. Thus, the findings presented here offer a basis for 
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comparison and can provide a practical guide for those developing bidding strategies 
within the industry.    
The results provide empirical weigh to a commonly held belief - a high percentage of 
thoroughbreds sold at auction incur net negative returns. The scale of losses is 
amplified as winning auction bids increase. Once winning bids exceed 
approximately €20,000, on average, losses are incurred on these assets. Taking 
bidding power as a measure of an owner’s status suggests that absolute risk aversion 
decreases with wealth. The results reported here can inform a wider debate relating 
to the motivations of owners.  
The next section offers a comprehensible guide on the workings of the industry in 
Ireland and the UK, focusing on the means of purchasing thoroughbreds and their 
maturation process. Section 3.3 provides a brief background to the few studies of this 
topic. Section 3.4 introduces the empirical framework, specifying the auction details 
and productivity data. Section 3.5 conducts an analysis of ex-post returns. Two 
previously unexplored behavioural explanations for the observed results are 
addressed at the end of this section. Section 3.6 briefly offers two possible 
explanations for the observed patterns. Section 3.7 concludes the essay and offers 
suggestions for future research in light of the findings and limitations of the study. 
3.2 A Primer on the UK & Irish Thoroughbred Industry 
There are multiple ways to purchase a thoroughbred racehorse in the UK and Ireland. 
Thoroughbreds can be acquired through (i) a claiming race - where all horses 
running are for sale, (ii) leasing agreements - where there is no commitment required 
from the buyer to purchase the asset, (iii) through a private purchase - where a buyer 
negotiates a price and is sold the asset directly from a stud farm, breeder or trainer 
105 
 
and finally, (iv) through an auction. These auctions constitute the most common 
sales mechanism and are usually organised by the age of the animal for sale and, in 
the case of foals, occur late in the calendar year.  
Importantly, a limited but equal information set is available to all interested parties. 
For buyers, decision making is commonly directed by the heritage of the 
thoroughbred. While heritable traits act as important indicators to buyers, genetic 
evidence suggests that approximately only 35% of the variation in a thoroughbred’s 
performance is attributed to genetic lineage (Gaffney & Cunningham, 1988). The 
Irish Horseracing body publicly discloses this inherent uncertainty to potential 
buyers, suggesting that the attribution to genetics can even be as low as 9% (Horse 
Racing Ireland, 2009 P.32). Therefore, regardless of quality of a thoroughbred’s 
genes, there is no guarantee of success based on breeding characteristics alone.  
Initially, auction companies list each foal in internationally published catalogues 
approximately one month prior to an auction. These catalogues provide access to 
each foal’s pedigree, veterinary reports, date of birth and the performance data of 
their relatives on the racetrack. Therefore, during an auction all potential buyers only 
have access to this information. Potential buyers are also permitted to vet the foal 
before it enters the sales ring. This allows buyers to subjectively evaluate the 
conformation of a foal, in addition to assessing its bone structure, movements and 
other factors that allow necessary due diligence. Buyers may also assess a foal for 
psychological characteristics such as temperament. 
The auctions for foals considered here are conducted in the format of an English 
auction where the highest current bid assumes the position of the standing bid. In this 
format, the signal (bid) of every interested party is known during the auction. By 
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dropping out one is disclosing their maximum valuation of the asset for sale.  
Owners who win an auction can be individuals, partnerships (which consist of 
between two and four people) and syndicates (which consist of up to twenty 
members).   
All foals are registered with the same birth date (1st of January). This allows 
organisers to group thoroughbreds into races and to follow bloodlines. The animals 
range in weight from approximately 31.8kg to 65.5kg at birth. They are suckled by 
their dam, in most cases for six months, grow quickly and reach 90% of their adult 
size by the time they are two years old (Horse Racing Ireland, 2009). Thus, by the 
age of two, far more information is known about the potential quality of the 
thoroughbred. The thoroughbreds are ‘broken-in’ (usually as yearlings). This is an 
initial step in their preparation to race and compete for prize money. Later, they are 
prepared for racing by a trainer. The training process usually involves detailed 
attention to the thoroughbred’s dietary requirements and exercise routines.  
The winning bidder at auction is not permitted to race their asset until it is two years’ 
old.  Once a thoroughbred reaches two years of age (and is appropriately trained) 
they are eligible to enter races where there is an opportunity to earn significant prize 
money to recoup the initial purchase price. Given the distribution of racing talent, 
thoroughbreds are grouped into similar racing classes to safeguard competitive 
balance. The best thoroughbreds are those that win the highest amount of prize 
money, often by performing in lucrative races known as the Classics such as the 
1,000 Guineas Stakes, the Epsom Derby and the St. Leger Stakes. In addition to this, 
other Group 1 races offer substantial prize money to successful entrants. For 
example, the winner of the Epsom Derby earns approximately £850,000. In the 
majority of races, prize money is offered in a descending scale from the first horse to 
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placed horses that finish second or third in a race. On occasion prize money is 
offered to entrants ranked lower. In general, an inverse relationship exists between 
the class of race and the prize money on offer. 
Depending on the ability of the thoroughbred they can have alternative career lengths 
and can run in different types of races. Generally, thoroughbreds that are recognised 
for their speed participate in more lucrative ‘flat’ races. That is in contrast to national 
hunt horses that participate in slower and longer races over hurdles and fences. Flat 
horses usually begin their career at two, with some of the most lucrative races taking 
place when they are three. These flat horses commonly peak between the ages of 
four and five and can retire as young as four years old.  Flat races are the primary 
focus of this essay.  
Thoroughbreds that are not recognised for their speed often participate in national 
hunt races, which involves thoroughbreds jumping hurdles and fences. National hunt 
thoroughbreds usually begin a career at a mature stage, usually about four years old. 
These thoroughbreds have longer careers than flat horses and, in some cases, can 
race up to the age of thirteen. They generally peak between approximately seven and 
eight years old.  
Given the distribution of prize money attached to particular races, long careers do 
not necessarily lead to a greater probability of high earnings; often elite horses must 
be selective about the races they enter. Trainers and owners may act strategically, 
attempting to maximise a thoroughbred’s return while minimising the likelihood of 
fatigue or injury. Once their career is complete, elite horses commonly retire to stud 





While past research has explored pricing models for thoroughbreds (Parson & Smith, 
2008; Robert & Stowe, 2016) sire stud fees (Stowe 2013) and the impact of 
disclosures on pricing (Plant & Stowe, 2013), analyses of bidding efficiencies and 
adverse selection effects have been rare and are restricted to the American 
thoroughbred industry (Chezum & Wimmer, 1997; Wimmer & Chezum, 2003). A 
series of contributions and replies at the turn of the century offer the only analysis of 
the topic to date (Gamrat & Sauer, 2000; Ray, 2001; Gamrat & Sauer, 2001; 
DeGennaro, 2003). 
Gamrat and Sauer (2000) initiated a discussion of returns to thoroughbred 
investment by revealing that owners pay a greater sum for an asset than its expected 
present value of cash flows. Less than half of their sample of 805 fillies recoup their 
initial cost. While this is a behavioural trait which a rational investor interested in 
maximising returns should avoid, the authors interpret the difference between mean 
returns and auction price as a measure of the non-pecuniary utility of ownership. 
They propose that a participation premium model to enter the sport is supported by 
the data (Gamrat & Sauer, 2000). This is in contrast to a pure championship model, 
where one would assume a causal relationship between the fee paid for a 
thoroughbred and probability of success on the track.  
The insights of Gamrat and Sauer (2000) were subject to discussion, particularly in 
terms of their sampling strategy. The data accessed is restricted to a sample of fillies 
only and did not take account of environmental factors relating to performance (Ray, 
2001). Further comment on Gamrat and Sauer (2000) is provided by DeGennaro 
(2003). In short, DeGennaro (2003) suggested that a non-linear relationship may 
exist between the distribution of thoroughbred prices and the expected returns of a 
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horse. In turn, this poses challenges to distinguishing between a championship model 
and a participation model; as the distribution of talent is highly skewed, few 
thoroughbreds sold at auction will become elite horses. To date, no additional data 
has been provided on this topic. While this essay does not attempt to solve the 
challenging problem posed by DeGennaro (2003), several of the sampling issues 
raised by Ray (2001) are addressed here, in particular I collect data across 
thoroughbred gender.  
3.4 Empirical Framework 
The empirical section of this essay focusses on the net returns of foals auctioned 
between 2007 and 2008. Information on the thoroughbreds is captured at two points 
in time. Firstly, when an auction sale took place and secondly when a thoroughbred’s 
flat career concluded.   
The monetary returns of each asset, that is their net profit or loss, are treated as the 
dependent variable. As opposed to win ratios, the net returns of a thoroughbred 
adjust for the quality of races entered. As one cannot simply model how a buyer will 
form expectations about a foal at time of sale, evaluating the ex-post productivity of 
the asset at time period two is the most logical manner to proceed.  Fundamentally, 
this method is a ‘first-pass’ test of efficiency (Burger & Walters, 2008). 
3.4.1 Auction Procedures & Data  
The dataset for this study is assembled manually through online resources. Data are 
accessed for foal sales from four auctions in Ireland (two) and England (two) 
between 2007 and 2008. These dates are chosen as in the majority of cases foals sold 
at these auctions had completed their careers by the end of the 2015 racing season. 
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The data for these auctions are accessed from the Racing Post Bloodstock Sales 
Database. Table 3.1 summarises the key details of the auctions.  
The two auction houses that organised the sales are Goffs and Tattersalls. All 
auctions occurred over a five-day period and followed an ascending bid or English 
auction format. At the time of bidding all potential owners were assumed to be aware 
of the possible rewards available to these foals once they have matured. Owners in 
Western Europe have their own interest group (AIRO) which was established to 
protect these financial interests. The group has specific goals that include 
maintaining and increasing prize money in races.   
Table 3.1 Auction Details 
Date 
Auction 
House Lots Withdrawn Sales Unregistered Removed N 
17-21 Nov 
2008 Goffs 1253 750 503 136 60 307 
25-29 Nov 
2008 Tattersalls 1251 688 563 123 51 389 
18-22 Nov 
2007 Goffs 1270 603 667 189 48 430 
27 Nov-1 Dec 
2007 Tattersalls 1390 597 793 190 48 555 
Source: Racing Post Bloodstock Sales Database 
 
The clearance rates for the four auctions ranged from 40.1% to 57.1%. For each 
auction a high percentage of total lots are either withdrawn or not sold. This 
regularly occurs as a foal may fail to reach a reserve price. From the remaining sales, 
a proportion of foals auctioned are unregistered. These are not named at the time of 
sale and could not be identified. Additionally, a proportion of lots sold are removed 
for one of two reasons. Firstly, an observation is removed if a thoroughbred’s career 
had not concluded as their total productivity is only subject to partial measurement. 
The most common reason for a thoroughbred not to have finished their career was 
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that they not only entered flat races but also competed in National Hunt horseracing. 
Thoroughbreds that have a dual registration normally compete for a longer time 
period than horses that solely run in flat races. National Hunt thoroughbreds can race 
until the age of twelve or older in some cases. Secondly, observations are removed if 
there is incomplete information concerning the thoroughbred’s earnings over the 
course of their career27. All foals that remained in the sample concluded their careers 
between 9th October 2009 and 23rd of September 2015. 
Information is available on the characteristics of 1,681 individual lots. Specific 
physical information is collected on each of the foals such as their colour (Black 
73%, Chestnut 19%, Grey 5% Brown 3%), sex (62.6% Colts; 37.4% Fillies), and 
relations (205 Sires, 1580 Dams). In addition, information regarding the specific lot 
is recorded; data are available on each foal’s breeder (1062), sales vendor (567), new 
owner (1102) and future trainer (665). 31 owners are recorded as syndicates (which 
consist of up to twenty members). Importantly, the winning auction bid for each foal 
is recorded. All winning bids are converted to euros and historical exchange rates are 
used to standardise the values28. Figure 3.1 displays the distribution of winning bids 
in ascending order. The average winning bid is €42,047.52 (SD = €58,631.31). The 
lowest winning bid is €991.03 while the highest winning bid is €655,192.10. 
                                                          
26 For instance, thoroughbreds may enter races in countries outside of Ireland and UK where no 
earnings data was accessible. 
27 Bids in English foal auctions are occasionally made in Guineas. These bids are converted to pounds 
sterling, and subsequently Euros, at the given exchange rates for the dates of the auction. A guinea 
was historically equal to one pound and one shilling (£1.05). Sales companies still use guineas, 




3.4.2 Productivity Data  
The productivity measure of lifetime earnings for each lot is accessed from the Irish 
Racing database. Irish Racing is a website owned by The Irish Times Ltd and 
provides comprehensive statistics on Irish, British and major international 
horseracing. In addition, data are collected on each lot’s number of starts during their 
career, number of wins, place finishes (2nd-3rd) and career length in days. Table 3.2 
provides descriptive statistics for the thoroughbreds. 
Table 3.2 Productivity Details 
Productivity 2007-2015 (n=1,681) Mean SD Min Max 
Starts 12.75 13.62 0 83 
Wins 1.37 2.06 0 13 
Places 2.60 3.64 0 22 
Career Length (Days Active) 25 579 0 2346 




















Figure 3.1 The Distribution of Winning Auction Bids in Ascending Order 
113 
 
The minimum activity for any lot is zero. This occurred if a horse only had one race 
in their career. Thus, a racehorse’s career start and end occurred at the same point in 
time. This is true for one hundred and forty-two lots in the sample. Thirty-seven lots 
(2%) of the sample, despite being successfully auctioned, never became active or had 
the opportunity to produce a return. This outcome is not surprising however and is 
indicative of the challenging process of preparing foals to race. 
3.5 Analysis  
This section begins by providing a descriptive account of the net returns at an 
aggregate level and details the asset’s returns along alternative dimensions such as 
the gender and bidding range. Following this, two regression models that account for 
the distribution of the data are estimated to explore the determinants of net returns. 
Finally, alternative behavioural explanations that can be controlled for are given due 
consideration. 
3.5.1 Average Returns 
Table 3.3 considers the average returns of the entire sample of auctioned 
thoroughbreds and gender specific subsamples. Consistent with Gamrat and Sauer 
(2000), on average, the net returns for the sample are negative. While fillies do incur 
greater losses than colts, the monetary differences are not substantial. The median 
net losses observed for the entire sample are -€14,375.15. For the colt sample and 
filly sample these net losses are -€14,763.78 and -€13,855.44 respectively. It is of 
note that these statistics abstract from any returns generated by insider information in 





Table 3.3 Ex-Post Analysis 
Ex-Post Efficiency Evaluation   Mean  SD  Min   Max 
Winning Bid (N = 1,681) € 42,047.52 € 58,631.31 € 991.03 € 655,192.10 
Lifetime Winnings (N = 1,681) € 18,337.91 € 68,328.62 € 0.00 € 1,206,376.00 
Net Returns -€ 23,709.61 € 85,967.64 -€ 655,192.10 € 1,191,376.00 
Winning Bid Colt (N = 1,053) € 44,248.27 € 61,757.08 € 991.03 € 655,192.10 
Lifetime Winnings Colt (N = 
1,053) 
€ 22,149.20 € 76,560.23 € 0.00 € 1,206,376.00 
Net Returns -€ 22,099.07 € 94,707.53 -€ 655,192.10 € 1,191,376.00 
Winning Bid Filly (N = 628) € 38,357.42 € 52,820.09 € 991.03 € 545,067.60 
Lifetime Winnings Filly (N = 628) € 11,947.33 € 51,086.77 € 0.00 € 1,004,890.00 
Net Returns -€ 26,410.09 € 68,855.84 -€ 545,067.60 € 902,971.10 
Source: Irish Racing 
 
Figure 3.2 presents the unconditional net returns (indicated in black) and the restricted 
net returns (indicated in grey) in ascending order for the 1,681 lots in the sample.  The 
unconditional net returns represent a straightforward analysis contingent on winning 
auction bids and returns. The restricted net returns measure controls for two further 
cost-side factors; (i) the annual average cost of a thoroughbred’s upkeep which is 
estimated at €15,200 per annum by AIRO, adjusted for each thoroughbred’s career 
length, and (ii) costs associated with commissions and jockey bonus fees, estimated to 
reduce reported earnings by approximately 10% (Gamrat & Sauer, 2000).  
 
For the unconditional measure, the frequency of negative returns across auctions 
ranges from 74.4% of the sample (Goffs 2008 auction) to 83.9% (Tattersalls 2007 
auction). For the complete sample 1,342 thoroughbreds (79.8%) realised negative 
returns and concluded their career in the domain of losses. 339 thoroughbreds (20.2%) 
returned a profit. Adopting the second criterion, which is sensitive to further cost-side 
information, deflates returns further. 1,610 thoroughbreds (95.7%) realised negative 
returns and concluded their career in the domain of losses. 71 thoroughbreds (4.3%) 
returned a profit. As the returns estimated from the restricted sample are derived from 
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relatively unsophisticated measures, the forthcoming inferential statistical assessment 
treats the first unconditional returns measure as the dependent variable. 
 
 
Given the distribution of the bidding and earnings data, it is important to distinguish 
between alternative ranges of winning bids. To investigate this relationship Figure 
3.3 represents the average returns for winning bids in nine alternative bidding ranges 
(€991-€4,999; n=249, €5,000-€9,999; n=211, €10,000-€19,999; n=307, €20,000-
29,000; n=207, €30,000-39,999; n=155, €40,000-59,000; n=177, €60,000-€79,000; 
n=113, €80,000-€99,000; n =85, >€100,000; n =177).  A monotonically decreasing 
relationship is observed. This phenomenon is robust to altering the parameters of the 
bidding ranges. Low winning bids, on average, produce net positive returns. 
Increases on average in winning bids correspond to net returns entering the domain 
of losses after the third bidding category (approximately €20,000). Once winning 
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Figure 3.2 Returns by Lots in Ascending Order 
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investment. Considering the distribution of the categories in Figure 3.3 and assuming 
bidding power is a measure of an owner’s wealth status, the monetary distances 
between the categories suggests that absolute risk aversion decreases with wealth. 
 
 
A one-way ANOVA to compare the differences in alternative bidding categories 
reports a statistically significant difference in productivity returns between the 
groups (F=65.67, p = 0.00).  Additionally, a Kruskal-Wallis test to compare mean 
ranks reports a statistically significant difference between the groups identified in 
Figure 3.3 (χ2 =1015.59, p = 0.00).  The specific differences between the bidding 
categories are identified in Table 3.4 along with the pairwise comparisons of means 
using the Bonferroni correction technique. Once bidding is greater than €100,000 
negative returns are amplified. These results add further insight to the nature of 
bidding efficiencies in the industry. In bidding conditions with relatively low 



















Figure 3.3 Average Net Returns for Alternative Bidding Ranges
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Table 3.4 Pairwise Correlations of Bidding Categories 
            
 Bidding Group 
Pairwise Correlations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
€991-€4,999 (n=249) -         
€5,000-€9,999 (n=211) 1.00 -        
€10,000-€19,999 (n=307) 1.00 1.00 -       
€20,000-29,000 (n=207) 0.07 1.00 1.00 -      
€30,000-39,999 (n=155) 0.07 0.14 0.31 1.00 -     
€40,000-59,000 (n=177) 0.00*** 0.01** 0.021** 1.00 1.00 -    
€60,000-€79,000 (n=113) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.03** 0.13 -   
€80,000-€99,000 (n =85) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 1.00 -  
>€100,000 (n =177) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** - 
Statistical significance: ***1% level; **5% level   
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3.5.2 Regression Analysis 
This section estimates a basic model to evaluate the important factors associated with 
each asset’s net returns such as winning bids (Winning Bid), a vector of performance 
statistics and further qualitative controls. Although the model specified represents a 
relatively parsimonious returns equation, it expresses the important characteristics 
associated with returns that are accessible. An assumption of this analysis is that 
given the publicly available information on pedigree prior to the auctions, any 
genetic factors relating to potential performance are fully incorporated into the bids. 
Given the skewness of net returns, estimating the relationship between net returns 
and a series of covariates with a least squares approach will likely produce 
inefficient estimates. Normality tests investigating skewness (Skewness - 3.931, 
Pr(Skewness) - 0.000) and kurtosis (Kurtosis - 67.420, Pr(Kurtosis) - 0.000) reject 
normality assumptions. In addition, the joint test indicates the non-normality of the 
dependent variable (χ²(²) =1015.59, Prob> χ² - 0.000) To allay these concerns two 
alternative estimation procedures are adopted. Firstly, a Huber (robust) regression is 
estimated using M-estimation. Unlike OLS, the robust regression is not as 
susceptible to non-normally distributed observations and, importantly, is not 
sensitive to outliers. In particular, the Huber estimates provides distributional 
robustness, as large deviations will not weaken the efficiency of the results. This 
robustness is achieved by penalising small residuals quadratically and greater 
residuals linearly. These estimates provide a benchmark to compare a second 
procedure; the quantile regression. This method was introduced by Koenker and 
Machado (1999) and is becoming an increasingly powerful research tool, offering a 
valuable alternative to the least squares approach. The primary advantage of the 
quantile regression approach is that it allows for a richer understanding of the 
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dataset. While OLS point estimates only provide a partial view, the quantile 
regression characterises the entire empirical distribution. As opposed to defining 
average relationships between the net returns and the covariates, the quantile 
regression allows one to understand fractional relationships across quantiles where 
the 50th percentile represents the median (Ƭ =0.5). Essentially, these are non-central 
points. Akin to the Huber regression, the quantile (median) regression is robust to 
outliers than least squares. Apart from gaining a more detailed understanding of 
variations within the dataset, this procedure is also not restricted in its assumptions 
regarding the distribution of the error term. Bootstrapped standard errors are 
included for the quantile regression estimates29.  
Regarding the model specification, let NETRi represent a thoroughbred’s net returns 
and xi a vector of explanatory variables on bidding information and performance. 
For the Huber (robust) regression the major difference is the absence of any analysis 
of a restricted distribution. The quantile approach requires that the inclusion of Ƭth 
quantile of the restricted distribution of NETRi is a linear function of the covariates 
x. The constant term is denoted by α(Ƭ) and β(Ƭ) represents a vector of unidentified 
parameters to be obtained. 𝑢Ƭi represents the error term which is unknown. No 
distributional assumptions are made about 𝑢Ƭi. 
NETR𝑖 = 𝑎(Ƭ) +  β(Ƭ)𝑥𝑖 + 𝑢Ƭi 
As the explanatory power of parameters β(Ƭ) is contingent on which quantile is 
estimated, the effects (as seen in the results in Table 3.5) on NETRi can vary across 
the distribution. In a nutshell, this is a primary advantage of this technique; the 
                                                          
28 This is analogous to robust standard errors in the linear approach. Essentially, the assumption of 
independent errors is retained and the assumption of identically distributed errors is relaxed. 
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results from alternative quantile estimates are interpreted with respect solely to that 
portion of the distribution. It is of note that log-linear approaches to modelling the 
dependent variable can be adopted; while this may decrease the skewness in the 
dependent variable, there is a cost. Namely, key characteristics of the returns 
distribution are overlooked.  
To control for the influence of environmental factors such as training and access to 
elite jockeys thoroughbreds are categorised into one of two stable grades. Elite 
stables are considered trainers in the top twenty total earners for the years of the 
dataset (Horse Racing Ireland, 2015). Sixteen stables fulfil this criterion and are 
classified as elite (Elite Stable). These stables are deemed to provide thoroughbreds’ 
access to leading training methods, facilities and riding skills. One hundred and 
twenty observations thoroughbreds are classified as elite. Consistent with the entire 
sample, thoroughbreds trained by elite stables, which potentially provide a clearer 
picture of owner’s seeking a championship horse, return average net losses of 
€24,662.63 (SD = €158,887.8).   
Regarding the vector of performance information, explanatory variables are 
incorporated to explain each thoroughbred’s returns, including the ratio of their 
number of starts (Wins and Places), how many days a thoroughbred is active for 
(Career Length) and additional dichotomous variables for a thoroughbred’s gender 
(Sex) and the auction house that processed the foal’s sale (Company). Given that a 
thoroughbred’s coat colours do not relate to racing performance this information is 
not included in the analysis (Stachurska, Pięta, Łojek & Szulowska, 2007). Table 3.5 
displays the results from both procedures. The pseudo R² provides a local measure of 
fit for the quantile regression. 
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Table 3.5 Determinants of Net Returns: Huber (Robust) & Quantile Regression Estimates 
DV: Net Returns 
 
Huber Regression Quantile Regression 
 
Covariates Estimates  ( Ƭ  = 0.25) ( Ƭ  = 0.50) (Ƭ = 0.75) 
Company  228.51 173.74 193.73 116.63 
 
(118.3010)   (131.188) (262.347) (159.68) 
Sex  -114.059 -116.587 -584.786 -77.65 
 
(123.213) (74.873) (256.292) (122.470) 
Winning Bid -0.999*** -0.999*** -0.999*** -0.9961*** 
 
(0.001) (0.0017) (0.0026) (0.0017) 
Elite Stable 725.446** 534.4401** 1171.446*** 505.425 
 
(227.023) (180.880) (321.566) (338.752) 
Wins % 38302.43*** 26581.71*** 53015.98*** 124441.5*** 
 
(475.36) (2701.805) (7628.243) (20550.5) 
Place % 4319.249*** 4077.625*** 3388.331*** 1750.635*** 
 
(328.54) (507.12) (738.286) (648.7) 
Career Length 2.181*** 2.567*** 7.255*** 12.891*** 
 
(0.104) ( .008) (1.142) 1.808 
Constant -466.903** -942.99*** -1072.722*** -528.537*** 
 (131.941) (258.845) (131.941) (136.9707) 
 Pseudo R² - .78 .62 .43 
 
Significance level: 1%:***;5%:**  












The results of both estimations show a statistically significant negative relationship 
between increases in winning bids and net returns (for all of the conditional 
quantiles). Using the log transformations of the dependent variable and winning bids 
produces almost identical results to those presented in Table 3.5. Higher winning 
bids are associated with lower net returns to owners. Notably, the quantile regression 
reports that this relationship is stable across the distribution.  
As expected, a thoroughbred’s career wins have explanatory power and are 
positively correlated with net returns in both models. Finishing in a placed position 
is also expectedly positive and statistically significant. Environmental factors such as 
a thoroughbred’s sale company or sex do not statistically influence their return. 
Although the magnitude of the effect is small, career length remains statistically 
significant for both models (and across quantiles). It is noteworthy that the quantile 
regression reports that the only statistical differences in environmental factors 
influencing returns across the distribution occurs for thoroughbreds producing 
negative returns; access to elite stables for these thoroughbreds can reduce their 
losses. 
3.5.3 Alternative Behavioural Explanations 
The thoroughbred horseracing industry is complex and involves multiple interacting 
parties. While the non-pecuniary motivations interpretation of the inefficiencies 
provided by Gamrat and Sauer (2000) offers a plausible explanation for this data, 
more rational interpretations may exist.  
A first explanation for significant losses could appeal to the misaligned incentives 
that arise between owners (principals) and trainers (agents). From the data collected 
it is possible to control for moral hazard that could emerge from misaligned 
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incentives. One can identify the returns of thoroughbreds that are owned and trained 
by the same individual (incentive-compatible condition) compared to the rest of the 
sample (moral hazard condition). 228 sales occurred where the trainer held full 
ownership over the foal, had a stake in its ownership, or the owner is directly related 
(through family name) to the trainer. In these circumstances, one could assume that 
the trainer had a greater interest in ensuring a thoroughbred performed to the best of 
its ability. The net returns for both the moral hazard and incentive-compatible 
conditions are negative. Interestingly, losses are greater for thoroughbreds in the 
incentive-compatible condition. The average net losses for thoroughbreds owned and 
trained by the same party are -€31,045 and -€22,492 in the moral hazard subsample. 
This finding suggests that traditional principle-agent dynamics are not an influencing 
factor on net returns. On the contrary, trainers, with future incomes in mind, may pay 
more attention to horses they do not have a stake in.  
Equally, owners that also trained thoroughbreds show a tendency to have similar 
bidding strategies; no distinct differences exist between the maximum amount 
training owners and non-training owners are willing to bid to win an auction. As a 
corollary of this argument, one could argue that ownership structures defined as 
syndicates may earn even lower returns; increasing the size of the ownership 
arrangement of a thoroughbred may detach a trainer further from achieving elite 
performance. There is no evidence to suggest that syndicates return 
disproportionately greater losses.  The 31 owners classified as syndicates returned 
average losses of -€26,571.63. 
A second explanation to account for the losses could appeal to owners adopting a 
diversification strategy when purchasing foals. Fully aware that some will return 
losses, owners could be confident that high profits from one successful thoroughbred 
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will insure the losses of others. Similar to the moral hazard argument, the dataset 
facilitates an empirical examination of this reasoning.  Table 3.6 displays the 
eighteen owners in the dataset who purchased five or more thoroughbreds across the 
four auctions. In light of the winning bids, only two of the buyers return positive 
earnings 
 Table 3.6 Alternative Behavioural Explanations – Returns to Diversification  
Owner  No. ≥ 5 Mean Bid 
Mean 
Returns Profit/Loss 
Andrew Tinkler  5 € 51,935.44 € 35,483.38 -€ 16,452.06 
Dr Marwan Koukash 10 € 26,851.99 € 54,890.24 € 28,038.25 
Godolphin 15 € 93,492.38 € 43,214.21 -€ 50,278.17 
Habton Farms  5 € 21,121.54 € 4,620.64 -€ 16,500.89 
Hamdam Al Maktoum 18 € 111,458.32 € 17,480.08 -€ 93,978.25 
Highclere Thoroughbred Racing 6 € 33,691.88 € 67,841.54 € 34,149.67 
HRH Princess Haya Of Jordan  5 € 38,757.86 € 15,400.65 -€ 23,357.21 
Jaber Abdullah 14 € 27,356.84 € 4,912.69 -€ 22,444.14 
M Khan X2 5 € 41,993.24 € 7,655.13 -€ 34,338.11 
Mark T Gittins  5 € 25,226.77 € 3,586.00 -€ 21,640.77 
Michael Tabor 8 € 213,804.10 € 138,594.24 -€ 75,209.86 
Mrs H Steel  7 € 58,708.29 € 27,157.26 -€ 31,551.03 
Mrs J Wood 7 € 56,681.07 € 8,814.26 -€ 47,866.81 
Mrs John Magnier  6 € 96,584.84 € 55,969.41 -€ 40,615.43 
Saeed Manana  11 € 32,979.24 € 8,268.37 -€ 24,710.88 
Saleh Al Homaizi & Imad Al Sagar  5 € 103,476.50 € 709.18 -€ 102,767.32 
Sheikh Ahmed Al Maktoum  18 € 80,217.00 € 27,435.01 -€ 52,781.99 
Sheikh Majid Al Maktoum  5 € 144,654.13 € 30,903.35 -€ 113,750.78 
Source: Racing Post Bloodstock Sales Database & Irish Racing 
As Table 3.6 clearly reveals, no systematic evidence exists to suggest that buying 
multiple foals can return a profit on average. As one would expect these owners to 
have a detailed knowledge of the industry, the losses posted are noteworthy. 
Additional ownership costs outside of the purchase price, coupled with the fact that 
the winning sums are not solely distributed to owners, would only serve to diminish 




3.6 Discussion  
Thoroughbred auctions are public contests, where non-trivial monetary sums are 
committed by experienced buyers. The evidence reported here confirms an intuition 
that the majority thoroughbreds purchased incur net negative returns. One is left 
questioning why such losses are accrued, particularly in light of the failure of 
standard economic explanations, and what are the implications of these results?  
3.6.1 Utility Maximisation vs. Profit Maximisation 
The first line of argument, consistent with that of Gamrat and Sauer (2000), suggests 
that this industry is one where the motivation of profit maximisation is questionable. 
If utility maximisation is the goal of owners, the extent of losses could be interpreted 
as a form of (conspicuous) consumption as opposed to investment or as an entry fee 
to participating in the sport. Akin to affluent individuals buying yachts or football 
clubs, thoroughbred horseracing could be viewed as another sphere where costly 
signalling is rampant. While it would be naïve to imply that every owner is 
indifferent to losses, the extent of losses has implications for the use of profit 
maximising models adopted to study this industry. This point is particularly relevant 
for owners with a greater number of purchases.   
A second consumption based interpretation involves viewing the purchasing 
activities of owners as collector-style behaviour. This type of consumption has been 
given a limited amount of attention by psychologists and behavioural economists 
(i.e. Apostolou, 2011). Viewed in this fashion, the losses could constitute the costs 
involved in building a portfolio of assets which is consistent with one’s perceived 
identity or image. The results may have implications for researchers looking for 
natural occurrences of this collector-style behaviour. 
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3.6.2 The Winner’s Curse Hypothesis 
A second line of argument which is previously unexplored relates to the potential for 
decision making errors to arise from the auction environment. While Ray (2001) 
suggests that evidence of overbidding may be due to an incorrect assessment of 
thoroughbred abilities, no research has considered an interaction of estimation 
failures and the auction mechanism as a potential cause of negative returns. The 
evidence presented here, while consistent with the idea of non-pecuniary motivations 
or some type of conspicuous consumption, is also generally consistent with a 
winner’s curse hypothesis. The winner’s curse is the systematic tendency for 
individuals to overbid or follow naïve bidding strategies when the true value of an 
asset is unknown. This has been a phenomenon subject to detailed experimental 
attention (Kagel & Levin 2002) and has been previously applied to other sport’s 
labour markets (Cassing & Douglas, 1980; Burger & Walters, 2008; Massey & 
Thaler, 2013).  
Given the uncertainty attached to a thoroughbred foal’s productivity and an expected 
variance in bidder estimates, the possibility of a winner’s curse may increase in 
likelihood in this industry. A premium associated with winning the auction may 
inflate losses. Although a statistically significant negative relationship is reported 
between increases in winning bids and net returns, as no information can be accessed 
on bidder characteristics this argument is evidently tentative and conjectural in 
nature. Despite this, the tendency for bidders to estimate an extreme value at these 
auctions and subsequently overbid, is a logical argument worthy of consideration.  
Naturally, this raises a question for future analysis if access to bidder data per 




This essay takes advantage of the unique characteristics of thoroughbred horseracing 
auctions to evaluate bidding strategies under unique informational conditions. This is 
a setting where the ‘cost of thinking’ is high – bidders tender significant sums of 
money. Conducting an ex-post efficiency evaluation of thoroughbred foals, I show 
that a high percentage of (79.8%) sold via public auctions in Ireland and the UK 
incur net negative returns over their career. When foals are grouped into specific 
bidding categories, a monotonically decreasing relationship is observed. Once a 
winning bid increases above approximately €20,000, on average, the assets enter the 
domain of losses. This scale of losses is amplified as winning bids increase beyond 
this breakeven threshold. Incompatible incentives between owners and trainers and 
diversification strategies on behalf of owners fail to explain the level of 
inefficiencies observed.   
When one considers the restricted estimates associated with ownership such as bonus 
payments, commissions, entry costs and training fee’s, there is a high level of 
inefficient bidding if owners are assumed to be profit maximising agents. The results 
show that increases in winning bids have a negative relationship with returns across 
alternative estimations, a result which has practical implications for those within the 
industry seeking to formulate optimal bidding strategies. Consistent with Gamrat and 
Sauer (2000), on average, thoroughbreds fail to recoup their value.  While this study 
does not attempt to identify the alternative motivations of owners, several of the 
methodological improvements relating to sampling strategies are addressed.  
It is important to highlight the limitations of this study. Firstly, one must be 
cognisant of missing information that cannot be accessed and restricts a complete 
measurement of returns. This study has purposely focussed on accessible valuation 
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and productivity information. Other than basic estimates, it is not possible to collect 
data on the transaction costs or management costs associated with owning 
thoroughbreds (e.g. training fees, commissions, entry fees and veterinary bills). 
These are heterogeneous expenses that will amplify negative returns and dampen 
positive returns. Equally, limited information is available on residual revenue 
streams from these assets, most importantly, a thoroughbred’s stud fees. Although 
foals are bred for the purpose of racing, a thoroughbred could recoup their initial 
investment if they are selected to breed. Stud fees are often negotiated privately and 
are frequently undisclosed. While this is a limitation, it should be noted that only 
select thoroughbreds are used in stud farms; the dataset of foals accessed here are 
sired by just 205 colts. Hence, holding a substantial residual value is reserved for 
elite thoroughbreds, several of whom may have already successfully recouped their 
initial cost on the track.  
Secondly, thoroughbred horseracing has a rich history. Bidding inefficiencies could 
be tapered if industry-specific informal mechanisms exist to allow bidders recoup 
investment. While no such informal mechanisms other than ‘pinhooking’ have arisen 
during this research, prospective work may identify subtle informal contracts, buy 
back arrangements or re-sale tactics30.  
Finally, isolating the heterogeneous motivations of owners could serve to distinguish 
between different owner types and address the concerns that multiple interpretations 
can explain the observed pattern. Disentangling these motivations is an interesting 
starting point for future research.  
                                                          
30 A strategy of a small group of buyers is an activity referred to as ‘pinhooking’. This is when 
investors purchase thoroughbreds solely for the purpose of resale. While individual ‘pin-hookers’ can 
earn significant profits following this strategy, this study focuses on the unconditional net returns on 
the assets rather than the distribution of gains and losses. 
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4. ESSAY THREE - UNRAVELLING & STRATEGIC DISCLOSURE: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE HOSPITALITY INDUSTRY 
4.1 Introduction  
Service providers, such as those in the hospitality industry, increasingly have the 
opportunity to publicly disclose information about the quality of their services in 
such a way that it reaches the widest possible number of consumers. When 
disclosure is possible, non-disclosure is meaningful since it can imply something 
about non-disclosed information. Usually this information is unfavourable because 
otherwise it would have been disclosed.  Economists have developed theoretical 
accounts of what information will be disclosed, and why (Viscusi, 1978; Grossman, 
1981; Milgrom, 1981; Riley, 2012). In this essay I investigate whether information is 
disclosed as predicted by theory and consider how to explain the results. The essay is 
written in the context of TripAdvisor rating disclosures from hoteliers at a regional 
and international level. Taking advantage of the potential to build extensive and 
unique datasets from online resources underpinned by electronic word-of-mouth 
(eWOM), I test the unravelling principle, an economic theory of disclosure. The aim 
of the essay is to build upon existing empirical investigations of this idea and to 
examine disclosure choices in a new market. Not only do I inform a wider empirical 
debate relating to disclosure, but as this essay focuses on tourism, the findings can 
provide qualitative insight for those interested in the operations of the industry. 
The hospitality industry is economically significant. In the UK, it is the fourth 
biggest in terms of employment. In 2014 it contributed an estimated 57 billion to UK 
GDP (4% of total GDP) and £41 billion to the Exchequer (Oxford Economics, 
2015). Despite the commercial importance and size of the sector, it has not attracted 
attention from researchers studying disclosure decisions. This is in contrast to the 
domains of health (Pope, 2009), education (Hastings & Weinstein, 2008; Luca & 
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Smith, 2013), housing (Carrillo, Cellini & Green, 2013) and finance (Patten, 2002; 
Brammer & Pavelin, 2004, Beaver, Shakespeare & Soliman, 2008). In the internet 
age, where an abundance of information is available on the quality of service 
providers, it is likely that researchers will turn their attention to consumer markets 
(i.e. Sah & Read, 2017a). 
The hospitality industry has also been dramatically effected by eWOM. Since the 
establishment of TripAdvisor in 2000, the website has become the primary third 
party ratings agency for hotels globally. The platform now acts as a credible third 
party rating tool for hotels to credentialise themselves outside of the star system. As 
of 2017, TripAdvisor has published approximately 465 million reviews, attracting 
390 million unique users. This growing influence of TripAdvisor is indicative of 
consumers’ suspicion of internal certification and an example of trust based internet 
systems (Jeacle & Carter, 2011). The impact of online consumer reviews has been 
subject to a great deal of research (e.g. Park, & Nicolau, 2015). In the context of 
hotels, it has been shown that exposure to online appraisals has a considerable 
impact on consumer choice (Vermeulen & Seegers, 2009; Casalo, Flavian, Guinaliu, 
& Ekinci, 2015). 
Conceptually, this essay relies upon the economic theory of disclosure and the 
unravelling principle. The intuition underlying the unravelling principle is the notion 
that an agent (such as a business) will disclose information about itself whenever it is 
in its interest to do so. If it does not disclose at any time it is because it judged itself 
better off not disclosing. How this can play out in practice gives rise to the term 
“unravelling”. Imagine a seller who has the best possible rating of, say, 5/5. Of 
course that seller will reveal that quality to a buyer, assuming it is costless to do so. 
Given this is what a 5/5 seller will do, then a 4/5 seller will also want to disclose 
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since otherwise it will be confused with those having even lower ratings. The process 
unravels, with the 3/5 disclosing because they do not want to be perceived as having 
less than 3/5, and so on.  Only the seller with the lowest rating will be indifferent 
between disclosure and non-disclosure, since by not disclosing they are revealing 
they have the lowest rating. In general, information on any given dimension will be 
revealed whenever by doing so one can avoid being pooled with agents worse than 
you on that dimension. 
This idea, that in equilibrium all information will be revealed, is best summarised by 
Frank’s (1988) full disclosure principle. According to Frank (1988, P.104) “if some 
stand to benefit by revealing a favourable value of a trait, others will be forced to 
disclose their less favourable values”. This ‘force’ is imposed on sellers who go 
through a sequence of logical steps, all contingent on the expected response of a 
consumer to non-disclosure. This anticipated consumer response to non-disclosure is 
the most interesting behavioural feature of the principle. Namely, sophisticated 
reasoning requirements are imposed on the consumer, who should interpret non-
disclosure with the maximum of scepticism.   
Despite the straightforward intuition behind the principle there has been relatively 
little empirical scrutiny of the topic. In particular, researchers have had 
comparatively limited samples at their disposal to test the unravelling result, 
commonly of less than three hundred observations distributed across a quality range. 
Obvious reasons exist to explain the absence of studies. Historically, centralised 
rating systems from which to voluntarily disclose positive traits very often did not 
exist. Furthermore, even if such non-mandatory systems were present, there were 
few (if any) practical methods to verify the presence of a disclosure or if disclosable 
information was available (or even if the disclosure was accurate). In the absence of 
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a way to verify costless claims, any such messages remain unsubstantiated ‘cheap 
talk’ (Farrell & Rabin, 1996). Previous researchers were commonly restricted to 
studying markets subject to legal changes which imposed structural breaks on 
disclosure requirements.   
Advances in both rating systems and data availability through online resources in 
light of the development of e-commerce has allowed for more detailed empirical 
research. Addressing the first limitation, online platforms offer a medium for the 
dissemination of non-endogenous quality ratings information for consumers. 
Examples include Yelp, IMDb, Angie's List, and in the context of this study, 
TripAdvisor and Trustpilot31. Regarding the second limitation, an online presence 
has become a critical route to market for many sellers. Thus, online platforms offer 
researchers accessible data on a seller’s disclosure decision and a means to test 
unravelling (e.g. Luca & Smith, 2015). Disclosures of this kind, while cheap, are 
verifiably so.  
The first major finding of this essay is that, on average, while higher ranked hotels 
are more likely to disclose their TripAdvisor score relative to lower ranked ones, this 
is not in the way unravelling theory predicts. In particular, unravelling is incomplete 
with many hotels with even good ratings failing to disclose. This partial unravelling 
result is true both regionally and internationally. An analysis of stricter subsamples, 
for individual locations, reveals that disclosure decisions follow similar patterns 
across cities but that idiosyncrasies exist between locations.   
                                                          
31 Both Yelp (Luca, 2011) and IMDb (Brown et al, 2012) have provided a data source to assess 




Secondly, I find that a pattern exists between the internal certification of a hotel and 
TripAdvisor ratings. The frequency of TripAdvisor disclosures for hotels ranked as 
5-star declines when they fail to achieve a corresponding TripAdvisor score. 
TripAdvisor performances that are greater than (or less than) an industry rating have 
higher rates of disclosure when outperforming their star rating and lower rates when 
underperforming. It is as if hotels believe their star-rating will be diluted if mixed 
with a lower TripAdvisor score, even though the two ratings are on different scales. 
Thirdly, assembling three additional datasets I offer novel insights. Firstly, I access 
data from holiday catalogues to show higher levels of TripAdvisor revelations occur 
when the disclosure decision is made by a third-party (I assume hotels have an input 
to this decision). In contrast to hotel websites, which often rely on visual marketing 
to entice consumers, holiday catalogues provide a wealth of detailed text information 
in a somewhat standardized format where one option is usually selected from a 
portfolio compiled by an intermediary agent. As predicted, disclosure increases 
considerably in this context as non-disclosure is salient. Secondly, I access 
supplementary data from Trustpilot, a lesser known online platform that operates in a 
similar fashion to TripAdvisor. This allows one to question whether disclosure 
patterns are different in a market where consumers may not realise there is a rating to 
disclose. Theoretically, the unravelling principle applies to situations in which 
consumers know there is a rating, since only then can the consumer identify non-
disclosure and draw any inferences. One should expect that unknown rating 
categories will rarely be disclosed, unless the ratings are very good. A comparison 
between disclosure of TripAdvisor and Trustpilot ratings therefore allow the degree 
of strategic thinking to be tested.  If companies are thinking strategically about the 
response of customers, they will almost always disclose their TripAdvisor ratings, 
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but be cautious about disclosing their Trustpilot ratings.  I find, however, there is no 
difference in the disclosure pattern between the two rating providers. Verifying 
disclosure decisions for 489 non-bank financial institutions registered with Trustpilot 
in the UK/Republic of Ireland and USA, I find that a similar monotonically 
decreasing disclosure relationship exists (as it does for TripAdvisor). This suggests 
that disclosure decisions are independent of anticipated consumer response to non-
disclosure and consumers’ expectations or access to quality information. Thirdly, we 
extend our primary analysis to investigate the propensity for elite hotels to 
countersignal. We identify the world finest hotels, accessing the Forbes Travel Guide 
– Star Award Winners list. 
The next section places the unravelling principle and the idea of strategic disclosure 
within the literature by introducing related theoretical and empirical work. Section 
4.3 provides a rationale for the study of disclosure based on the features of the 
industry. A particular emphasis is placed on the advantages of the product and 
markets characteristics. I underline how this industry provides a perfect setting to 
connect theoretical and empirical domains. Section 4.4 introduces the empirical 
framework, the data and procedures. The analysis and results are presented in 
Section 4.5. Section 4.6 introduces the first additional dataset by evaluating the 
importance of the choice environment. The results are explained in Section 4.7 and I 
explore the behavioural motivations important to non-disclosure, introducing the 
second supplementary dataset. Section 4.8 concludes the essay by proposing the 
practical implications of non-disclosure for the hospitality industry and suggests 




4.2 Disclosure & The Unravelling Principle 
4.2.1 Basic Theory & Implications  
The unravelling principle is important to strategic interactions where an agent with 
favourable private information wishes to communicate this trait to other agents. The 
equilibrium prediction of the game is full disclosure on behalf of more informed 
parties. While the initial labelling of the term can be traced to Viscusi (1978) in the 
context of labour markets, the theoretical development of the unravelling equilibria 
was made by Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) who assessed monopolist 
disclosure decisions when facing no disclosure costs. This was extended by 
Jovanovic (1982) who took into account the cost of disclosure. Further theoretical 
refinements include that of Farrell (1986), who recognised the costs associated with 
acquiring information.  
As outlined, the unravelling principle should lead to complete disclosure on the part 
of better informed sellers. Full disclosure is appealing from a policy perspective as it 
can improve consumer welfare without legislation, permitting competitive behaviour 
to overcome problems associated with asymmetric information (Akerlof, 1970). As 
Dye and Finn (2007) suggest, adverse selection should not pose a problem to the 
operation of markets if the unravelling principle holds, so long as sellers can make 
credible, costless claims. Examples of the positive implications of disclosure include 
increased trust between buyers and sellers, improved market sorting (both 
horizontally and vertically), and the escalation of competitive pressures which can 
cause inferior firms to improve. Voluntary disclosure can allow consumers to make 
more informed choices and protect them from unscrupulous sellers. In sum, 
resources are allocated more efficiently as disclosure should alter the frequency of 
trade and the price structure. Dranove and Jin (2010) provide a complete review of 
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the effects of disclosure, expanding on many of the positive consequences suggested 
here, while Sah, Cain and Loewenstein (2013) provide insights into the perversions 
of mandatory disclosure policies. 
While the unravelling principle is logically sound, the implications of the principle 
are behaviourally questionable. Specifically, the iterative logic is premised on sellers 
disclosing because they believe consumers will interpret non-disclosure in the worst 
possible light. The assumption that consumers will construe sins of omission in this 
way is debatable. A significant body of research has shown that individuals routinely 
fail to appreciate, and commonly underestimate, the information content of others’ 
actions. Consumers can suffer from informational based projection biases, falling 
under the broad remit of bounded awareness in negotiation (Bazerman & Moore, 
2009).  In a negotiation context, individuals can systematically fail to see ‘what is 
not there’ (Chugh & Bazerman, 2007). Recent experimental evidence is adding 
greater weight to the claim that individuals fail to adjust for non-disclosure as 
unravelling theory would predict (Sah & Read, 2017b). This is one recent finding 
from many. Loewenstein, Sunstein and Golman (2014) provide a general insight to 
the behavioural economics of disclosure and how information disclosures relate to 
the law in light of a range of findings which suggest individuals are subject to biases. 
4.2.2 Empirical Tests of Unravelling   
A limited amount of empirical work has tested the unravelling prediction. This 
branch of literature is concerned with whether firms make a quality disclosure. The 
earliest study is by Mathios (2000) who used scanner data to study voluntary and 
mandatory disclosure for salad dressing in American markets after the 1990 
Nutrition Labelling Act. He demonstrated a striking and linear relationship between 
the likelihood of disclosure and fat content. Virtually all products with under six 
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grams of fat per serving disclosed, 60% of those with between 7 and 9 grams of fat, 
and only 20% of those with between 10 and 20 grams. 
The contributions of Jin and Leslie (2003) and Jin (2005) represent further tests of 
the unravelling prediction. Taking advantage of legal variations, Jin and Leslie 
(2003) studied hygiene quality regulation in Los Angeles where a disclosure decision 
was voluntary and mandatory for different groups. They found that restaurants 
mandated to disclose their hygiene ratings improved on the hygiene dimension 
relative to restaurants for which disclosure was voluntary. Jin (2005) studied 
disclosure by analysing accreditation reviews from 1991 to 1998 for Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMO’s). They used regression to control for important 
demand and cost factors associated with disclosure in the industry. Similar to 
Mathios (2000), the findings are contrary to the strict unravelling prediction. 
Interestingly, lower disclosure rates were observed in highly competitive markets, a 
finding which might cast doubt on the assumed relationship between competition 
and disclosure.  
Carrillo et al (2013) investigate disclosure decisions over two periods in the context 
of education and housing markets in Virginia. They found that home owners 
selectively reveal school quality traits when selling a property. Properties located in 
relatively higher quality schooling districts are more likely to voluntarily disclose 
school quality. With time, these disclosures increase – 68% of the property listings 
made a school quality disclosure over the 2001-2002 period, increasing to 75% for 
2006-2007. 
Considering the limits of strategic inference, Brown, Camerer and Lovallo (2012) 
tested disclosure and non-disclosure in the entertainment industry. They analysed the 
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success of films that are opened with or without prescreenings for critics. Analogous 
to the shunning of restaurants that do not disclose hygiene scores, movie goers 
should rationally use the information content embedded in this decision and make 
the inference that studios have no confidence in films that are not prescreened and 
therefore they are of poor quality. Brown et al (2012) found that consumers were 
much more forgiving than indicated by the unravelling principle. Films that were not 
prescreened earned box office premiums when compared to pre-screened films of 
similar quality. This premium occurred only in the first week. These films showed 
precipitous box office drops once word of mouth spread. 
The most recent empirical test of unravelling addresses the disclosure of business 
school ratings. Luca and Smith (2015) assess disclosure decisions for MBA 
programs in American educational institutes. They found that 65% of 240 business 
schools publish their review score. Interestingly, elite schools with very high ratings 
sometimes countersignal by not disclosing. Mid-ranked business schools were more 
likely to disclose their rating when compared to elite schools. 
4.3 Disclosure Decisions & The Hotel Sector 
Outside of the more palpable motivation relating to the greater quantity of data that 
can be accessed on the hotel sector (in comparison to earlier empirical studies), and 
the economic significance of the industry, there are two broad advantages of 
investigating the unravelling principle in this domain. These benefits can be 
separated into (i) appealing product-market characteristics and (ii) the fit between 





4.3.1 Product-Market Characteristics 
The hotel market is characterised by vertical product differentiation, with hotels 
differing greatly in quality. This is the basis for internal industry standards, 
embodied by the star certification system, and the emergence of review websites 
such as TripAdvisor. Secondly, the ability to game disclosure systems is less 
applicable in this sector. This is in contrast to, for instance, hospitals that can often 
select which patients to treat. Hotels cannot screen customers systematically. This is 
likely to increase the validity of user ratings. Thirdly, certain attributes of the product 
are appealing. Hotels have high turnover rates and therefore, as with any high 
frequency repeated purchase, there are many consumers available to provide ratings.  
Hotel visits are also repeated experience good, with most customers having 
experience of many hotels. Consequently, consumers can put considerable trust in 
the expertise or domain knowledge of TripAdvisor contributors. Finally, in contrast 
to many experience goods where tastes are idiosyncratic, preferences for hotels 
should be relatively well-behaved. Most customers prefer hygienic hotels to 
unhygienic ones, polite staff to discourteous ones and more leisure facilities to less. 
Well-behaved consumer preferences are a prerequisite for complete unravelling, and 
I suggest this is a reasonable assumption for the hotel market.     
4.3.2 Theoretical – Empirical Fit  
Firstly, a critical assumption of the unravelling principle is that traits must be 
costless to credibly disclose. This is a safe assumption to make for this industry 
given that quality disclosure merely entails a hotel incorporating TripAdvisor 
information on their official website. This disclosure decision is not a costly signal 
and is easily interpretable by consumers. Nor is it a technically challenging task to 
incorporate a rating. The TripAdvisor ‘bubble rating’ is a summated rating offered as 
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a summary measure of quality on an ordinal scale ranging from 1 to 5 where half 
unit scores are possible. The scoring system corresponds to Excellent (5), Very Good 
(4), Average (3), Poor (2) and Terrible (1)32. The ease with which this information 
can be interpreted increases its effectiveness in altering consumers’ opinions (Sparks 
& Browning, 2011). 
Secondly, purchasing a hotel stay often involves travel to a location where guests 
have limited local knowledge concerning quality, and so one can assume buyers do 
not have complete information regarding their purchase ex ante33. A perfect 
information environment does not exist. While it is possible that guests can access 
quality information on TripAdvisor, assumedly known by hotels, they may not opt to 
acquire this information. Assuming all hotels are aware of their performance on the 
TripAdvisor platform, the best quality hotels should seek to signal their quality. 
4.4 Empirical Framework 
To investigate whether unravelling occurs in the hospitality industry two factors are 
required: (i) favourable traits that distinguish hotels (TripAdvisor ratings) and (ii) an 
instrument to verify whether a favourable trait is voluntarily disclosed.  
4.4.1 Verification & Disclosure Definitions 
Hotel websites represent modern shop windows and online bookings are a primary 
sales avenue for the industry. This presents a niche for researchers. To consider the 
frequency of disclosure, I manually verify the presence of the TripAdvisor rating on 
                                                          
32 The summated score for a hotel offered by TripAdvisor is more sophisticated than an average score 
of all contributions. The system incorporates ratings to determine overall satisfaction that is weighted 
based on the recency of a review and the performance of other hotels. 
33 Perhaps this is best captured by the Guardian journalist Kira Cochrane (2011) who suggests that the 
emergence of the TripAdvisor ratings system has led to “a seismic shift in power, from hotelier to 
consumer, which has, in many ways, been enormously positive for travellers. Where once we were 
vulnerable to the quirks and rudeness of countless Basil Fawltys, we now have a source of both 
warning and redress.” 
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each hotel’s official website. As different hotel websites hold alternative designs, a 
definition to constitute a disclosure is required to confirm whether a voluntary 
admission is made. For this essay, a hotel is said to disclose their TripAdvisor rating 
if at least one of the following criteria is met: (i) the score is explicitly published on 
the website or an inbuilt trip advisor (non-endogenous) review section exists (ii) the 
score is ‘one-click away’ or a distinct (hyper)link exists to connect the hotel’s rating 
on TripAdvisor’s website or (iii) a specific claim to a hotel’s TripAdvisor reviews or 
performance is made on their official website. Visual examples of these criteria are 
provided in the appendix.  
4.4.2 Data & Descriptive Statistics  
One part of the dataset is assembled at a regional level and another on an 
international scale. This sampling strategy allows one to consider market dynamics 
locally and cross-cultural differences. The regional sample constitutes hotels in the 
United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. The locations selected represent 
relatively densely populated cities across the region. The international sample 
comprises of the following major international cities; London, New York, Paris, 
Rome, Singapore, Sydney and Tokyo. These cities represent major tourist hubs.  
Densely populated areas are sampled to ensure that relatively competitive markets 
are in operation both regionally and internationally. All of the hotels from these 
locations are sourced from the TripAdvisor platform. Hostels, B&B’s, lodges and 
other forms of accommodation are excluded from the analysis to ensure a well-
defined market. All of the included properties held an industry certification.  
To be included in the analysis, a hotel must have accumulated over 100 reviews on 
TripAdvisor. This minimum threshold ensures a precise measurement of hotel 
quality. While consumer reviews could be argued to produce noisy data, one would 
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expect more accurate estimates as the number of reviews increase. Furthermore, this 
sampling procedure is adopted as a sceptic may have worries relating to selective 
gaming or deceptive acts. Fraudulent behaviour could occur by hotels submitting 
their own reviews, which could result in spurious correlations caused by inaccurate 
assessments. The fast pace of the industry (TripAdvisor widgets are updated on a 
daily basis) and the sheer volume of reviews (TripAdvisor post an average of sixteen 
reviews and opinions every minute) substantially reduces the likelihood that gaming 
will systematically alter the recorded review scores34.  
Data are accessed on the hotel name, location, internal star certification, TripAdvisor 
rating, the number of reviews on which the rating is based, and whether the hotel 
disclosed their rating. As online ratings and hotel websites can change rapidly, all 
data were collected over two short time periods; the regional dataset was assembled 
during a two-week period during August 2016 while the international data were 
collected over one month in February 2017.  
In total, data are collected on 4,357 hotels across 22 locations globally. The quality 
measures across the locations are derived from 4,060,830 individual reviews 
submitted to TripAdvisor. This sample size is substantially greater than earlier 
studies analysing disclosure decisions: Mathios (2000) provided data on 86 salad 
creams and, most recently, Luca and Smith (2015) access data on 240 MBA 
programmes.  In light of the findings, two auxiliary datasets are complied. The first 
considers disclosures from holiday catalogues. This allows one to consider the 
                                                          
34 TripAdvisor have specifically developed a content integrity policy to protect against fraudulent 
reviewer behaviour. They guarantee that “businesses are not able to influence TripAdvisor to improve 





importance of the sales context on the disclosure decision. The second dataset is 
compiled from Trustpilot. While this data concerns a different market, it allows one 
to control for the expectation of disclosure. The details of both datasets are outlined 
in later sections. 
4.4.3 Regional Dataset – United Kingdom & Rep. of Ireland 
TripAdvisor rating are obtained for 1,490 hotels in sixteen locations in UK and 
Ireland35. It is possible to verify whether this rating is disclosed on the official 
websites of 1,475 of these hotels. The 15 excluded hotels either had non-operational 
websites or had recently closed. Table 4.1 summarises the important information for 
the dataset by location in the regional dataset. While I later investigate the 
relationship between star ratings and TripAdvisor ratings, it is important to note that 
both scales are different. 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics – Regional Dataset 
                                                          
35 These locations are Cork, Dublin, Galway, Kerry and Waterford (Ireland) and Belfast, Birmingham, 
Coventry, Edinburgh, Leeds, Liverpool, London, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham and Sheffield 
(UK). 
Location N Mean Star Rating  Mean Trip Advisor Score  Mean No. Reviews  
Belfast 32 3.5 4.1 1,295  
Birmingham 78 3.2 3.8 990  
Cork 22 3.7 4.2 1,097  
Coventry 26 3.2 3.6 695  
Dublin 113 3.3 3.8 1,272  
Edinburgh 126 3.5 4.1 1,085  
Galway 31 3.5 4.1 1,047  
Kerry 63 3.7 4.3 748  
Leeds 46 3.4 4.0 960  
Liverpool 60 3.4 4.1 1,345  
London 686 3.5 3.8 1,202  
Manchester 72 3.4 3.9 1,499  
Newcastle 44 3.3 4.0 823  
Nottingham 33 3.2 3.7 752  
Sheffield 30 3.3 4.0 777  
Waterford 13 3.4 3.8  789  
Totals 1,475 3.4  3.9  1,134 
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The quality measure is established from a total of 1,673,641 reviews. The average 
number of ratings per hotel is over 1,000 (ranging from 109 to 12,702 - the Park 
Plaza Westminster Bridge, London). 
The lowest average number of reviews in any one location is 696 (Coventry). The 
maximum is 1,500 (Manchester).  TripAdvisor ratings can range from 5 to 0 in 
increments of .5, with higher ratings more prevalent. In the sample, the following 
distribution is obtained: 5 (33 hotels), 4.5 (440 hotels), 4 (541 hotels), 3.5 (250 
hotels), 3 (96 hotels), and <3 (115 hotels). Note that ratings of 3 or lower are placed 
into a single bin because they are so rare. 
4.4.4 International Dataset 
Data are collected for hotels from two sources for seven locations internationally for 
the second dataset. A pan-continental strategy is used to identify locations. I access 
TripAdvisor ratings for 3,658 hotels and verify disclosures for 3,568. The ninety 
hotels are excluded as their website was either not operational at the time of 
verification or the hotel had recently closed. Table 4.2 summarises key properties of 
this dataset. 
Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics – International Dataset 
 
The quality measure is established from 3,225,773 reviews. The average number of 
ratings across the sample is over 900 reviews (minimum 100 and maximum 20,037 – 
Location N Mean Star Rating  Mean Trip Advisor Score  Mean No. Reviews  
London 686 3.5 3.8 1,202 
New York 372 3.6 4.2 1,932  
Paris 1277 3.3 3.9 509 
Rome 755 3.3 3.8 619 
Singapore 214 3.5 4.1 1,290 
Sydney 119 3.8  3.9 1,406 
Tokyo 145 3.2  4.0 574 
Totals 3,568 3.4  3.9 901  
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the Marina Bay Sands, Singapore). The lowest average number of reviews in any 
one location is 509.06 (Paris). The maximum is 1,932.76 (New York). As is the case 
with the regional dataset, six specific class intervals are identifiable that range from 
excellent to a pooled category of poor-terrible: 5 (74 hotels), 4.5 (1008 hotels), 4 
(1300 hotels), 3.5 (730 hotels), 3 (270 hotels), <3 (186 hotels) 
4.5 Analysis & Results 
This essay focuses on information unravelling. Do lower ranked hotels follow the 
normative prediction and disclose their TripAdvisor score for fear of being thought 
of as worse than they actually are? 
Two contrasting hypotheses emerge; full disclosure (economics prediction) and 
selective disclosure (behavioural science prediction). The first hypothesis comes 
from unravelling theory and is a strict prediction; full disclosure will occur for all 
hotels except the worst ranked. The second hypothesis comes from past empirical 
tests of disclosure practices. Here, the prediction is that a lower level of revelation 
will occur; incomplete disclosure will emerge with hotels being more reluctant to 
disclose the lower their rating. 
The outcome of the strict hypothesis can be clearly rejected. For the combined 
datasets, an aggregate disclosure rate of 43% is observed. Such a finding is 
incompatible with the full disclosure hypothesis. The selective disclosure trend is 
however compatible with the second hypothesis. Table 4.3 provides the disclosure 
proportions for each TripAdvisor categories for the combined dataset. A Kruskal-
Wallis test to consider the statistical differences between the disclosure decisions of 
the six categories for the combined dataset reports significant results at a 1% level of 
statistical significance between categories (χ2(5) =292.17, p=0.00).  A chi-square 
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test is carried out to assess the relationship between adjacent proportions (i.e. 5 to 
4.5, 4.5 to 4) rather than for differences across the entire range of categories. The 
associated probability values reveal clear differences between all adjacent intervals.    
Table 4.3 Disclosure Rate by TripAdvisor Category – Combined Dataset 
TripAdvisor Score 5 4.5 4 3.5 3 <3 
Complete Dataset - Disclosure (%) 67% 55% 48% 29% 16% 5% 
No.  of Hotels 83 1253 1642 856 319 204 
χ2 4.61 13.82 84.28 18.77 16.34 - 
p-value 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
 
To consider the unravelling result at a regional and international level, Figure 4.1 
displays the rates of disclosure (black bars) across the six rating categories hotels can 
receive. This is compared to the strict prediction of full disclosure derived from the 
unravelling principle (white bars). For the lowest rating (in this case <3) the 
prediction is either full disclosure or no disclosure36. 
Figure 4.1 Observed and Predicted Rating Disclosures by TripAdvisor Category 
 
                                                          
36 The final white bar of both diagrams is dashed to indicate that sellers are indifferent to disclosure. 
For illustrative purposes hotels ranked less than three are considered indifferent to disclosure given 
how few are rating in the range of 1.5-2.5. Technically, only the lowest possible ratings (1.5) should 
be indifferent to disclosure. Only four hotels in the dataset however received this score. No disclosure 
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The unravelling result is incomplete for both the regional and international sample. 
Only 51% disclose a TripAdvisor score in the regional sample, and 41% in the 
international sample. As seen in Figure 4.1, the disclosure rate is contingent on a 
hotel’s TripAdvisor rating. A monotonic relationship is observed for both datasets 
voluntary disclosure decreases as TripAdvisor ratings decline. This finding is 
consistent with the selective disclosure hypothesis.  
At a regional level, whereas over 80% of hotels having a TripAdvisor rating of 5 
disclose, this falls (monotonically) to 34% for a rating of 3.5. It is interesting that not 
all of the 5 rated hotels disclose their rating. This is consistent with recent 
experimental evidence showing that while the majority of best quality sellers will 
attempt to signal their relative superiority, not all will do so (Sah & Read, 2017b). 
The theoretical prediction that the lowest quality sellers are indifferent to disclosure 
is approximately compatible with the theoretical prediction. Only 5% in this sub 
sample ranked <3 disclose a TripAdvisor rating. Internationally, a similar trend is 
observed. Although a lower level of aggregate disclosure is recorded, the frequency 
of disclosure declines jointly with TripAdvisor scores. Only 4% of the lowest quality 
hotels make a disclosure. Statistical differences exist across the range of intervals for 
the disaggregated datasets also. Significant differences are present between the 
categories for both the regional (KW: χ2(5) =170.31, p=0.00) and international 
dataset (KW: χ2(5) =221.28, p=0.00). To consider threshold effects between the 
categories, Table 4.4 provides the disclosure proportions for each TripAdvisor 
categories regionally and internationally. Results from chi-square tests from adjacent 
categories are also reported to identify the thresholds. The associated probability 
values reveal statistical differences between the adjacent intervals with the exception 
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of the comparison of categories 3.5 and 3 for the regional dataset. No statistical 
differences in the disclosure decisions are reported between these hotel groups.   
Table 4.4 Disclosure Rate by TripAdvisor Category – Regional & International 
TripAdvisor Score 5 4.5 4 3.5 3 <3 
Regional–Disclosure (%)  85% 68% 57% 34% 25% 5% 
χ2 (p-value) 3.91(0.05) 14.18(0.00) 35.64(0.00) 2.55(0.11) 16.78(0.00) - 
Int.–Disclosure (%) 64% 52% 48% 29% 15% 5% 
χ2 (p-value) 3.80(0.05) 3.81(0.05) 66.22(0.00) 20.36(0.00) 12.07(0.00) - 
 
4.5.1 Estimation 
To test for the presence of unravelling and to analyse the direction of the relationship 
seen in Figure 4.1, a probit regression is estimated for the basic model identified 
below. Consistent with past disclosure research, qualitative response models offer 
the most appropriate means to estimate the impact of information on a seller’s 
disclosure behaviour. In particular, this allows one to predict the likelihood of a 
disclosure by hotels in different TripAdvisor categories with the probit regression 
(ceteris paribus). The specification of this model remains consistent across the 
alterative estimations that consider both datasets. The dependent variable is a 
categorical variable where 𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑪𝑳𝑶𝑺𝑼𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑨   is defined as equalling 1 if a disclosure is 
made and 0 otherwise. The covariates are individual dummy variables indicating if a 
hotel’s TripAdvisor score falls within a specific class interval. For the purposes of 
regression, the omitted variable is the category of worst ranked hotels (hotel category 
<3). Additionally, locational specific dummy variables are included in the model to 
investigate if spatial dynamics influence disclosure decisions. 
𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑪𝑳𝑶𝑺𝑼𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑨 =  𝛂𝟎 +  𝛃𝟏(𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈𝟓) + 𝛃𝟐(𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈𝟒. 𝟓) + 𝛃𝟑(𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈𝟒) + 𝛃𝟒(𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈𝟑. 𝟓) + 𝛃𝟒(𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈𝟑) +




Marginal effects for seven different samples, starting with the combined datasets, are 
reported in Table 4.5. These marginal effects reveal how changes in the disclosure 
decision change in response to a ceteris paribus changes in a covariate and identify 
the linearity apparent in Figure 4.1. A measure of localised fit is also reported. 
Diagnostic checks on all regressions are conducted to ensure that the model is 
appropriately specified. A link test on each probit regression reports non-significant 
results (P >0.90 for all regressions) indicating that the generalised model does not 
suffer from specification errors.  As only two distinct locationally specific 
relationships are identified these coefficients are not included in the results. The two 
incidences are noted below and subject to explicit analysis.  
The first regression (I) in Table 4.5 displays the average marginal effects for the 
combined datasets. Relative the reference group of the lowest rank (<3 -Poor-
Terrible), hotels ranked from 3 to 5 are more likely to disclose their TripAdvisor 
performance. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level for each category. 
Relative to the base category, hotels ranked 3 are 24% more likely to disclose. The 
likelihood of disclosure increases with the TripAdvisor rating; for the combined 





OV = <3 Hotels        
DV = 1 if Disclosure, 0 Otherwise (I) (II) (III) 
Model: Probit / Sample Combined UK & Ireland London Provincial BI International Paris Rome 
Rating 5 .755*** .920*** .814*** - .739*** .601*** .496** 
 (.070) (.107) (.111) - ( .075) (.130) (.163) 
Rating 4.5 .640*** .729*** .684*** .727*** .639*** .402*** .501*** 
 (.050) (.064) (.071) (.128) ( .057) (.105) ( .110) 
Rating 4 .577*** .620*** .681*** .510*** .607*** .423*** .475*** 
 (.051) ( .065) ( .071) ( .131) ( .057) (.104) (.109) 
Rating 3.5 .395*** .420*** .446*** .361* .431*** .381*** .264 
 (.053) (.071) (.081) (.139) (.059) (.106) ( .114) 
Rating 3 .242*** .329*** .308*** .408* .258*** .120 .072 
  ( .059) (.082) (.095) ( .159) (.066) (.118) ( .129) 
N 4,357 1,475 686 545 3,568 1,277 755 
Pseudo R² 0.07 0.12 0.16 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.08 




Table 4.5 Probit Results – Marginal Effects 
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The second series of estimates (II) addresses the causal relationships for the regional 
dataset only. This allows the consideration of regional, in additional to state specific 
effects37. Firstly, the complete dataset for the British Isles is considered. Statistically 
significant results are recorded for all coefficients. A strong initial signal to initiate 
an unravelling process is observed; hotels rated as elite are 92% more likely to 
disclose their score relative to the worst ranked hotels.  
As London accounts for 46% of the regional dataset it is considered separately. 
Analysing this specific sub-sample is motivated by the question of whether the size 
of market and an expected greater intensity of competition, alters disclosure 
decisions. London also represents a major international city and tourist hub, in 
comparison to smaller and potentially less desirable regional cities. The probabilistic 
results for London only subsample are consistent with the theoretical direction of the 
disclosure hypothesis. Excellent hotels, rated as 5, are the most likely to offer a 
voluntary disclosure. Hotels rated as second and third best respectively are equally as 
likely to make a disclosure.   
The final regression for the regional dataset (II) considers 545 UK (non-London) 
hotels. This subsample brings greater homogeneity to the regional dataset. The 
nature of London, as a major international tourist destination, may elicit externalities 
or other types of spill over effects from reviewers. To investigate this, the final 
sample restricts the cities of analysis to provincial city locations (Provincial BI), 
providing destinations that are of greater spatial comparability. The statistical results 
                                                          
37 For instance, the Irish government charges a lower VAT rate of 9% on tourist-related services.  
Given the sample size of Irish hotels it is not feasible to estimate a probit regression. It is noteworthy 
that evaluating the unravelling principle for both Irish and UK markets using a linear probability 
model (LPM) reports analogous results. Analysing just the Irish market alone with a LPM, reveals a 
similar linear relationship to that of the UK sample. All Irish hotels rated as 5 make a voluntary 
disclosure while hotels with a rating of 4.5, 4 and 3.5 have voluntary disclosure rates of 63%, 51% 
and 17% respectively. None of the lowest ranked Irish hotels (all rated 3.5) make a disclosure.  
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observed for this subsample do not exhibit the exact linearity of the London only 
sample. While a strong statistical relationship exists between disclosure decisions 
and TripAdvisor scores for hotels rated as 4.5 and 4, this weakens for lower ratings. 
Rating 5 is dropped from this analysis as it produced a perfect prediction for the 
dependent variable. 
The third series of estimates (III) considers the unravelling results for the second 
dataset, evaluating hotel disclosures in the context of international locations. Similar 
to the peripheral UK cities providing greater homogeneity on a provincial scale, 
analysing major international destinations allows one to consider a homogenous 
sample at a global level. Furthermore, an international comparison can provide 
insight to cross-cultural disclosure activity and the effectiveness of the TripAdvisor 
signal outside of the UK and Ireland. The first finding from the combined 
international dataset, observable in Figure 4.1, is the similar monotonic relationship 
apparent from the regional dataset. Although the rate of disclosure is lower 
internationally, similarly robust statistical relationships are reported and a downward 
trend is observed. 
As noted, two locational specific effects are reported for the international sample; 
hotels in Rome and Paris are between 12% and 18% less likely to offer a voluntary 
disclosure (at a 1% level of statistical significance). Given these dynamics, and as 
both Paris and Rome represent substantial sub-samples, the second two regressions 
for the international dataset (III) investigate the likelihood of disclosure in these two 
locations exclusively. Regarding Paris, a similar downward relationship exists, but 
the rate of disclosure falls dramatically for the second-best category of hotels; those 
rated 4.5, while still statistically more likely to disclose a score relative to the worst 
hotels, only do so 40% of the time. As regards Rome, a disclosure threshold is 
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observed with all hotels ranked at 4 or above significantly more likely to disclose 
their rating. This decision approximates the same probability, 47.5% to 50%, and is 
independent of the rating. These findings are interesting and may point toward the 
weakening power of the TripAdvisor signal outside of the regional market. The 
international sample records a lower total level of disclosure, a consequence which 
could relate to role of cultural norms and the adoption of the TripAdvisor signal. 
4.5.2 The Star Certification-TripAdvisor Interaction 
Next, I turn to the interaction between a hotel’s star certification conferred by the 
industry and the TripAdvisor rating. These certifications are based not (typically) on 
customer experience, but on non-standardised factors like whether rooms have 
internet, quality of the bedding, the presence of minibars, and so on. The star rating 
coincidentally is over the same numeric range as the TripAdvisor score. I investigate 
whether hotels use their certification as an anchor, and so are reluctant to disclose 
TripAdvisor scores that do not match or exceed their certification.  This could partly 
explain the tendency for even high TripAdvisor scores to remain undisclosed.   
 
There is a relationship between certification and TripAdvisor scores (R = 0.45).  
Figure 4.2 displays TripAdvisor ratings (regionally and internationally) for each 
class of hotel star certification (2-5). These represent mean TripAdvisor ratings for 
each star certification category (95% CIs [4.45, 4.56], [4.11, 4.47], [3.66, 3.76] and 
[2.11, 2.25] for the regional dataset and [4.41, 4.48], [4.04, 4.10], [3.77, 3.83], [3.34, 
3.46] for the international dataset). As can be seen, 5-star hotels receive high 
TripAdvisor scores (on average around 4.5) and the average score declines with level 




Figure 4.2 Star Rating-TripAdvisor Indifference Curves 
  
The data suggest that, as expected, hotels do use their certifications as a reference 
point.  Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 report disclosure decisions as a function of star rating 
and TripAdvisor rating.  As can be seen by inspecting the table row-by-row (i.e., 
holding TripAdvisor rating constant), there is a tendency for hotels with lower star-
certifications to be more likely to disclose their TripAdvisor rating.  This is 
especially true for the regional dataset. By taking a hotel’s industry certification into 
consideration, these contingency tables display the percentage of disclosure 
decisions for twenty-one subsamples (regionally) and twenty-two subsamples 
(internationally). Comparing mean ranks between the star ratings reports a 
statistically significant difference between the disclosure decisions for the categories 
identified in Table 4.6 for the UK and Ireland (χ2(3) =123.47, p=0.00) and in Table 
4.7 for the international destinations (χ2(3) =189.78, p =0.00). Comparing mean 
ranks for the two complete hotel classifications (4-star and 3-star) also reports 
statistically significant differences for the UK and Ireland (t=7.01, p =0.00) and 

































Table 4.6 Disclosure Decisions (%) by TripAdvisor & Star Ratings Criteria - Regional Dataset 
TA Rating/Star 
5 4 3 2 
5 83% (23) 89% (9) 100% (1) - 
4.5 51% (87) 68% (216) 82% (132) 40% (5) 
4 56% (16) 55% (237) 58% (253) 57% (35) 
3.5 50% (2) 28% (64) 36% (150) 35% (34) 
3 - 20% (5) 25% (67) 25% (24) 
<3 - 0% (3) 7% (68) 2% (44) 
 
Table 4.7 Disclosure Decisions (%) by TripAdvisor & Star Ratings Criteria – Int. Dataset 
TA Rating/Star 
5 4 3 2 
5 74%  (31) 57% (30) 54% (13) - 
4.5 48% (224) 51% (439) 55% (311) 56% (34) 
4 58% (48) 51% (498) 45% (634) 43% (120) 
3.5 33% (6) 30% (187) 32% (399) 20% (138) 
3 0% (1) 7% (43) 16% (142) 15% (97) 
<3 - 14% (14) 6% (83) 1% (76) 
 
While categorising the data according to both criteria reduces the size of the 
subsamples, further insights can be gained by testing for differences within each star 
rating. Firstly, the frequency of TripAdvisor disclosure decisions for hotels ranked as 
5-star declines when they fail to achieve the equivalent maximum TripAdvisor score 
at both a regional (χ2=7.66, p=0.05) and international level (χ2=10.09, p=0.03). 
Hotels graded as 4-star and 3-star, importantly where TripAdvisor scores can be 
greater than or less than an industry rating, are observed as having higher rates of 
disclosure when outperforming their star rating and lower rates when 
underperforming. Statistical differences between TripAdvisor ratings are reported for 
4-star hotels (regionally - χ2=43.36, p=0.00; internationally - χ2=59.69, p=0.00) and 
for 3-star hotels (regionally - χ2=137.85, p=0.00; internationally - χ2=125.60, 
p=0.00).  These contingency tables also provide insight into possible underreporting 
from lower star rated hotels. Despite a relatively strong TripAdvisor performance 
from many 3-star and 2-star hotels, substantial proportions of the subsamples fail to 
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disclose ratings above their star certification (e.g. only 43% of 2 star hotels in the 
international dataset rated as 4 on TripAdvisor make a disclosure).  
 
To summarise the results, I report three major findings; (i) measured from the strict 
prediction of the unravelling principle, I find an incomplete level of disclosure that 
reveals a directional relationship in support of the incomplete disclosure hypothesis; 
(ii) monotonic disclosure patterns exist both regionally and internationally, with few 
spatial nuances; (iii) the data indicates that internal certification can act as a 
reference point for a disclosure.  
 
4.6 Salience of Disclosure: The Case of Holiday Catalogues 
Hotel websites are stand-alone entities and have a great deal of heterogeneity in their 
presentation. This heterogeneity has the potential to “mask” nondisclosure of 
TripAdvisor scores, or any other information the hotel may choose not to disclose.  
Hotel information is also often provided in holiday catalogues, which present hotel 
data in a much more homogeneous way and consecutively, so that any missing 
information will be highly salient.    
To investigate whether TripAdvisor disclosure increases in this context this section 
compiled data from two holiday catalogues - Jet2Holidays and Thomson. The 
Thomson catalogue consists of hotels and resorts included in the 2017 Spain, 
Portugal & Cape Verde catalogue. All hotels and resorts in the Summer Holidays 
2017 catalogue are considered for Jet2Holiday.  
 
Data are available for a total of 790 hotels across both catalogues for a total of thirty-
two European destinations. Unlike hotel websites, the disclosure levels are very high.  
The Thomson catalogue provides full disclosure; a TripAdvisor score is included for 
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179 hotels in the catalogue. 6% of these hotels score 3.5 or under on TripAdvisor 
and the rating is included for all of these hotels. Only for hotels refurbished (4) or 
newly opened (5) is a TripAdvisor rating not provided. In the absence of a 
disclosure, a justification is offered (refurbishment symbol or new hotel symbol). A 
larger sample is available on 611 disclosure decisions from the Jet2Holiday 
catalogue. A disclosure rate of 97% is recorded for this second intermediary. 
Refurbished or new hotels are excluded from the non-disclosure sample. The 
distribution of hotels in the Jet2Holiday catalogues for each category is; 5 (8 
hotels/apartments), 4.5 (228 hotels/apartments), 4 (280 hotels/apartments), 3.5 (84 
hotels/apartments), 3 (9 hotels), <3 (2 hotels/apartments). Figure 4.3 reveals the 
higher level of disclosure in this context for the Jet2Holiday sample and the marginal 
rate of non-disclosure in the relatively lowest rated category. 
 
Figure 4.3 Catalogue Disclosures - Jet2Holidays 
 
To evaluate the likelihood of a catalogue disclosure, specific point estimates can be 
attained from a linear probability model (LPM) of the same form adopted for the 
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probability of a disclosure relative to a base category for the catalogue data. For the 
purposes of the LPM, the category of 3 and <3 are merged and subsequently omitted. 
Relative to these hotels, those ranked greater than or equal to 3.5 are not more likely 
to exhibit selective disclosure (all p’s >.17). As expected, no statistically significant 
differences are reported in the disclosure decisions between the rating for the 
catalogue data (χ2(4) =3.74, p=0.44). 
4.7 Non-Disclosure & Motivations 
Consistent with Mathios (2000), I observe a monotonic relationship between ratings 
and disclosure decisions. The primary domain of analysis is online TripAdvisor 
disclosures by hotels. The central finding is that the strict unravelling prediction fails 
to materialise. Approximately half of the regional dataset opts to disclose their 
TripAdvisor score while less than half of the international sample makes a voluntary 
disclosure. The lowest ranked hotels are more likely to withhold their rating both 
regionally and internationally. By analysing holiday catalogue disclosures, which 
provide an alternative sales medium and simpler choice environment, disclosure 
rates are significantly higher. In this different sales context, disclosure is carried out 
by a third party and nondisclosure is salient.  
Given that the proportion of hotels that offer a voluntary disclosure is highest for the 
best hotels, at both a regional and international level, it is natural to speculate why a 
fuller level of disclosure does not occur? Various explanations exist to explain the 
results. These are not mutually exclusive but are discussed independently here. 
Furthermore, I introduce the second supplemental dataset to consider the expectation 




4.7.1 Internal Certification  
Firstly, as Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 suggest, hoteliers may rely on an internal 
certification system conferred by the industry when TripAdvisor casts them in a light 
which is not consistent with their internal certification. While no qualitative (or even 
anecdotal) evidence exists to suggest an internal certification rating is solely relied 
upon for branding or promotion activities, this star rating could act as a reference 
point to determine whether a disclosure is made. While it is important to stress that 
both ratings systems do exist as different scales, and are not substitutional systems, it 
is not improbable that guests could conflate the scales. For instance, when a hotel is 
already conferred with a high star rating by the industry, a TripAdvisor disclosure 
may not influence a hotels profitability or reputation. Understanding whether internal 
certification acts as a reference point for disclosure should be a future line of 
enquiry. 
 
4.7.2 The Countersignalling Hypothesis 
Although I find resilient evidence of non-disclosure trends in the hospitality 
industry, this is a market where an elite hotelier could equally choose to rely on 
reputation rather than on third party rating systems. 15% of hotels awarded the rare 
‘excellent’ TripAdvisor rating in the UK and Ireland choose not to disclose their 
score. This non-disclosure rate increases to 36% internationally. This type of 
signalling behaviour by elite hotels could be consistent with a countersignalling 
hypothesis and is indicative of the complexity of the signalling process. One is left 
speculating why disclosure rates are not higher for the best hotels and for hotels 
significantly outperforming their star rating. It is not implausible to suggest that 
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unexploited gains from trade exist. For instance, only 55% of 3-star hotels 
internationally reveal the second best TripAdvisor score of 4.5.   
 
To consider if countersignalling is a plausible interpretation for non-disclosure I 
consider data for hotels that are not only elite but also global leaders. I collect data 
on 157 Trip Advisor disclosures for hotels certified as five stars and also included in 
the 2017 Forbes Travel Guide– Star Award Winners. These hotels are located across 
twenty-one countries globally and none of these hotels are rated lower than 4.5 on 
TripAdvisor. A disclosure rate of 48% is observed for this sample. The Forbes 
Travel Guide contains 47 hotels with a five-star certification and the maximum 
TripAdvisor rating. While no difference exists between the Forbes data and hotels in 
the international sample that fulfil the same criteria (χ² =1.15, p=0.28), the disclosure 
rate varies from that of the elite regional hotels (χ²=9.72, p=0.00). Elite regional 
hotels signal more often. Interpreted through the lens of countersignalling, this result 
could be considered as partial evidence in support of the view that outstanding 
international hotels take exceptional reviews as a given, and either do not feel the 
need to disclose them or indeed believe it might be demeaning to do so.   
 
4.7.3 Heterogeneous Preferences & Market Segmentation 
A full unravelling result may not be observed if consumers retain heterogeneous 
preferences for quality or hold tightly constrained budgets. While I argue that 
preferences for hotels should be relatively well-behaved in comparison to other 
experience goods, there is room for debate on this point. Where multiple product 
attributes exist a full-disclosure equilibrium may fail to materialise (Hotz & Xiao, 
2013). Although the markets for low and high quality are clearly differentiated, 
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consumers holding a preference for low quality hotels may not care for, or be 
influenced by, the provision of quality information.   
 
The supply side interpretation of this explanation reasons that greater levels of 
disclosure may not emerge if smaller markets are nested within a wider market. If 
the hotel market is deeply segmented in these locations, implying that hotels only 
compete against a range of similarly rated hotels, a seller may choose non-disclosure, 
assuming that consumers are selecting a hotel from an understood and narrower 
quality range offered by few competitors. Likewise, if higher quality hotels 
understand that consumers are restricted by their budgets, despite their preference for 
greater quality, disclosure may not make a difference to their hotel choice; the price 
of the product may still be beyond the budgets of a section of the market, irrespective 
of a quality signal. If this is the case, disclosure may only serve to intensify 
competition with close rivals.  
 
4.7.4 Strategic Non-Disclosure  
Strategic non-disclosure is a plausible explanation to explain the failure of the strict 
theoretical prediction. Although nondisclosure should be equally revealing to 
consumers, hoteliers may choose to hide a TripAdvisor rating for darker motives. 
Specifically, TripAdvisor ratings may not be disclosed if hotels believe consumers 
cannot interpret non-disclosure in the worst possible light. Recent experimental 
evidence suggests that individuals suffer from this problem and that the optimal 
policy for service providers with average ratings can be to conceal it (Sah & Read, 
2017b). If interpreted in this manner, the findings are consistent with models of 
limited strategic thinking. Following the reasoning of Brown et al (2012), if hotels 
anticipate that consumers hold the most limited ability to make strategic inferences 
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(level-0), they, as more strategically sophisticated agents (level-1), choose not to 
reveal TripAdvisor ratings.   
 
This explanation is strengthened by significantly higher levels of disclosure in an 
alternative sales setting. In a context where non-disclosure is salient, holiday 
catalogues, the rate of TripAdvisor admissions significantly increases, even for 
relatively lower ranked hotels. The supplementary data on catalogue disclosures 
from intermediary agents indicates that the context of the consumption decision is 
important to whether a disclosure occurs. The high level of disclosure in these 
settings indicates that the potential for hotels to strategically veil their rating 
increases when choices move away from set formats.  
 
4.7.5 Disclosure Expectations 
A clear result is that disclosure is higher in the regional sample. This raises new 
questions. In particular, is the expectation of a TripAdvisor disclosure less likely 
across cultures? A behavioural explanation for non-disclosure, outside of those 
discussed, is that a TripAdvisor rating is not a recognised or expected signal in 
international markets, or that the platform has only partially diffused internationally. 
An assumption of the unravelling equilibrium is that there must be common 
knowledge between buyers and sellers; both parties must understand the signal and 
the environment in which they transact. If this assumption is undermined by cultural 
or market norms in a given location, disclosure may not occur. Although few spatial 




To consider whether the expectation of a disclosure influences the patterns observed, 
I introduce a second supplementary dataset and consider the relationship between 
disclosure and quality in a market context where the common knowledge assumption 
is tenuous. To do this I consider voluntary quality admissions for 489 non-bank 
financial services firms (NBFS) who receive online appraisals from the Danish 
review firm, Trustpilot. This is a relatively well-defined market on the Trustpilot 
platform and is a market that has been subject to much scrutiny. This platform is 
selected as, like TripAdvisor, the quality scale relies upon eWOM. Comparable to 
hotels adopting the TripAdvisor platform, the NBFS industry has embraced this 
lesser-known certification platform as a third-party signalling mechanism. The 
expectation of a disclosure is scarcely anticipated by consumers however38. This 
allows one to ask if the frequency of disclosure, as a function of quality ratings, is 
altered by consumer expectations.  
Firms are rated on an ordinal quality scale, from low (0) to high (10) on Trustpilot. A 
comparable procedure and analysis is adopted for this dataset.  For an admission to 
occur, the following disclosure definition is adopted and a firm must fulfil at least 
one of the two criteria; (i) the firm explicitly publishes their Trustpilot rating on their 
website homepage or (ii) the firm refers to their Trustpilot performance, without 
explicitly stating a star rating or score. Data are accessed on 504 NBFS firms from 
the Trustpilot platform (343 UK/Ireland and 161 USA). Only firms with at least 100 
individual consumer reviews are included in the analysis. Verifications took place 
                                                          
38 The differences in the diffusion of these signals is corroborated by comparing the ‘interest over 
time’ of both signals via Google Trends; TripAdvisor has an interest over time score of 75, in 
comparison to a considerably lower score of 2 for TrustPilot. These scores represent search interest on 
Google relative to the highest point in December 2017. A value of 100 is the peak popularity for a 
term. A value of 50 means that the term is half as popular. Likewise, a score of 0 means the term was 
less than 1% as popular as the peak. 
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for 489 firms. At the time of verification, 15 NBFS websites were either non-
operational or the firm had ceased to trade. These data were collected over three 
weeks in April 2017. While the primary product offered by these firms differs, and 
many overlapping products are on offer, seven specific categories are identifiable. 
These allows one to classify the primary function of the NBFS firm. These are; 
pension and investment (57), insurance (138), short term personal and business loans 
(124), debt services and tax advisory (48), currency and exchange (75) and 
informational based organisations such as price comparison firms and credit score or 
switching services (47).  
Accordingly, the firms are classified according to the following intervals: 10-9.6 
(114), 9.5-9.1 (164), 9-8.6 (91), 8.5-8.1 (39), 8-7 (38) and ≤7 (43). These review 
measures are derived from 814,633 individual consumer appraisals. On average, 
each firm had 1,666 reviews, with a median review of 452 reviews (min 100, max 
40,087). The UK/Irish firms have a higher average number of reviews, 1,986 (min 
100, max 40,087). This is greater than US firms that have an average number of 940 
reviews (min 100, max 8,893).  The total rate of disclosure across both the 
UK/Ireland and the USA is 63%. This is weighted toward higher ranked firms in 








Figure 4.4 Observed Rating Disclosures by Trustpilot Category 
 
Similar to TripAdvisor disclosures, the full unravelling result does not emerge for 
the combined sample or for either market individually. The rates of disclosure for the 
UK/Irish sample is: 88% (10-9.6), 80% (9.5-9.1), 61% (9-8.6) 57% (8.5-8.1), 27% 
(8-7) and 0% (≤7). For the U.S the rates of disclosure are:  72% (10-9.6), 55% (9.5-
9.1), 56% (9-8.6), 55% (8.5-8.1), and 38% (≤8). A monotonically decreasing 
disclosure relationship is observed for the complete sample. Once a firm is conferred 
a review score of less than or equal to 8, the rate of disclosure reduces substantially. 
Whilst it is expected that at least one category stochastically dominates another in 
Figure 4.4 (χ2(5) =83.80, p=0.00), chi-square tests are conducted between adjacent 
categories to investigate the disclosure differences between categories. This allows 
for the identification of any threshold effects. A chi-square test reports statistically 
significant differences across the disclosure proportions of the first and second 
categories (χ2=10.53, p=0.01), second and third (χ2=3.81, p=0.05), fourth and fifth 
(χ2=3.82, p=0.05) and fifth and sixth (χ2=8.83, p=0.00). No statistical differences 
are reported between those ranked in the third and fourth category (χ2=1.08, 











between those rated 10-9.6 and 9.5-9.1 and also for those rated 9.5-9.1 and 9-8.6. No 
middle ranked threshold effects are observed. Equally, two lower rank thresholds are 
observed between those ranked from 8.5-8.1 and 8-7 and finally for those ranked 8-7 
to under 7.  
A probit model similar to the specification previously identified is estimated to 
produce specific probabilistic estimates regarding the likelihood of a disclosure. An 
addition to the model is that it introduces a vector of controls relating to the primary 
product of the firm. All of the reported estimates are for the marginal effects of the 
probit model; this allows one to understand the practical implications of the 
estimates.  
Relative to the worst ranked firms (omitted category), firms ranked in the highest 
category 10-9.6, are 88% more likely to provide a Trustpilot admission (RSE = .089, 
p= 0.00. z =9.80). The monotonic relationship observable in Figure 4.4 is recognised 
in the point estimates; the second category is 70% more likely to provide a Trustpilot 
admission (RSE = .091, p= 0.00. z =7.68) The third and fourth are 59% (RSE = .098, 
p= 0.00. z =6.06) and 55% (RSE = .109, p= 0.00. z =5.05) more likely to offer a 
disclosure respectively. Relative to the lowest category those ranked 8-7, in the 
second lowest class interval are 37% more likely to make a disclosure a 5% level of 
statistical significance (RSE = .115, p= 0.02. z =3.17).  No statistically significant 
results are reported for firms with alternative primary products; disclosure is not 
influenced by a firm’s specialisation (i.e. pay-day loans, insurance or debt services). 
While a similar disclosure pattern is observed across both markets, with the elite 
rated firms having the highest level of disclosure (88% UK/Ireland; 72% US), 
statistical differences are reported at a 10% level of significance between the two the 
markets. Albeit a relative minor coefficient size, firms in the UK are 11% more 
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likely to make a disclosure when compared to US based operations (RSE = .040, p= 
0.08. z =5.05).  
Trustpilot rating disclosures for NBFS shows that even when providers do not have a 
reason to disclose, as the signal is less expected, a similar disclosure relationship 
arises. Elite providers offer a disclosure while relatively inferior ones opt for non-
disclosure. I interpret this as evidence that the common knowledge assumption 
relating to consumer expectations (or the structure of the environment faced by 
consumers) is inconsequential to the disclosure patterns.   
4.8 Conclusion  
This essay builds on previous empirical assessments of strategic disclosure by testing 
the unravelling principle in a new domain. Constructing a sizeable dataset from a 
third party rating system – TripAdvisor, I study the disclosure decisions and the 
unravelling principle for 4,357 hotels. Two smaller supplementary datasets allow the 
consideration of peripheral questions that emerge from the results. The primary 
finding is that the strict equilibrium prediction of the unravelling principle - full 
information revelation - is incomplete. Despite the fact that a disclosure process is 
set in place, with 85% of the hotels regionally and 64% of hotels internationally, 
ranked as ‘5-excellent’ voluntarily disclosing their TripAdvisor performance, a 
substantial degree of disclosure (49% and 59% respectively) fails to transpire. A 
linear relationship is observed for both regional and international datasets, a trend 
that matches the directional predictions of the unravelling principle only. The lowest 
ranked hotels display a tendency to hide their TripAdvisor rating. An explicit 
emphasis is placed on three locations given the size of the market (London) and the 
aggregate results reported (Paris and Rome). An analysis of the interaction between 
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two scales which could be conflated, TripAdvisor scores and star ratings, suggests 
that hotels believe their certification will be weakened if a low TripAdvisor score is 
revealed. 
Two additional datasets provide further insights to the topic. Firstly, when the same 
signal is considered in a less complex choice environment, where alternative options 
can be compared and the salience of nondisclosure is increased, I show a result that 
approximates full information revelation. In this catalogue context, no statistical 
differences exist across the disclosure decisions of hotels/apartments that hold 
alternative TripAdvisor ratings. While past research has shown that the context and 
comparability of a choice influences consumer decision making (i.e. Hsee, 1998), 
this result reinforces the importance of context from the seller’s side of the bargain. 
What information is disclosed by sellers is regulated by the sales medium.   
A second additional dataset allows the consideration a theoretical point relating to 
the expectation of a disclosure across markets.  I identify a similar disclosure pattern 
for a market with an analogous but unanticipated signalling mechanism. This is a 
signal which is arguably not expected to be seen by consumers. Despite the absence 
of these consumer expectations, which would suggest that firms are not required to 
make a disclosure, a majority still do. I take this as evidence that, despite the fact that 
consumers may not expect a disclosure, similar disclosure patterns arise regardless of 
what the consumer anticipates.  
Irrespective of the behavioural motivations underlying non-disclosure, failing to 
provide consumers with informative additional information can have practical first-
order and second-order implications for the industry. Given the limited amount of 
poorly rated hotels that disclose a score, the results presented here may have 
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implications for practitioners seeking to improve the experience of tourists. While 
the information on TripAdvisor is publically available, and hence there is no grave 
concerns mandating any form of intervention, whether consumers can infer the 
implications of non-disclosure by hoteliers when placing a reservation online is 
questionable. Past research has highlighted the presence and salience of quality 
ratings disclosures as a significant contributor in decision making (Luca & Smith, 
2013).  Of all of the assumptions underpinning the unravelling principle, the rational 
expectations conjecture may be the most onerous. A significant literature in 
behavioural decision research has identified that individuals face psychological 
barriers when required to interpret missing information rationally. Failing to 
recognise this logic can be a source of naïve judgement, a behaviour which is 
perhaps best summarised by the acronym WYSIATI - supposing that “what you see is 
all there is” (Kahneman, 2011 P.85). Urging consumer caution in online markets 
and emphasising the importance of seeking out additional information is a clear 
recommendation emerging from the findings.  
 
A second-order implication of the high level of non-disclosure relates to 
organisational ethics and practices adopted by the industry. Conditional on hoteliers 
realising that consumers struggle to process missing information effectively, and in 
the face of strong competition, a schism can emerge between professed and revealed 
preferences of hoteliers. Although hoteliers claim that their interests are 
synchronised with those of consumers, individually they may face a financial 
incentive to strategically hide information. Ensuring a fair digital market with 
reference to a competitive practices and online review systems is already a priority 
for British Hospitality Association (BHA, 2016a, BHA, 2016b). As is understood, 
such recommendations are yet to extend to disclosure.   
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Finally, the comparison of signals based on alternative eWOM platforms has deeper 
theoretical implications for information unravelling. The results indicate that a 
consumer’s knowledge of the transaction environment and one’s anticipation of a 
signal is independent of, perhaps, a ‘universal’ monotonic disclosure relationship, 
wherever a quality range exists. This posits theoretical questions for economists who 
evaluate the strength of signals in markets – whether anticipated or not, it is unlikely 
that unflattering information will be disclosed unless non-disclosure is highly salient.  
 
It is important to note the limitations of this study and additional directions for future 
research. Firstly, this study is possible due to publically available information; while 
the information environment studied can be thought of as being as unbalanced, this 
asymmetry is impure and any imperfections to the information structure can be 
remedied by a savvy consumer. Hence, whilst significant datasets can be assembled 
to explore this topic, the strength of the test is limited. Secondly, I do not have access 
to data which could offer valuable insights. While on the surface there does not 
appear to be any missing information on common disclosure costs faced by hoteliers, 
I do not have information on certain demand and supply side factors. In particular, 
qualitative data concerning the hotel reviewers or detailed information relating to a 
hotelier’s disclosure motivations. These can limit the inferences one can make 
regarding the underlying behavioural motivations for non-disclosure. Thirdly, richer 
review data may be available to future work. The one dimensional TripAdvisor 
measure may hold a non-linear component or could be subject to reference 
dependent preferences. Weighted versions of this index could offer an increasingly 




5. CONCLUSION   
The purpose of this thesis is to import insights from psychology to study economic 
scenarios where adverse selection can arise. The essays focus on decision-making in 
bilateral trades, auction environments and consumer settings. Over the course of this 
thesis, I offer insights on the general theme of negotiator cognition, across multiple 
markets, through utilising alternative methods. The contributions have an application 
to general topics and also to niche industries. 
The findings are reached by (i) conducting experimental tests of previously 
unexplored questions and (ii) undertaking field studies in new domains through the 
construction of novel datasets. Throughout the thesis I argue why researching at the 
intersection of microeconomic theory, insofar as it concerns information, and 
psychology is important. These motivations are general, as discussed in the 
introduction, but are also specific to developing literatures. Making a contribution to 
developing literatures is a key goal of this thesis; Essay Three is at the forefront of 
investigating the (behavioural) economics of disclosure.  
The first objective of this conclusion is to summarise the major findings of the three 
essays. This is carried out in section 5.1. Secondly, section 5.2 reflects upon the 
results in light of the research agenda and discusses the directions for future research. 
Whereas specific conclusions are reached in each individual essay, this part of the 
thesis serves to interpret the findings from a general perspective in light of the 
introductory objectives. Thirdly, section 5.3 addresses the limitations of the essays 
and reflects on the barriers faced when conducting the research over the last five 
years. This is important as it offers a degree of reflection in light of an extensive 
research process. The thesis is then concluded.  
173 
 
5.1 Summary of the Major Findings  
 
This section offers a summary of the main points of the thesis in light of the features 
of specific literatures. The primary findings from the three essays within this thesis 
are abridged in the points below. 
Essay One - Thirty Years of Acquiring Companies: A Review of the Winner’s 
Curse in Bilateral Bargaining 
 
 The general topic of naïve bidding strategies has become of increasing 
interest to researchers since the 1980’s and swelled between 2002 and 2009.  
Initially, industrial analysis and the sale of oil leases attracted the attention of 
researchers interested in the winner’s curse. The works of William 
Samuelson and Max Bazerman in 1985 served to extend the domain of 
analysis from common value auctions to bilateral bargains.   
 
 Over a thirty-year period, the AAC game has provided a crisp method to test 
whether individuals can foresee the perils of selective acceptance. Since the 
seminal application of the AAC game in 1985, fifteen further experimental 
studies have incorporated extensions or adjustments to the basic model. 
Experimental tests of the problem suggest that the percentage of bidders that 
submit an optimal bid ranges from 0% to 15% of a sample. The majority of 
participants suffer from the winner’s curse. The model has been subject to 
increasing complexity to test new hypotheses in a laboratory setting, a 
process which has produced fruitful insights relating to participants’ minimal 
ability to learn and the capacity of irrelevant messages to alter the efficiency 
of trade. While training participants and group participation can diminish (but 
not extinguish) naïve bidding strategies, the winner’s curse in this setting is 
largely robust to strong learning techniques The key insights of this model 
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have practical implications, being applied to managerial decision making 
and, most recently, ethical decision making. 
 
 Whereas initial research on the AAC problem could be classified as asocial, 
research trends have investigated strategic nuances of bargaining by 
incorporating communication into the AAC game. By adopting a between 
subject design and introducing alternative types of costless pre-play 
communication, I find that for the first ‘strict’ criterion of the AAC game, a 
negligible number of participants (4.27%), follow a normative bidding 
strategy. This is compatible with past studies. For the second criterion, I find 
no statistically significant differences emerge between alternative cheap talk 
treatments and bidding behaviour.  
 
  Switching to the seller’s side of the bargain and introducing a preliminary 
step to the AAC game, I find that seller’s ability to strategically avoid 
information is limited. This is the first test of irrational behaviour using the 
AAC game that questioned whether bounded awareness can flow from the 
opposite direction of the trade. Whereas buyers failed to focus on the 
decision rules of informed sellers in the AAC game, sellers also mostly fail to 
foresee the perils of additional information, exhibiting a difficulty in 
performing contingent reasoning on future events. 78% of the sample 
followed a naïve strategy and choose to ‘curse themselves’, learning the 
value of their asset and thereby entering an asymmetric information 





Essay Two - Winner Alright? High-Stakes Bidding and Returns to Ownership 
in the UK and Irish Thoroughbred Horseracing Industry 
 
 
 Studying bidding behaviour in a naturally occurring auction context, I find 
evidence that is compatible with the winner’s curse hypothesis. Ex-post, a 
high percentage of foals (80%) sold to winning bidders in Irish and English 
public auctions earn net negative returns. On average, thoroughbreds return a 
loss of €23,709.  Similar losses are recorded across thoroughbred genders.  
Estimates of a quantile regression model report a statistically significant 
negative relationship between increases in winning bids and net returns 
throughout a sample of 1,681 foals. Point estimates from a Huber regression 
suggest comparable results across the entire distribution.  
 
 Incompatible incentives between owners and trainers and diversification 
strategies do not mitigate the inefficiencies observed. No notable differences 
are recorded in returns to thoroughbreds owned and trained by the same 
parties vis-à-vis those owned and trained by alternative parties. This suggests 
that moral hazard problems may not be a plausible argument when explaining 
these losses. Secondly, only two of eighteen owners that purchased more than 
five horses across the four auctions report positive returns. This finding 
suggests that diversification strategies do not mitigate net negative returns.   
 
 Whilst a pure disregard for profit maximisation may appear a plausible 
psychological explanation, overbidding is an ever-present phenomenon in 
this industry. The findings are compatible with the winner’s curse 
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hypothesis. Alternative interpretations relating to utility maximization also 
offer reasonable explanations for the observed pattern.  
 
Essay 3 - Unravelling & Strategic Disclosure: Evidence from the Hospitality 
Industry 
 
 The unravelling principle is tested in the hospitality industry by constructing 
two unique datasets. I verify disclosure decisions for 4,357 hotels across 22 
locations globally. The signalling mechanism is created from 4,060,830 
TripAdvisor reviews. The key finding is the existence of a downward linear 
relationship between TripAdvisor scores and voluntary disclosures both 
regionally and internationally. The strict equilibrium prediction of full 
information revelation is not observed. An unravelling process is initiated 
through the disclosure of high-quality signals but a substantial degree of low 
level disclosure fails to transpire. A partial unravelling result is reported, a 
finding which is consistent with past work in behavioural science.  
 
 Evaluating interactions between TripAdvisor ratings and star ratings reveals 
that industry standards may offer hoteliers a reference point from which to 
make a disclosure decision. Two additional datasets facilitate (i) the 
consideration of the choice environment and (ii) control for the expectations 
of a disclosure. The first is from holiday catalogues and shows that disclosure 
increases considerably in a menu style decision-making context when non-
disclosure is noticeable. The second dataset, from an emerging third-party 
signalling mechanism (also based on eWOM), reveals a similar disclosure 
pattern occurs in a domain where a disclosure may not be expected. The 
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results have practical implications for practitioners in the hospitality industry, 
especially those attempting to improve consumer experiences and parties 
concerned with the ethics of the industry.  
 
5.2 Directions for Future Research 
 
This section considers possible directions for future research in the light of the three 
essays. These directions are partitioned according to the primary topic and method of 
study.   
 
The Winner’s Curse in Bilateral Bargaining  
Research on the AAC game, while well-developed, has room for future progress. 
The most recent tests of the game have sought to identify grainier characteristics of 
bidder dispositions such as an individual’s communication strategy. Given that 
communication is an essential feature of bargaining, further studies focussing on 
communication effects may provide a more nuanced view of how efficient trades are 
reached and how buyers respond to alterative and more complex types of 
communications signals. 
 
Experimenting further with the seller’s side of the bargain may provide further 
fruitful insights to the psychological mechanisms important to asymmetric 
information trades. Experiment II in Essay One represents a first attempt to ask 
whether sellers foresee the interdependences of a negotiation if given the choice over 
access to information. Strategically avoiding information is a cognitively challenging 
task. Developing this line of enquiry could serve to alter the focus of the problem to 




A bolder line of enquiry involves searching for the boundary conditions of the 
winner’s curse in bilateral bargaining and testing the puzzle’s sensitivity to 
contextual changes. One notable observation is that the experimental instructions 
adopted by researchers assume a default instruction context of ‘acquiring a 
company’. The vast majority of previous research articles have adopted this identical 
narrative structure and context to the problem. Since the original formation of the 
problem, the instructions read by participants establishes a scenario where the buyer 
is “currently considering acquiring” an asset of unknown value. These are three 
important words. This may act as a subtle cue (embedded in the narrative) that elicits 
an experimenter demand effect. Specifically, this context establishes a frame of 
buyer engagement for participants and a momentum toward making a positive bid. 
Would optimal bidding behaviour emerge if the seller initiated a trade? Further 
research may concentrate on altering default options and incrementally raising the 
salience of the adverse selection problem to underline the perils of selective 
acceptance. Will heightening a buyer’s awareness of the problem reduce the 
incidence of the winner’s curse? Would developing an intuitive scenario, to guide 
participants through the mathematical structure, increase the frequency of optimal 
bids? These are questions that future research may wish to address.  
 
Auction Environments & Adverse Selection 
Although the switch to studying the winner’s curse experimentally is associated with 
confounding field evidence, it will be interesting to question whether the 
methodological pendulum will swing back. Researchers may place a greater 
emphasis on field studies in light of the increasing availability of fitting natural 
conditions and datasets available through online resources to test for the curse. As 
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Essay Two identifies, the proliferation of data in online markets is allowing 
researchers to establish increasingly superior measures and more fitting 
environments to test for overbidding. Naturally, the challenge with these studies is 
that alternative domains have industry-specific motivations at play. Although 
arguments concerning informal industry mechanisms have been at the heart of the 
winner’s curse (in the auction format) since the original conceptualisation of the 
idea, it is important for future work to understand industry specific mechanisms to a 
greater degree and to identify similarities and differences across markets with 
different institutions. A completely clean test of the winner’s curse following a real-
life auction remains elusive.  
 
The Unravelling Principle & Adverse Selection 
A motivation for this thesis is to develop the literature which considers the 
economics of disclosure. With a growing number of ranking systems, online review 
systems and the expansion of internet capabilities, it is likely that disclosure 
decisions underpinning this principle will become increasingly studied in consumer 
markets. In turn, this may provide stronger tests of the unravelling principle, which 
include a time dimension. Given the glut of information relating to consumer 
products online, analysing marketing strategies in relation to what information firms 
disclose/do not disclose could be a fruitful area for future research. In Essay Three, I 
offer conjectures as to why firms may not disclose. Qualitatively detailing the 
motivations of those that do not report quality information, across industries, is an 




Furthermore, empirical findings on the failure of unravelling may feedback into the 
(re)formulation of economic theory. For instance, a key theoretical component of the 
unravelling principle suggests that whether or not the worst off seller in a market 
discloses or not does not matter. Rational consumers will make appropriate 
inferences from non-disclosure once they understand the market environment. 
Theoretical refinement may be required here.  
 
A growing number of studies, including Essay Three of this thesis, show that non-
disclosure, or shrouding of information, is the most likely tactic of the lowest quality 
seller in a market place. The lowest quality seller does not appear indifferent to 
disclosure. This empirical observation should be of interest to theoreticians. Later 
work, while not only empirically testing the unravelling principle in new markets, 
may focus on refining the principle to incorporate the fact that it is more likely that 
the lowest quality sellers will have a preference for a non-disclosure strategy. 
 
Research on unravelling may also spur future policy-related papers concerning 
consumer welfare. If a partial unravelling result is a robust market equilibrium (i.e. is 
present across markets a variety of markets), such findings may inform policy 
disputes over information and encourage those seeking greater levels of required 










It is important to be cognisant of the limitations of different aspects of this thesis. 
These limitations are most often methodological in nature and are partitioned 
according to the method of study adopted below, beginning with experimental 
limitations.  
 
Clearly, the experiments do not employ financial incentives within the design. While 
incentives are important, the use of monetary incentives is complex and is subject to 
debate and disciplinary norms (Read, 2005). The costly nature of using incentives 
within the experimental design is an impediment to their adoption. The prudent use 
of budgets prevents the use of monetary incentives within the design. Despite this 
limitation, a considerable amount of past evidence shows that the frequency of the 
winner’s curse in bilateral bargaining does not differ significantly when financial 
incentives are employed within the experimental design.   
 
A second limitation of the experimental method adopted is that games played by 
participants are one-off.  It is important to note this as repetition in experimental 
trials is a common method adopted in experimental economics. Finally, the sample 
sizes gathered in the experimental settings limit the power of inference one can make 
regarding the results. While budgetary concerns dictate the sample size for the 
experiments conducted, one could produce increasingly powerful studies by 
recruiting higher numbers of participants.  
 
Although the experimental method provides an opportunity to tightly measure 
specific variables, one loses this control when field studies are pursued.  For all of 
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the advantages of the sizable datasets constructed for Essay Two and Essay Three, 
several unobservable variables exist which cannot be controlled. Thus, one must be 
careful when making inferences. While every care is taken to find fitting target 
environments to explore adverse selection and bounded awareness, it is important to 
state that neither of the chosen environments are flawless. Naturally, they suffer from 
drawbacks. For instance, full measurement of returns to thoroughbreds (i.e. the 
residual stud value) is not possible. Equally, the tests of unravelling in Essay Three 
are reliant on publically available information. While this makes the study possible, 
it diminishes the strength of the test. The field environments examined are generally 
appropriate but they do not offer a panacea to solving all empirical questions. 
 
5.4 Conclusion  
 
 
In this conclusion I have reviewed and summarised how this thesis advances 
knowledge by offering insights to strategic decision making, in settings characterised 
by alternative information conditions, where adverse selection problems can arise. 
Specifically, this conclusion focusses on reiterating the major empirical findings, 
evaluating general directions for future research and identifying limitations. 
 
An important component of the empirical insights is the consideration of 
psychological factors central to adverse selection problems. Whilst for the most part 
the key contributions of this thesis are empirical, minor methodological contributions 
are also made. This approach is intended to progress and deepen the connection 
between psychological approaches in economics and their application to markets 
characterised by information imperfections.  Studying bounded awareness in an 
economic context is important. Much work is left to be done. With time, it is hoped 
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that this phenomenon can be considered across a broader range of markets and 
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Appendix I – Essay One 
The Acquiring a Company Game (Standard Instructions) 
In the following exercise, you will represent company A (the acquirer) which 
is currently considering acquiring Company T (the target) by means of a tender 
offer. You plan to tender in cash for 100% of Company T’s shares but are unsure 
how high a price to offer. The main complication is this: the value of the company 
depends directly on the outcome of a major oil exploration project it is currently 
undertaking. 
 The very viability of Company T depends on the exploration outcome. In the 
worst case (if the exploration fails completely) the company under the current 
management will be worth nothing - - $0/share. In the best case (a complete 
success), the value under current management could be as high as $100/share. 
Given the range of exploration outcomes, all share values between $0 and $100 
per share are considered equally likely. By all estimates the company will be worth 
considerably more in the hands of Company A than under current management. 
In fact, whatever the value under current management, the company will be worth 
50% more under the management of company A than under company T. In the 
worst case, the company is worth $0/share under either management. If the 
exploration project generates a $50/share value under company T, the value under 
company A is $75/share. Similarly, a $100/share value under company T implies 
a $150/share value under company A, and so on.   
The board of directors of company A has asked you to determine the price they 
should offer for Company T’s shares. This offer must be made now, before the 
outcome of the drilling project is known. From all indications, company T would 
be happy to be acquired by company A, provided it is at a profitable price. You 
expect company T to delay a decision on your bid until the results of the project 
are in, then accept or reject your offer before releasing the news of the drilling 
results to the press.  
Thus, you (Company A) will not know the results of the exploration project 
when submitting your price offer, but company T will know the results when 
deciding whether or not to accept your offer. In addition, company T is expected 
to accept any offer by company A that is greater or equal to the (per share) value 
of the company under its own management.  
As the representative of Company A, you are deliberating over the price offers 
in the range of $0/share (this is tantamount to making no offer at all) to 
$150/share. What price offer per share would you tender for Company T’s stock?  





Experiment I Design & Instructions 
Introduction 
We would like to thank you for participating in this task. In the following screens you will make a 
hypothetical decision. You will also be asked basic survey questions. The task should take 
approximately 6 minutes to complete and we would ask you to take it seriously, complete it alone and 
in one session.  
 
Please enter your Prolific ID below. 
 
Stage 1 
You and another contestant called Alex have reached the final round of a game show. Both you and 
Alex’s objective is to win as much money as possible. In the final round you both negotiate over the 
sale of 10 locked boxes. Each box contains a gold coin or is empty. One of you must play as the buyer 
and the other as the seller. The game show host tosses a coin to randomly determine your role. 
*** 
You are the buyer. 
Stage 2 
The host brings 10 locked boxes to the stage. All the boxes could be empty; all could contain a gold 
coin, or anything in between. Every possible number of gold coins is equally likely. The host chose a 
random number between 0 - 10 at the start of the show and filled the boxes accordingly. Alex, as 
seller, is gifted the 10 locked boxes by the host.  
 
Gold coins are worth £1,000 to Alex and empty boxes are worthless to you both. In total Alex’s boxes 
could be worth anywhere from £0 (if all the boxes are empty) to £10,000 (if all the boxes have gold 
coins). If you successfully buy the boxes, the host will give you £1,500 for each gold coin. 
Stage 3 
On Alex’s request, the host unlocks the boxes. Alex looks inside each box and learns their value. 
 
 
The host adds one further twist. Before you make a bid for the boxes, Alex can send you one message 
about how many boxes are empty. Alex can specify any number, and the message need not be correct. 
198 
 
Stage 4  
Alex says the following number of boxes are empty (0/1/2/4/6) 
 
Alex is claiming the boxes are worth (£10,000/£9,000/£8,000/£6,000/£4,000) to him 
 
Stage 5 
You will now get an opportunity to make one bid. Your bid is for all of the boxes, you cannot buy 
individual boxes. If you fail to reach an agreement, Alex keeps the contents of the boxes. Please enter 
your bid. 
Please be aware that you are entitled not to submit a bid.  If you wish to refrain from entering the 
trade submit a bid of £0  
Stage 6 
Contents Revealed  
 
Survey 
Which one of the following statements was true? 
a. Gold coins were twice as valuable to me. 
b. Alex was required to act truthfully when sending me a message. 
c. The boxes were more likely to be empty than to have gold coins. 
d. Alex learned the true value of the boxes and then sent me a message. 
On the scale below, please respond to each of the following statements. 
 
 









Experiment II Design & Instructions 
Stage 1. 
You and another contestant called Alex have reached the final round of a game show. Both your group 
and Alex’s objective is to win as much money as possible. In the final round you both negotiate over 
the sale of 10 locked boxes. Each box contains a gold coin or is empty.  
 
You are the seller and the host gifts you ten locked boxes. 
 
All the boxes could be empty; all could contain a gold coin, or anything in between. Every possible 
number of gold coins is equally likely. The host chose a random number between 0 - 10 at the start of 
the show and filled the boxes accordingly.  
 
Gold coins are worth €1,000 to Alex and empty boxes are worthless to you both. In total Alex’s boxes 
could be worth anywhere from €0 (if all the boxes are empty) to €10,000 (if all the boxes have gold 
coins). If you successfully buy the boxes, the host will give you €1,500 for each gold coin. 
Stage 2. 
Before Alex makes a bid you have an option to look inside your boxes. Even if you learn the true value 
of your boxes, Alex will still not know what is in them. Your decision however (whether or not to look 
inside the boxes) will be known by Alex. 
Yes – I would like to look inside the boxes  
No – I would not like to look inside the boxes 
 




If yes - The host adds a further twist. Before Alex makes a bid, you can send one message. Your 
message to Alex will be about how many boxes are empty. You can specify any number you want 
between 0 and 10. Alex is aware that you are under no obligation to tell the truth. After this message 
Alex will make one bid. 
Please enter a number between 0 to 10 as your message to Alex: 
[Regardless of the message] Alex has made a bid of £0 for your boxes. Do you wish to accept or 









If no – Alex has made a bid of £5,000 for your boxes. Do you wish to accept or reject this bid? 
 
Survey 
Which one of the following statements was true? 
a. Gold coins were twice as valuable to me. 
b. Individual boxes could contain more than one gold coin. 
c. The boxes were more likely to be empty than to have gold coins. 
d. Alex knew whether or not I looked inside the boxes. 
[If Yes] Think back to before Alex made their bid and respond to the following statement. 
I believed that the message I sent Alex would influence their bid 
 
[If Yes] you had any particular reason for sending these messages to Alex, please provide it here. 










Appendix II – Essay Three 
 


















(iii) A specific claim to TripAdvisor reviews and performance on the website are made via 






(iv) Disclosure (left) and non-disclosure (right) in the context of holiday catalogues 
 
